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ABSTRACT 
Women, the designer of civilization, the pivot of family, the protector 
of home, the spirit, strength and soul of man, shaped the destiny of human 
race. Many times, she has proved that she is not frail, fragile and delicate. 
Though physically she is weak yet spiritually she is strong. It is she who 
raised Prophets and Pharorah but unfortunately this segment of society is 
never treated as human being in the world of males, sometime she is 
considered as 'Devi' and worshiped by male as Lakshmi Durga and Kali, 
sometime treated as Vasi'. From the dawn of civilization, she is the victim 
of vast discrimination and male chauvinism. 
With the heralding of the new millenium, the problem of woman's 
dignity and gender inequality stands as one of the most important global 
challenge. The existence and perpetuation of gender injustice is a blot and 
slur on modern welfare state. It is a curse upon society, a disgrace for the 
entire human race, a malady that may wreck the back bone of man kind. 
The future of the human world very much depends upon the development 
of the fair sex. The fate of a nation inextricably interweaved with the 
welfare of its women folk who constitute half of the world's population. 
The recent trend, in the global system, is to evaluate the 
development of any country, not in terms of their military or economic 
strength or splendour of their capital cities and public buildings but also in 
terms of human development or the well being of its people. Against this 
backdrop the persistence of gender discrimination has been one of the 
main limiting factor in the way of iiuman development in all, particularly in 
the third world countries. The issue of the woman's property right is a 
major human right issue and at the same time it is highly emotive one. 
According to one report of United Nations Organization, women 
contribute 2/3 of total working hours, still they earn only 1/10 of world's 
income and posses only 1% of immovable property in their name. In view 
of the magnitude of the problem,an International programme for the 
elimination of gender inequality was launched all over the world. 
The movement, from the First United Nations World Conference on 
women held in Mexico in 1975, to the Fourth World Conference on women 
held in Beijing in 1995, has travelled to eliminate gender discrimination and 
to accord the rightful place to women throughout the world. A glut of 
International Conventions and Declaration in support of women's property 
rights have been passed and specialized agencies are busy in promoting 
equality of rights of men and women. 
Despite an array of woman welfare legislationsand judicial verdicts 
the problem of practical implementation of these statutes and women's 
emancipation is still a distant dream and spinning its wheels. They are 
deprived of getting shares in the property. In fact the practical significance 
of these enactments are meaningless. The concept of non giving the family 
property to females, as it will go in the hand of another family, is so deeply 
rooted in society that it is hard nut to crack even to imagine that women will 
get their due share peacefully and honestly. In the aforesaid harsh facts 
the significance of the problem has assumed a great importance. 
The law of inheritance is an important subject to be considered not 
only because that it ensures the future security of woman both married and 
spinster but also because it may lead to social tragedies in accordance to 
system adopted. For the emancipation of women the economic 
independence is of a paramount importance. Though the gender inequality 
exists in every walk of life yet the most harmful one is in the field of 
property rights from the very beginning of the family system. Till the later 
half of the 18*^  century the females were not considered to be able to have 
any economic rights. They were wholly dependent upon the sweat will of 
their husband, father, brother and even on their own sons. On the other 
hand because of these financial security, men thought that they could 
subject them to abject humiliation. Property always plays an important role 
in the life of an individual, community and country. The practical 
significance of the property lies in the fact that it enables us at least the 
necessities and amenities of the routine life if not the means of comfort. 
Sometime to earn their bread they are bound to do some heinous acts, 
which dirt the whole society. The property rights will give succour to the 
sufferings and to fight the battle of their lives. 
The women's liberation movement picked up momentum in the 
beginning of the second half of the 20"^  century to raise the status of 
women and to give them their just rights. The social movement for women 
upliftment and women's awakening highlighted the pathetic conditions of 
this segment of society and pointed out that women folk have been living in 
distress and subject to exploitation under male domination. 
The property rights of women has passed through a long struggle 
and revolutionary changes. Perhaps Islam is the pioneer of introducing the 
females as heir and considered them to be able to hold the property in the 
Austinian sense, whereas the rest of the world did not consider woman as 
able to hold the property or have economic rights. They were considered 
as a ceremonial devices. Persons having superficial knowledge in the law 
of property (both testamentary and non testamentary) alleged time and 
again that the property rights available to Muslim women are discriminatory 
so far as the women of other religions are concerned. 
The above arduous facts prompted me to undertake the study on the 
topic titled as "Women's Property Rights Under Personal Laws in India : A 
Socio-Legal Study." The main aim for the present study is to evaluate 
critically the statutory and customary laws relating to women's property 
under different religio-legal system and to bring about certain controversial 
problems to surface. Another aspect of the study is whether the shares 
allotted to Muslim females, under the provision of Holy Quran in different 
capacities are justified,keeping in view the liabilities discharged by them in 
family. 
With the heralding of new millennium the problem of women's 
property right stands as one of the most pompous challenge before the 
world. When the woman is desolated, despaired, desperated and deserted 
the first question which comes in the mind of destitute female is as to what 
option left for her ? There are luminous literature available on the offences 
against women, the law relating to marriage, dowry, divorce and other 
matrimonial disputes but very little attention is given towards the property 
rights of woman. 
Gender inequality exists in different forms but the most harmful one 
is in the field of property rights. In ancient time the women were not having 
any property right in any part of the world except in Islam. With the 
passage of time the women's property rights were recognized by every 
legal system though discriminatory. But the most shameful thing is that 
instead of the plethora of International conventions which contains 
yardsticks of gender equality, the misogynic malignancy remained dormant 
because of the lack of the non enforcing agencies. 
It is a stigma on the independent India that the anti-woman customs 
and usages, which flourished in the British period, continued till today and 
even got the judicial recognition in many cases. Despite of the passing of 
various revolutionary enactments there is very little proof that a woman 
actually inherits. All the Acts remain the paper tiger with no teeth. The 
piecemeal legislation of 1956 is also better known for its blatant violation 
rather than its faithful compliance. Now another legislative showpiece of 
2005 has come into existence which apparently abolishes all the 
discrimination faced by Hindu female in the field of property rights. 
The only achievement in the field of woman's property right is that 
the females now upto some extent, are conscious about their rights. The 
most remarkable one is that the old concept of women's property prevailed 
in the form of matrimonial property or Stridhana or Women's limited estate 
are abolished and women have been conferred property rights in the 
Austinian sense as in Islam from the very beginning. 
The double share of male is considered as the most discriminatory 
provision of Islamic law of inheritance which discriminates only on the 
basis of sex. If one sees the Islam with a deep insight he will realize that it 
is the daughter who is ultimate beneficiary though apparently the 
discrimination is visible. Under Islam equality means a judicious treatment 
with the male and female keeping in view their social, biological and 
economical factors, which according to a noted physicologist Dr. Alexis, 
are imperative to take, the difference between the two sexes, into account 
in constructing the civilized world. Rights are the creatures of events. 
Before deciding whether a particular system or law is discriminatory or not 
it is obligatory to look at the whole system. 
The son of Abu Ahuja had doubted about the female's half share. 
Imam Jafar Sadiq cleared the air by saying that a female was exempted 
from the performance of many duties imposed by law upon a male such as 
service in the holy wars, maintenance and support of relations and 
payment of expiatory fines and dowers etc., that was the reason that her 
share of inheritance had been justly limited to half the portion of male. But 
at present it is really a matter of regret that because of the prevailing of the 
anti-women and anti Islamic customs and usages, sometimes the females 
are totally excluded from the inheritance. 
The long journey of the judicial decisions of the Apex court and 
different High Courts are evident of this discriminatory fact. In many cases 
the judicial protection to these discriminatory customs is really a blot and 
stain on the concept of the welfare state governed by the rule of law. 
These are discussed at full length in the present work and corrective 
measures have also been submitted at proper place. 
An attempt has also been made to domestify the law of inheritance 
by the comparative charts to ascertain the share of females in different 
capacities at a glance in different religo-legal systems. 
To establish a gender just society and to ensure the dignity of 
human being envisaged in the contemporary world some qualitative 
changes are necessary in the prevailing infrastructure of the society. A 
humble attempt is made by the researcher to give some suggestions to 
overcome the problems and to resolve the issue of gender discrimination 
particularly in the field of inheritance. These are as follows :-
• To establish an equilibrium between men and women as 
regards tn social, legal and traditional status in the existing 
society the participation of both sexes is equally important. It 
is a genetic reality that any attempt to accord women a low 
and artificial legal status will not stand at the test of justice 
and fair play. So some grass root steps should be taken to 
weed out the patriarchal biases. 
• The general legal literacy is a need of the time for the females 
of all communities especially the females of tribal and rural 
areas. In a literary backward country like India the people 
particularly women are not aware of their rights and duties. So 
far as the property rights are concerned the females are not 
conversant of their shares in inheritance. The drastic changes 
brought by the latest legislative steps of 2005 in the Act of 
1956, are not known by the Hindu females. To make aware of 
their rights brought about by the Amendment Act of 2005, a 
nationwide special programme to spread legal awareness, be 
run by the State machinery. Various women's Organizations, 
NGO's and law students should come forward to take initiative 
to educate the women particularly those belonging to weaker 
or submerged group living in slums and villages. 
• The legislative steps taken up recently, are appreciated and 
warmly welcomed by the women folk and the right thinking 
people of the society. But in this regard the women should act 
sensibly to reach their goal of attaining equality without 
disturbing the family bond and harmony. The transition of 
power should be smooth and without any heart burning. 
The feminist movement could be more effective and result 
oriented if men also came forward and join hands with them 
because the fight is not against the men but for human worth 
and dignity. To avoid chaos and family fortune to be wasted 
the family problems should be solved within the four walls of 
home. For this there be a change in the stereotype attitudes 
of men towards the women at family, at society, at state and 
at global level. The men folk must realize the necessity of 
property rights of women, which helped them in distress. They 
should themselves impart their due shares honestly to make 
the society a better place to live. It is very obvious towards 
achieving the goal by changing the conventional ideas of male 
domination. The need is to change the infrastructure of the 
society. 
The law does not exist in vacuum and mere promulgation of 
legislations cannot provide the proper solution of the social 
problem unless it is effectively enforced. It is, therefore, 
suggested that there should be a number of law enforcing 
agencies and family crisis wings within the family welfare 
centres throughout the country. These institutions should be 
looked after either by State Government or by Central 
Government. 
• There must be drastic changes in the composition of the three 
components of government judiciary, executive and 
legislatives. Loins representation should be given to the fair 
segment of the society in these organs. Hundred of Kiran 
Bedi's, who know the agony of womenhood should be 
employed to treat the cases passionately. 
• The proceedings of the courts are needed to be expedious 
and time bound. As the best laws can be rendered 
meaningless, particularly the issues relating to women, by an 
ineffective justice delivery system. As inspite of the glut of pro-
woman enactments, we are unable to eradicate the gender 
discrimination and to establish an equality between the two 
sexes of the society till date. Sometimes the delay in justice 
even frustrates the object of seeking the justice. 
• The provision of inheritance under different system of religions 
and statutory laws should be strictly enforced. In case of the 
non compliance of the decisions delivered by the courts, 
some sanctions must be provided in the law. In this 
patriarchal and male dominated society, it is impossible for 
female to get justice without the provisions of sanctions or 
punishment particularly in the field of succession. 
• In case of agricultural land, the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari 
Abolition & Land Reform Act, 1950 has excluded all females 
except widow from having any share in agriculture land. This 
is a flagrant discrimination with the females. No empowerment 
of women could be possible unless they are made 
economically sound. Therefore in this era of women 
empowerment it is ripe time that a suitable amendment should 
be made in the land laws to entitle the females a share in 
agricultural land. It should be noted that some States like 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Naidu and Kerala have already taken 
a positive step in this direction. It is, therefore, suggested that 
certain amendments should be made in the Shariat 
Application Act, 1937 to extend its application to the 
agricultural land as in some States, these steps have been 
taken relating to Hindu females. 
• To avoid the fragmentation, the provision may be attached 
that if the females want to sale the property or their share in 
the agricultural land, the family members should be given 
preference to buy it, provided that they give the best price. 
• Even after the attaining of 58 years of independence certain 
anti-women customary laws still prevail in certain part of the 
Indian sub-continent as in Jammu & Kashmir, the customs 
like 'Khana-e-damadi' or 'Pisar-e-parvarda' etc. In this 
direction the government must take some grass root steps to 
eradicate these customs and ensure the implementation of 
the pro-women Islamic law of inheritance for Muslim females. 
• There must be a comprehensive codification of the entire 
Islamic law, it is inevitable. In this process the representation 
of the Ulemas of all schools should be taken. In this way there 
would be a uniform law for all Muslims throughout India. Any 
delay in its exercise will be detrimental for the cause of 
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Muslim women in the country because the applicability is not 
uniform what is applied to the woman of Kerala, is not applied 
to the woman in Jammu & Kashmir. 
In cases of conflict between statutory law and personal law, 
reference should be made to a jury of experts in personal 
laws as well as unbiased judges who would ensure speedy 
justice. 
With all due respect to judiciary, it is submitted that our 
lawyers and judges are not very much conversant with the 
provision of Islamic law. It is, therefore, suggested that the 
government should provide the statutory status to the Qazi 
Courts and empower them to handle minor cases of property 
disputes, succession and family strifes of the community etc. 
This will not only lessen the burden on courts but will also 
save the valuable time and money of the litigants. These 
courts should not be considered as an attempt to create a 
parallel judicial system but just an agency to help our already 
overburdened courts. Creation of such courts are not new in 
this country, these courts are already working. In Madya 
Pradesh almost every district has a Qazi Court. Such courts 
are also working in many cities of Maharashtra. Darul-Uloom 
and Nadwatul-Ulema are the glaring examples of the success 
of such courts. 
Discrimination against women is so pervasive that it 
sometimes surface on a bare persual of the law, made by the 
legislature itself as in the case of a Christian mother under the 
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provision of section 42 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. So 
necessary amendment should be made in the above said Act, 
enabling the Christian mother to inherit the property 
simultaneously with the father. It will be more appropriate and 
more humanitarian to entitle the parents to inherit the property 
even in the presence of lineal descendants to save them from 
any social distress. 
The provisions of Indian Succession Act, 1925 has done great 
injustice with the peoples of different religion especially with in 
the field of inheritance, for instance, the parties who have 
contracted their marriage under the provision of the Special 
Marriage Act, 1954, will be subjected to the Indian Succession 
Act, 1925, in the matter of succession even if both the parties 
are of same religion and it will extend to their future 
generation also. But after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, 
this provision is not applicable in case of Hindus where both 
the parties are of same religion (Hindu). They will be 
governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The above 
provision is highly discriminatory. It is, therefore, submitted 
that a uniform law be applicable to all irrespective of their 
religion. 
12 
WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER 
PERSONAL LAWS IN INDIA-
A SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Mottov of ptitlQs;opI)p 
IN 
BY 
URUSA MDHSIN 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
Prof. (Dr.) IQBAL ALI KHAN 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
2006 
' \ 
, ! > ' '' ' - ' ' > ' / . 
,v.p 
^ 
AV^ 
T6540 
to mvi 
hch vcb 
hrothcrs 
Department of Law 
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh 
Ref No Dated: 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that Miss Urusa Mohsin, Research Scholar, 
Department of Law, A.M.U. Aligarh has worked under my 
supervision for her Ph.D. Thesis on ^'Women's Property Rights 
Under Personal Laws in India: A Socio - Legal Study." The 
data and material incorporated in the thesis have been collected 
from various sources. The study Is an original contribution to the 
field of Personal Law. 
(Dr. Iqbal Ali Khan) 
Professor 
Phones: Off. (0571) 2602127, Res. 2420786; Fax 91-571-2700528 
Preface 
Deprived, destitute, desolated, discriminated, despaired and 
deserted etc. are the other names of a woman. On one front she is loved, 
respected, even worshiped and placed at the highest social status but on 
the other she is humiliated, illtreated, brutalized and put to contempt. The 
reason for all these torture is monetary dependence and economic 
inequality. 
Man and woman are supposed to be the two halves of the society 
and neither can reach its highest creative excellence without the 
cooperation of other. Even then blatant injustice is being perpetrated on 
them since ages. Though we have stepped in the new millennium, the 
status of woman has not improved due to the traditional biases and 
prejudices towards that segment of the society, which were segregated 
from main stream for no fault of their own. 
The discrimination stems not from legislative in sufficiency but from 
the attitudinal biases of the society. Time to time material and substantial 
modifications have been done in laws, which brought radical changes 
including recent enactments that spell about woman's dignity and equality 
as a global norm. Inspite of all these, the discrimination in respect of 
property rights along with many others still continues and till now the 
women possess only one percent of immovable property in their own 
name. 
Today women are storming most male bastions and proving 
themselves equal in every walk of life. Though she might be found wanting 
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when it comes to using brute force of the savage kind. She is better 
endowed with the gift of civilization. There is no reason why a woman 
should be dominated simply for being a woman. 
I would like to utilize this opportunity while writing the preface of this 
work that substantial and fundamental changes have been brought in the 
Hindu Succession Act 1956 after the completion of the thesis. It seems 
that my thoughts have been caught by the wisdom of the legislature and 
translated in the body of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. 
Sub Section (2) of section 4 of the Act has been deleted. Section 6 has 
been substituted by new provisions. The right of daughter as a coparcener 
has been recognized. Section 23 & 24 of the Principal Act has also been 
omitted. Section 30 of the Act has been amended by including females 
within the section with full rights of testamentary disposition of property 
capable of being disposed of. The schedule has been amended by 
bringing in certain specified heirs in class I. The changes affected 
fundamentals and the old law stood abrogated and substantially altered. A 
diligent effort has been made to incorporate the provisions of the amending 
Act and its effect at appropriate place in this work. 
It is solely and exclusively due to the showering mercy of Almighty 
Allah (SWT) who is most benevolent, merciful, omnipotent, omnipresent 
and omniscient that I have been able to complete this work. 
I owe my heartiest gratitude to Prof. Akhlaq Ahmad, Dean & 
Chairman, Department of Law, A.M.U. Aligarh for his inspiring attitude and 
constant encouragement to complete this study. 
It is not difficult but impossible to give expression in the words to the 
feelings of respect, sense of gratitude, indebtness devotion and admiration 
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towards a teacher. Despite of his busy schedule he has given ample time 
to evaluate critically the whole thesis and made it possible to complete the 
work in time. Yet it gives me immense pleasure to express my profound 
gratitude and sincere thanks to my learned teacher and supervisor Prof. 
(Dr.) Iqbal Ali Khan for his unparallel guidance, inspiring attitude and 
constant encouragement throughout the course of study. 
I navigate my deep sense of gratitude towards Prof. Saleem Akhtar, 
Prof. Mohammad Shabbir, Prof. Nazeer Hasan Khan, Prof. Faizan Mustafa 
and all my learned teachers of the Department of Law, A.M.U. Aligarh and 
L.U. Lucknow for their guidance co-operation, motivation and constructive 
advice to concentrate on quality and originality of research work. 
I salute and venerate to my (late) parents. I extend my sense of 
elevation to all my kith and kin specially my brothers and sister whose love 
and benediction fill the vaccum of parental love. 
I am proud of having very sincere and devoted friends, seniors and 
juniors who have co-operated me at every stage to complete this work. 
From the kernal of my heart, I am thankful to my hostel mates also. 
I am also beholden to the staff members of the Law seminar and 
office bearers of A.M.U. Aligarh, L.U. Lucknow and the staff of the 
NadwatuI Ulema for their assistance and help rendered to me. 
My pleasant duty has made to express my sense of gratitude to all 
those who have directly and indirectly inspired and prompted me to 
undertake this difficult task. I extend my sense of elation to all those who 
have contributed in my elevation to the status of writing this thesis. 
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Last but not least, my special thanks to my typist Mr. Mohd Yaseen 
Khan for typing my thesis with care, devotion and diligence. 
(Urusa Mohsin) 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
An Overview 
Gender bias discrimination is a global phenomenon. Today the 
greatest challenge, before the world, is that of gender justice. There 
is not a single gender just society neither in advanced Western world 
nor in traditional Asian and African societies. At present we stand at 
the remnant of the 21^' Century but we are still unable to boast of a 
society where there is total gender equality. 
Woman, the most disadvantaged group of human species, is the 
architect of civilization, the nucleus of the family, the protector of the 
house, the inspiration and strength of man on every front, who shaped the 
destiny of human race. She has proved that she is not frail, fragile and 
delicate, though physically weak yeX sp'iniuaWy strong who raised Prophet 
and Pharoah. It is the woman to whom the Creator has empowered to 
transform the man into the desired mould through the influence of her 
motherhood. A powerful generation is impossible without the powerful 
women. It is a stigma and a stain for the entire human race if woman is 
compelled to remind society for her rights. Social democracy, for its full 
strength, requires the women empowerment, social and economic both. 
The discriminatory status of woman is constantly lamentable and produces 
unsatisfactory results. No development is possible unless and until the 
woman's rights are protected. 
Prof. Harold. J. Laski observed, "Rights are those conditions of 
social life without which no man can seek in general, to be himself at 
his best." 
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For the emancipation of women, the economic independence is of a 
supreme importance. Alongwith economic independence the total 
development of women is needed special consideration by making 
equilibrium between their rights and responsibilities. The secret polygamy, 
utter illiteracy, occupational disproportion and economic denigration are 
the ground realities of today. Domestic injustice and body violence are 
escalating day by day. The nuptial thread is also no longer as strong as it 
was till the recent past and the rate of divorce is increasing. 
When the woman is desolated, despaired, desperate , and 
deserted, the first question which comes in the mind of destitute 
female, is that-what option left for her? There is luminous literature 
available on the offences against women, the law relating to dowry 
and other matrimonial disputes but very little attention is given 
towards the property rights of women. At ancient time the woman 
was devoid of any property right in any legal system except in Islam. 
Though in Hindu legal system some property rights, subject to 
certain restrictions, had been given in the name of Stridhana. In 
West there was no concept of property right of females. The rights, 
which were attributed to females, were also very discriminatory. With 
the heralding of new millenium, the problem of women's property 
right stands as one of the most important challenge. 
The discrimination is the fate of women since the incipient of 
civilization to the present day, all over the world. The women, who 
constitute the world's half population, are the subject of male chauvinism 
and treated as a second-class citizen. From cradle to grave they are meek 
to the unfair social custom and gender prejudices. The basic cause of this 
Chapter I 
degraded status of female is chiefly attributed to the factors shaping the 
traditional society. 
Freedom, for which nations clashed, wars were waged, peace 
was sought and forsaken, is men's inner urge and call. It is the life 
and blood of society. The freedom, especially when it relates to 
women, is the given freedom from the imposed instructions of men. 
From the dawn of civilization the women suffer from submissiveness 
and the fight for equality and freedom continue till the date. Despite 
her lofty role in the world affairs, her status changed little with 
changing times and claims. Her misuse continues at every place, 
and at every time. Chinese believed that: 
"Eighteen goddess like daughters are not equal to one son with 
a hump"^ 
Jews daily prayer is, "blessed, art thou Lord that thou has not 
made me a woman."^ 
The Christian philosopher Malleus Maleficarum in the Holy Book 
termed woman as, "imperfect animal, naturally fickle deceivers who in the 
lust of flesh, were easily led by the devil in becoming witches."^ Bible too is 
the product of patriarchal society which states.'V/Ves submit yourselves 
unto your husband as unto the Lord."^ Sir Bernard Shaw called her face 
"the burning wind', and her voice 'the hissing of snakes." The Hindu 
' Whitehead R.N. and Booth G.V.: The Sexes Changing Relationship in a Pluralistic Society, Toranto Gage 
Publishing Ltd. 1986 pp. 5-6, cited by Munawar A. Anees in his Article "Survival of the Sexiest" Islamic 
Culture An English Quarterly Vol, LXVIIl No. 3 July 1994. 
-Ibid. 
Hummudah,' Abd-Al-Ali, Family Structure in Islam, Indianapolis, American Trust Publication (1977), p. 
185 (cited by Munawar A. Anees) op cit. 
Gonslaves Lina: Women & Human Rights, p. 34 
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scholar Chanakya says, "telling a lie, acting without thinking ^nd 
foolishness are the defects lies in woman, you can learn manners from 
princess, politeness from scholars, falsehood from gambler and 
wickedness from woman." Islam, which is considered as the torchbearer in 
such darkness also, placed the husband next to God. She was always 
considered as an evil temptress. 
However, these old adages appear to be losing its significance 
and the above scenario are being changed though slowly and not 
absolutely. Steps are being taken to promote education among 
female and also for the empowerment of women socially and 
politically. It is a welcome gesture. But it will take time for the male 
dominated society to submit to the female mutiny. 
The feminist movement started from the first United Nation's 
World Conference on women held in Mexico in, 1975. Harold Coffin 
said, "remember when feminist movement were something, men 
gathered on street corners to admire the girls strolled by." The 
international recognition of the women's problems all over the world 
resulted as the women's decade from 1975-1985. The publication of 
the report of the National Committee, on the status of women in 
1975, stressed that despite constitutional guarantees-roles, rights 
and participations of women in almost all spheres of life, were 
limited. In fact the various conferences and seminars were indicative 
of the growing awareness of the plight of women all over the world. 
The International women decade came to an end in 1985, with the 
birth of witnessing a series of conferences, seminars, actions, 
programmes, emergence of women's organizations and women's 
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movements against atrocities meted out to them in all stages and 
areas of their life. A wide spread awareness about women's life, 
conditions, problems and issues faced by them has been noticed 
recently in almost all corners of the globe. The Beijing Conference 
held in China in 1995, also high-lighted the problems with special 
reference to domestic violence and gender injustices. 
Among all these international instruments the CEDAW acquired 
importance in the Indian sub-continent along with many other 
countries. It is considered as the Magna Carta for the rights of 
women. The discrimination is defined in this convention as: 
'\..any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on tiie basis of 
sex wliicli lias the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field." 
This convention provides the basis to undertake effective measures 
to equalize men and women in every walk of life by giving equal 
opportunities in, economic, political and public life. By abolishing all 
discriminatory laws, all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of 
women, this convention affirms the reproductive rights of women and 
targets culture and tradition as influential forces, which shaped gender 
roles and family relation. 
The Convention, on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), 1979, is the main foundation of the rights 
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of women, which recognized the discrimination against them, which 
in term hampers economic growth and affects the society at large. 
Countries that have ratified or acceded to the convention are 
legally bound to put its provisions into practice. The signatory 
countries are consigned to present national reports at every four 
years, about the steps they have taken to comply with their treaty 
obligations. India is also among them. 
The large part of the world society present woman as the 
weaker sex. On the lack of equal opportunities in every field, the 
possibilities of women competing on an equal stage with men are 
naturally bleak. According to one report of United Nations 
Organization, 1980, "Women contribute 2/3 of total working tiours, 
still they earn only 1/10 of the world's income and possess only 1% 
of immovable property in their name."^ 
Gender inequality exists in different form but the most harmful 
one is in the field of property rights. The women, in every religion 
and legal system, are now discriminated to inherit the property only 
on the basis of sex. 
There is no such difference as visualized by the society 
between the male and female. They all are human beings. It is only a 
recognition or division of the work and role. No one is superior over 
the other. 
The difference is only genetic, ethical and physical as two brothers 
are not identical. The difference and discrimination are not synonymous. 
^ Agarwai B.D.: Inheritance Injustices, Law Teller, p. 518. 
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Difference is a natural phenomenon but discrimination is a conduct, which 
is done intentionally or unintentionally. To do discrimination between two 
human beings is a sin. The women sulTered a lot of discrimination from the 
time of sex determination to the Sati leap. Some time she is worshipped as 
'Dew' and some time she is treated as 'Dasf but never be considered as a 
human being. 
About the feminist movement Justice Krishna Iyer rightly, 
pointed out ''the fight is not for women's status but for human worth. 
The claim is not to end inequality of women but to resiore universal 
justice." 
Umesh C Benerji J said, "Manifest injustice is curable in nature 
rather than incurable."^ 
To ensure the dignity of human being, envisaged in the 
contemporary world to the other half or better half, it is necessary to 
bring qualitative changes in their situation. Their personal dignity is 
trivialized. The question of women's dignity and rights has to include 
wider issues. 
In ancient time the women were not having any property right in any 
part of the world except in Islam. These economic rights were non-existent 
and their fate was wholly depended upon the sweet will of their husband, 
father and guardian. Because of the financial security, man thought that 
they could subject her to abject humiliation. Property always plays a vital 
role in the life of individual, community and country. The protagonists of 
social contract theory of State, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau also admired 
' Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 para 2 
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the importance of property. The practical significance of the property lies in 
the fact, that it enables us to solve the problem of poverty and to give 
everyone at least the necessaries of the life, if not the means of comfort. 
There is a glut of International Conventions, starting with the 
Declaration of Human Rights in, 1945, followed by the United 
Nations Declaration, 1948, Rome Convention for Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 and it's protocol in, 
1952, European Social Charter, 1961, American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969, International Convention on Civil, Political and 
Economic Rights, 1976, The Convention on Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights 1981 and Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action 1993, all contain yardsticks of gender equality. These 
resolutions, declarations and platform of action to wipe out the 
injustice and inhibitions of a misogynic malignancy remained 
dormant because of the absence of enforcing agencies for these 
International laws. Indeed every statutory remedy enacted or 
executive policy proclaimed, remains a remedy that aggravates the 
malady. It is also that law cannot go in alone, courts cannot cure or 
correct by heavy punishment and profound pronouncement the 
masculine culpability. The feminist movement cannot be successful 
unless the men themselves come forward to join hands with them. 
Participation, of both men and women, is equally important to make 
the society a better place. 
The property rights of the females are still discriminatory, 
inspite of the plethora of International Conventions and Declaration 
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in support of property rights of women. The UNO stands at the apex 
seat, In its commitment to protect the women's property right world 
over. The females of Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Parsis all are 
the victims of this discrimination of property right in some or the 
other form. In ancient time there was no concept of women's 
inheritance, she was not considered as an heir and competent to 
inherit the property. Islam is, perhaps, the first religion, which 
entitles females to inherit the property whether she is a mother, 
sister, daughter, grand-mother, or widow. 
The law of inheritance is an important subject to be considered 
not only because it ensures the future security of woman both 
married and spinster but also because it may lead to social tragedies 
in accordance to system adopted. It is also, more or less, a subject 
of controversy on the point that the woman has been devoid of her 
equal rights with man in the matter of inheritance. Although such 
conflicts at present are between the traditionalist and reformers and 
rather than technical and legal. 
Indian Scenario: Before the annexation of British regime the major 
laws of inheritance in India had either their roots in their respective religion 
or were deeply influenced by personal laws, owing their allegiance to 
religion. The religious based distinction of the personal laws is evident 
and accepted fact. These laws are zealously guarded, fiercely 
protected and justified by various religious communities. The notable 
feature of these laws was that they were unanimous in relegating 
women to background with respect to inheritance. There was 
uniformity in their general preference of agnates over cognates and 
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in conferment of superior rights to males in comparison to their 
female peers. Under the grab of religious injunctions and customs, 
the custodians of these laws, many times denied them the 
inheritance rights totally where they indeed had some rights. 
The discrimination against women and consequently the 
inferior status conferred on them and a tendentious attitudes of the 
superiority of males, are some of the factors that stand out even 
after a bare reading. 
The contact of Islamic law with India is almost a millennium 
old. It started with the Arab conquest of the Sindh in the beginning of 
the 18^ ^ Century. Both Hinduism & Islam represent two varieties of 
traditional worldviews. The pattern of cultural syncretism between 
Hinduism and Islam are significant social movement. The process, of 
the development of the Islam in India, has been evolved through 
three stages. These stages were set by the historical forces and 
greatly influenced the structure of its tradition. The first stage relates 
to the duration of the Islamic law in India, second stage was initiated 
after the establishment of the British domination and finally the third 
stage was marked at the beginning of the Indian freedom movement, 
leading to the countries political independence. Islamic law, which is 
a body of rules, gives practical expression to the religious faith and 
aspiration of the Muslim. It does not leave the world to the whim and 
caprice of an individual or the group of persons neither in economic 
nor in any other field of culture. Islamic law has brought many sound 
changes in socio-economic status of males and females, providing 
standard of behaviour for the believers in every field of life. Islam 
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enforced its followers to remove pain, destitution, social and 
economic disabilities from the lives of the woman by granting them a 
status equal to men in their respective spheres. 
The edifice of a splendid legal system of Islam is based on the 
injunctions of the Holy Quran and the urges of the Prophet (PBUH). 
It provides minute details of the rights, duties and privileges of 
human being. It has awarded a graceful image to the woman and 
placed them at high platform at the time when the females of the 
world had no identity of their own. From the historical point o^ view 
there is an interesting phenomenon of growth of Islamic law. 
Islamic law of inheritance is a misunderstood subject all over 
the world though it is supposed to be one of the most perfect laws 
obtainable in the juristic era. It is portrayed globally as a means of 
persuasion, torture, abnegation and oppression in the hand of 
callous, egoistical, tyrannical and often uneducated Muslim males, 
especially the matters related to females. It is visualized that Muslim 
women is the most miserable creature of the world. This caricature of 
the Islam has polluted the mind of even the right thinking people of 
the society. 
Actually there is a great deal of diversity in the manner in 
which Islam is practiced and perceived. Many times these practices 
go against the basic tenets or grains of Islam. The Islamic law 
relating to women has passed through different channels of 
development. Law, culture, traditions, attitudes and Government 
policies are the determining factors of the status of women in 
society. The status of Indian women has also undergone various 
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transformations under the various foreign colonizers who brought 
their institutions and legislations to India. Before the Britishers came 
to India, the Indian females were enjoying high social standard. 
In regard to the status of women in England, which could be 
true to the other countries in the West, Mrs. Ray Strachey said, "ihls 
favourite was denied every civil rigtit, was sliut out from education 
and from all but lowest form of wage earner and has to surrender her 
property and herself to her husband."^ 
The trend of giving preference to the anti women customs and 
usages was started from British period and continued till today, even 
after the 58 years of independence. The most shameful thing is that 
they got the seal of judiciary over it, inspite of the fact that all these 
are very much repugnant to the principles of Islam. Even in Muslim 
dominated States these anti-woman customs still exist such as 
'pisare-e-parwarda,' 'khana-e-damad' and 'dukhtar-e-khana nashin', 
etc in Jammu & Kashmir. Times and again voices were raised by 
different women's organizations and right thinking people of different 
communities against these unjust, illogical and anti women policies of the 
Government. As a result the British Government took different legislative 
actions and so many territorial enactments were passed such as Coach 
Behars Muhammadan Inheritance Act, 1897, the Moplah Succession & 
Wills Act 1918-1928, the Cutchi Memon Succession Acts of 1928 -1938 
and the Shariat Application Act, 1935. But the peoples were not satisfied. 
A movement 'Ghasab-ul-Mirath' was launched all over India, which was 
Hammeton J. A: Universal History of World ,London n.d. vol. 1 p. 378 (Cited by Ali Nadwi; Status of 
Women, p. 11) 
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resulted in the formulation of the Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application 
Act, 1937. Under section (2) of this Act, certain provisions were made 
governing the law of inheritance. 
Section (2) of the Act, 1937, talks about the special property of 
females. It includes all the property inherited or obtained under contract or 
gift or any other provision of personal law. In Islamic law there is no 
concept of different kinds of property. The Act of 1937 has been excluded 
from its application the succession of an agricultural land, because that is 
the subject of the state laws. Different state's laws® excluded the females 
from inheriting the agricultural land as section 171 of the Uttar Pradesh 
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 1950 leaned towards the male 
agnates . Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala had made an 
amendment in the Shariat Act, 1937 after independence and made the 
agricultural land also the subject of Shariat Act, 1937. But in other States it 
still prevails which keeps the women away from the landed property. 
Application of the Shariat Act, 1937, on the inheritance and 
Wills to the Muslims in suppression of the anti women's customary 
practices and usages, had been a major legal issue in India since the 
days of British regime. Much hue and cry was made. Instead, in 
Malabar after the enactment of Shariat Act, 1937, law was enacted 
to protect the custom of matriarchal succession among certain 
sections of Moplah Muslims and the validity has been affirmed in 
a. Section, 26 of liombay Rcgiilaliou Acl of 1827, 
b. Section, 5 & 6 of Punjab Laws Act, 1872. 
c. Section, 5 & 6 of Central Province Laws Act 1875. 
d. Section 3 of Oudh Laws Act 1876. 
e. Section, 16 of Madras Civil Court Acts, 1883. 
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some judicial pronouncement after the Independence, thougii for 
Hindus it was abolished in 1975, in Kerala. 
The ceiling laws, generally, treat husband and wife as a single 
entity, which is against the Islamic law. Under Islamic law the girl on 
marriage does not merge her personality in that of husband, instead 
she retains her personality individually with full proprietary rights. To 
avoid, the Government Escheat of excess land under Ceiling Laws 
Acts, Muslim women claimed some fake divorces.^ 
In 1939, theDissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, gave absolute 
proprietary rights to Muslim women, which were already possessed by a 
Muslim female in the Austinian sense from the advent of Islam. On the 
other hand it has gone a step ahead in favoring the female, which was 
contrary to Islamic law that the husband interference in the proprietary right 
of wife be a ground for the obtaining of divorce.^° 
The local legal culture had also not spared even the tribal woman. In 
every tribal society the women are generally looked up with great respect 
but they do not have the right to inherit the property. Only form of security 
that was assured in traditional tribal society was that the village council 
used to take care of them at the point of distress. 
The Hindu law is as old as the Indian civilization and traces the 
rules, which are found in the Vedic literature of about 1500 BC. The 
fundamental rules of law and their spiritual supports are available in 
texts, which are usually dated between 500 BC and AD 200. Exact 
' The famous Oudh Divorce Case. 
'° Clause (d) of sub section (viii) of section 2. 
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chronology is defied by the traditional materials, which had so long a 
working l ife." 
In the field of property right, as the Indian culture developed 
because of the patriarchal system, only male agnates have the right 
to hold and to inherit the property. The concept of women's property 
existed only in the form of Stridhana which was very complicated and 
subject to certain restrictions. 
The Hindu Law of inheritance was based on the patrilineal system. 
The instrument of patriarchy has been, the denial of property rights to 
woman. The gradual growth of property law continued to be complex and 
discriminatory against women. The earliest Act, which is the first step in 
this connection, was the Married Women's Right to Property Act, 1856, 
that gave some relief to married women to earn and to hold property. 
But the benefit of this Act was not fruitful for the Hindu and Muslim 
females because of the non-interference policy of the Britishers. 
Some other Acts which gave some relief to the females were the 
Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, Hindu Widows Remarriage 
Act, 1856, Hindu Law of Inheritance Act, 1928, its Amendment Act, 
1929, Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, and most 
vigourous step was taken in 1956, by the passing of the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. Recently after the completion of my research 
work, an amendment has been made (The Hindu Succession 
Amendment Act, 2005) which has, io a great extent, ameliorated the 
economic position of daughters by making them a coparcener. 
" See Nickman N.A. & Macheon R : The Edicts of Ashoka, (Chicago) London Phonex 1966. 
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It seems that the nineteenth century, in the Hindu Women's 
World is a piecemeal, in which many reforms were brought not only 
in economic sphere but also in improving their social status that 
removed certain deep rooted evils such as Sati Pratha, temple 
prostitution, child marriage, polygamy, polyandry, lack of inheritance, 
remarriage of widows and female infanticide etc. So many legislative 
steps have been taken to do away these evils. 
No doubt Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was the most 
revolutionary effort but the latest step taken by the legislature in 
2005, seems to be more effective attempt for women empowerment 
which removed almost all the defects and drawbacks of the previous 
Act of 1956 and equalize the females to the male heirs in every 
respect. 
In England the married women had no right to own and to 
appropriate the property independently and was subject to the 
restriction of her husband. The law was very discriminatory and the 
married women were economically dependent to her husband. In 
1882 the Married Women's Right to Property law was passed which 
enabled the married women to own and to inherit the property. The 
Act was passed because of the pressure, which was made upon the 
British Parliament to remove the injustice after the famous case of 
Caroline Norton. 
Practical Significance of Different Acts 
There is always a gap between policies, ideologies and its 
implementation. The sanctifying role of the judiciary is crucial in the 
process of the upliftment of the social, economic and legal status of 
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women since time immemorial. The best laws can be rendered 
meaningless by an ineffective implementation of the justice delivery 
system. 
It seems that Indian legislature is fully committed to ameliorate 
the status of women and conscious about the need to protect the 
interest of women and to give them equal status to their counter part 
men. The Indian women do not suffer from legal disparities but they 
suffer from practical disparities because the enforcement of the 
legislative policies generally remains neglected. 
The Hindu women in the country despite the revolutionary 
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 remain generally 
deprived of property right. In reality it has been a mere legislative 
showpiece. Though the Act brought revolutionary changes which 
have been more often ignored by the family members in actual 
practice because the provisions goes against the established Hindu 
social ethos. 
Generally, there is no proof that a woman actually inherits. The 
court's function ends with the definition and interpretations of the 
rights in the estate under the relevant laws. Mostly the matter of 
succession is settled out of the court and without woman inheriting at 
all. To prevent the family property, within the control of family, 
females are generally persuaded not to claim their share. The 
system of kinship relations in traditional society is so vital to the 
protection and security of women that they are willing to renounce 
property right for its sake^^. Some time the women transfer their 
12 
Ahron Layish : Women and Islamic Law in Non IVlusiim Statesp. 303 
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share in the estate by sale deed without consideration, ox gifted out 
of natural love to brothers, or other male member of the family. The 
unmarried girl who lived with her brothers and was supported by 
them renounced her share in favour of her germane brothers. In 
many cases the females are pressurized to make a will in favour of 
male relatives to avoid the family's considerable fortune being 
fragmented by intestate succession. 
The statutory laws on women's property rights are of course 
intact and enforce, but the actual practice in the society, however 
presents a different picture. Before 2005, several legislative steps 
had been taken such as Hindu Succession Act and Dowry Prohibition 
Act with all their successive amendments, but these Acts remain 
paper tiger with no teeth. These Acts are better known through their 
blatant violations rather than for a faithful compliance with their 
provisions. 
Another Legislative Showpiece of 2005 
After fifty-Eight years of independence, the 5**^  September 2005 
will be remembered as a red-letter day in the era of Hindu women's 
world. The recent initiative in amending the Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Act, 2005 is a landmark event for the cause of 
women's equality. A lucid Act which brought a light in the darkness 
and erode all the discriminatory provisions of the Act of 1956, such 
as sections 6, 23, 24, and 30. It gives absolute and equal rights of 
inheritance to females. The Act of 2005 covers, inequalities on 
ancestral property, dwelling house, widows rights and also protect 
18 
Chapter I 
the interest of some new heirs by inserting them in the list of Class I 
heirs. 
It is a step further to the cause of social justice for women. The 
Act is passed on the recommendations of the 174'" report of the Law 
Commission on, "Property Rights of Women Proposed Reform Under 
the Hindu Law". It really gives a deathblow to the old Hindu Law 
where females were made devoid of any property rights. This Act is 
welcomed by the Hindu women's world. Now the Hindu daughter of 
Mitakshara joint family will also born with a silver spoon in her 
mouth. She will possess all the rights, which her male counterpart 
has. But simultaneously she is also burdened with same liabilities as 
a male in respect of coparcenary property. Under the provisions of 
an Amendment Act, 2005 she is entitled to claim partition in the 
dwelling house. The bar, which disentitled the widow to inherit the 
property of her husband on remarriage, has also been abolished. 
These amendments will have far reaching consequences for 
the emancipation of Hindu females if got practical significance. By 
making women coparcener in the joint family property the Act has 
given them great importance in the family. Now the women become 
the 'Karta' of the family and will got same importance as the males 
have. Unfortunately if divorce, took place the girl can return to their 
home by right. 
How much temptous and alluring this Act seems to be but the time 
will say how it really proved in eradication of discrimination. In reality, there 
is a visible gap between the law as it stands and the law as it operates. It is 
regularly impaired by incidents of overwhelming discrimination. All these 
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are theoretically, very laudable efforts but the difficulty lies not in 
recognition of the women's property rights but trying to enforce thenn. On 
the scale of socialistic approach, the actual practice shall face many 
problems in the context of people's orthodoxness and ancient cultural 
attitude. As the conceptualization of the law is grounded in society so let 
not the lofty guarantees in our constitution or the generous endowments in 
our enactments deceive us for a moment or detract from the reality that we 
are in society which has institutionalized acceptance of social hierarchy, 
where men have control over women, where woman have internalized 
lower gender status as personal failure, where violence against women is 
considered to be a personal harm rather than a social injury.^^ 
The women's emancipation is still a distant dream. Nothing is 
fair when it comes to the talk of fairer sex. On the whole though law 
of inheritance is gradually changing yet women are not at much 
comfort. 
Hypothesis 
The prime object, of the present study, is to critically evaluate the 
statutory and customary laws relating to women's property under different 
religio-legal systems and brings out certain controversial problems on the 
surface. The horrendous problem facing the society is regarding the 
discriminatory share of females in the matters of inheritance. 
Jaising Indira : Domesticc Voilencc & Law Rcporl Collegium on Justice lor Women, limpowcrmenl 
through Law (Lawyer's Collective Women's Rights Initiative, Butter Worth India New Delhi. 
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The other problem to see, is whether the shares allotted to 
Muslim females in Holy Quran under different capacities are justified, 
keeping in view the liabilities discharged by them in the family? 
The above problems have prompted me to undertake a 
research study on the above subject. So a modest attempt has been 
made by the researcher in the work to suggest certain measures to 
enable the females to get just shares in the property of their 
ancestors. Some useful suggestions have also been given which 
may go a long way not only to improve the socio-economic position 
of women but to impart Justice with the class that has been 
suppressed, oppressed, discriminated and avoided for long. 
There is a lot of scope for further research on the topic such as 
the impact and outcome of the new Amending Act of 2005 on the 
females. Though on the face of the Act, it seems that equal shares 
shall be given to females but the thing to be seen is how the courts 
will see it and get the provisions of this Act implemented? Another 
thing is how does the society perceive and accept this amending 
Act? 
Scheme of Work 
The present work consists of six chapters. The first chapter is 
the introductory part of the thesis in which a brief introduction about 
the subject of the research has been made. The researcher has tried 
in this chapter to highlight various discriminatory customs, practices 
and laws. An endeavour has also been made to surface the plight of 
females in the society. The aims and objectives also find place in 
this chapter. 
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The concept of the women's property under various religio-
legal system of the contemporary world is dealt with in the second 
chapter. Gender based discrimination meted out to a woman in 
regard to the evolution of property has also been prominated. 
In third chapter an effort has been made to identify and 
ascertain the share of females under different system of laws. A 
critical evolution of the relevant provisions relating to inheritance has 
been made. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to formulate the comparative 
charts of the shares of females under different capacities under 
different religions. By this, an effort has been made to domestify the 
complicated law of inheritance, which will help the members of a 
given society to know the shares of females at a glance. 
As a critique the long journey of the judicial decisions of the 
apex courts and different high courts have been discussed at full 
length and corrective measures have been submitted at appropriate 
places. 
Holding the entire study in retrospect, the recapitulation is 
made in the six chapter and a meager but honest attempt has been 
made to suggest certain measures for women's empowerment, 
emancipation of women from gender bias system and equality of 
rights in matter of inheritance. 
Research A/Iethodology 
The research methodology, adopted by the present researcher 
in completing the research work, is purely doctrinal. An exhaustive 
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and critical study has been made of all available relevant statutes, 
texts and case laws on inheritance. An attempt to prepare exhaustive 
comparative chart of the shares of females under Muslim, Hindu, 
Christian and Parsi laws, has been made. 
The research materials, for the present thesis, consist of 
various books on the subject, relevant case laws from various 
reports, different articles published in various journals, 
encyclopedias, various commissions' reports on the subject and 
relevant statutes. Published articles in National Dailies, magazines, 
and periodicals have also been consulted and incorporated in the 
thesis at appropriate place. The relevant verses of Holy Quran, 
Hadith, Dharamshastras, Vedas and the saying of prominent 
scholars have also been incorporated wherever these are needed. 
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Concept of Women's Property Under Different 
Legal System 
An Overview 
In early stages, the word 'property' was not understood in its modern 
sense. With the passage of time and the development of the industrialized 
world, the notion of 'property' has become complicated. As an object of 
legal right, the property means a thing or group of things owned by an 
individual in the context where it is found. With the globalization of the 
world, the word property became the technicality of law. It includes so 
many interests and rights concerning the objects. Its area is going to be 
very wide. 
It is difficult to understand the real nature of any thing unless we 
know when and how it was born. The true nature of things really lies in 
their genesis, 'it is' says, Vico, "notiiing but tfieir birtfi in certain times and 
in certain forms."'^ The history of property indeed lies in the analysis of the 
history of human nature itself. 
The Concept of Property 
The English word, 'property derives its origin, either directly or 
through French 'propriete' or from Latin 'proprietas', which means the 
peculiar nature or quality of a thing and (in post Augustian writings) 'owner-
ship'. The Latin word, 'proprietas' \s derived from 'proprius,' which means 
'peculiar' or 'own'. The origin of the word 'proprius' is uncertain it may be 
originated from the Latin- 'pro', 'prae' and 'prope,' Greek 'pro' and 'prin' 
Pal Radhabinod : The History of Hindu Law (1958) p. 6 
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and Sanskrit - 'pra' which may stand for'//? Irani of, 'before', 'choose, to' 
and 'on behalf of.^ 
Generally, property is defined as the rights of a person with respect 
to a thing. Thing may be tangible or intangible. Jurist used the term 
property in more than one application. The diversity, of the property system 
of societies, suggests that any concept of property depends, upon the 
culture in which it is found. Lord Porter said, that 'property' is not a term of 
art but takes its meaning from the context in which it is found.^ 
The essence of property is, in its relations among men arising out of 
their relations to things. By 'property" means an exclusive right to control 
an economic good. By 'private property" means the exclusive right of a 
private person to control an economic good. By 'public property means the 
exclusive right of political unit (city, state, nation etc.) to control an 
economic good.'* 
According to Charmer, 'general property is a synonymous for 
ownership where as special property refers to lesser interest."^ 
Holland stated, "the sum total of man's fortune, including not only the 
objects of which he is owner but also the value of any claims which he may 
have against other persons, after deducting the amount of any claim, 
^ The New Encyclopedia Britanica-Vol. 26 15 ed. 1993. p. 181 
3. Nokes V Donester Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940) A.C. 1014, 051 (The Combridge Law Journal) 
(1997)CLJpart. I, Vol. 56, p. 577. 
4 Ely : Property & Contract in their Relation, to the Distribution of Wealth, Vol. I, Book I, (quoted by 
Cohen & Donester Reading in Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy. P. 7) 
5 Cf. Sewell V Burdick (1884) 10 AFP cases 74, 92, 93, 
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which might be made good against himself, is described as his property 
and he is said to own it."^ 
Homes described, "property denotes the consequences and 
connotes the facts ... there are always two things to be asked, firstly, what 
are the facts which make up the group in question and then, secondly, 
what are the consequences attached by the law of that group."^ 
Bentham said, "property Is nothing but a basis of expectation, the 
expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said 
to possess. In consequences of the relation, In which we stand towards it. 
There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the 
relation that constitutes property. It is not material. It is metaphysical, it is a 
mere conception of mind. To have a thing In our hands, to keep It, to make 
it, to sell It, to work it up into some thing else, to use it, none of these 
physical circumstances, nor all united, convey the idea of property. The 
idea of property consists in an established expectation; In the persuasion 
of being able to draw such an advantage from the things possessed 
according to the nature of the case."^ 
At another place Bentham said,^ "property Is fictitious entity seeming 
to have some connections with possession and possession Itself 
proves to be a fictitious entity." According to him, in speaking of a property 
there are four things, to be considered. 
"Holland: On Jurisprudence, lO"' ed. p. 202. 
^ Homes, note 29 at p. 215 (Combridge Law Journal) (1997) CU parti 1, Vol.56, p. 577 
^ Morris R. Cohen & Felixs Cohen: Reading in Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy (New York) Prentice 
Hall Inc. (151) p. 8 
' Bentham Jcrmy : The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined, (Charles Warren F.vcrrcit) Columbia University 
Press, New York, Morning side 1 leighls Mem. Lv 1945, p. 35 
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First:- The nature of the thing is whether corporeal or 
incorporeal. 
Second:- The person who is said to possess the property or to 
whom the property is said to belong, who is styled as 
the proprietor and whose property, the thing is said to 
be. 
Third:- The nature of the relation or proprietorship which 
subsists between that person and the things and in 
virtue of, where the person is said to be the object of the 
property or the possession of the thing, briefly the 
property or the possession of that person. 
Fourth:- The facts in which the exercise of the property consists. 
Some jurists use the term property^o denotes ownership or the 
subject of ownership or valuable things. In the first of these applications, 
ownership is not frequently considered, as the aggregate of the rights of an 
owner, who has absolute control over the thing, whose interest is unlimited 
as to duration, and who has absolute power to dispose of it. But this is 
taking too limited, a view of significance of the word. It seldom happens 
that all the rights over a thing are centered in the same person. The 
distribution of rights, says Sir William Marks-by, 'detached from ownership 
which we actually find in use, is very extensive and yet it is the holder of 
the residuary right in a thing or subject of ownership, whom we in common 
paralance, always consider as the owner of the thing and distinguishes the 
holder of the detached rights as owner of a particular right.' In all above 
these applications, the word 'property" and the idea of a right to exclude all 
others from the enjoyment of the subject of ownership are predominant. In 
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the case of public property although no one has the right to exclusive 
enjoyment, and none can rightfully prevent another from enjoying it."^° 
Salmond points out in his book, 'On Jurisprudence' that the word 
'property" is used in four different senses.^ ^ 
First:- In the widest sense 'property" includes all person's legal 
rights of whatever description. A man's property is all 
that is his in law. 
Second:- In the narrow sense property includes not all rights of a 
person but only rights in respect of things and not in 
respect of persons, the former constitutes his status or 
personal condition. In this sense a man's land, chattels, 
shares and debts due to him or his rights in action, are 
his property but not his life or liberty or reputation. 
Third:- The property includes not even all proprietary rights, but 
only those which are both proprietary and real, in other 
words a man's right in things in rem and not a man's 
right in things in personum. In this sense free hold or 
lease hold estate in land or a patent or copy right is 
property but a debt or the benefit of a contract, is not. 
Fourth:- Finally, in the narrowest use of the term property 
includes nothing more than corporeal property that is to 
say that the right of ownership in a material object or 
that object itself identified with the right by way of 
metonymy. 
The relation between religion and wealth changes from one type of 
society to another, so we have to look the socio-religious traditions, which 
have affected the different economic conditions of the primitive, archaic or 
prehistoric societies. A new tapestry of myth emerged about the concept of 
wealth and property due to the influence of religion. The theological based 
Milra Ram Charan : The Law ofJoint Property and Partition in British India, Tagore Law Lecture i i cd. 
P.N. 3. 
" Salmond : On Jurisprudence 9"' ed. p. 578-580 
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societies changed from hunting \.o agriculture. With the advent of cities, 
settled agriculture, writing and the historic religions like Hinduism, 
Christianity, and Islam, the relation between religion and wealth changed 
from Africa to the far East. Ancestral spirits were worshipped in order to 
bring wealth and prosperity to the family. The religion sanctioned the family 
ownership of wealth.^^ 
Under Different Legal System. 
The concept of property is changed according to the society, culture 
and legal system, in which it is founded. Ehrilich says that, "the center of 
gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, 
nor in judicial decision but in society itself."^^ Religion played a very 
important role in the development of legal ideas in primitive days, 
according to their own tenets and philosophies. Max Weber writes, "When 
we are concerned with law, legal order and rule of law, we must strictly 
observe the distinction between a juristic and a sociological point of view. 
Jurisprudence asks for the ideally valid legal norms. Sociology investigates 
what is actually happening in the society because there is a certain chance 
that its members believe in the validity of an order and adopt their 
behaviour to this order."^"^ Now we have a look upon the different legal 
system to ascertain in what sense the term property is used or understood 
there, such as in Islam, Christianity and Hinduism. 
'^  Encyclopedia of Religion Vol. 15, p. 362 
'•' Prof. Eugcn EhriiitA: Eundamciilal Principles of Ihe Sociology of Law (foreword) 
''' Webber Max : Essays in Sociology, (translated and edited by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Wills), New York 
(1946), p. 226 
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Islamic Legal System 
In Islam the concept of property is very simple. It includes wealth, 
estate, attribute and what is one's own. 'The word property under Islamic 
legal system is applicable only to the objects which have a perceptible 
existence in the out side world that is, to say, to things corporeal and 
tangible,'^^ says Abdur Rahim. This definition of Abdur Rahim does not 
cover the modern concept of property, which is recognized at present by 
all Islamic luminaries and jurists. It is a very narrow one and does not 
cover many rights such as intangible and incorporeal, as intellectual 
property right or copyright etc. Actually in the Islamic legal system there is 
no classification of different kinds of properties, as real or personal 
property, legal or equitable estates and ancestral or self-acquired 
property. ^ ^ 
Generally, the world 'mal' is used for the property in Islamic law 
which is defined as that can be hoarded or secured for use and enjoyment, 
can be made at the time of need or that to which a man's desires incline 
and which can be given away to others and excluding others there form.^'' 
The word 'mat has much narrower meaning than the word 'property" and it 
cannot be said that the 'mat is the true reflector of Islamic concept of 
property. In Islamic legal system the word property is used in much more 
wider sense than any other legal system because there is no concept of 
limited estate and ownership without possession. It recognizes absolute 
ownership. Islamic law does not recognize the concept of community or 
'^  Abdur Rahim: The Principles ofMohammaden Jurisprudence, p. 249 
'* Ram Abidi v Mirza Ahmad AIR (1925) Oudh 
" Ib id 
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joint family property. Proprietorship is individual. Islamic law does not 
recognize the joint Muslim family or tenancy in common.^ ® 
When the members of a Muslim family live in commensality they do 
not form a joint family in the sense in which the expression is used under 
Hindu Law.^ ^ In Shahid Ahmad vs Sultan, ^° the recognition has not been 
given to a pint family as a legal entity under Islamic law. Under Islam there 
is no concept of matrimonial property or common property resulting from 
marriage as in Western Law. There does not exist, any thing like 
Stridhana, Woman's limited estate or hold property in lieu of maintenance 
as under Hindu Law. Islamic law does not divide or make any distinction 
between male or female's property. Under Islam, female got absolute right 
to hold and dispose of the property like males. 
Privy Council in the case of Nawazish AN Khan discusses the 
distinguishing features of Islamic laws at length.^^ About the concept of 
property there is not much difference among the different schools of 
Islamic law. According to Abu Yousuf & Abu Mohammad, 'the waste land 
are, as sort of common goods and become the property of cultivator by 
virtue of his being the first possessor in the same manner as in the case of 
seizing game or gathering fire wood'F 
In the light of the given definitions of property, it is deduced that 
property has two different meanings one is narrow, which includes 
person's rights in respect of a thing. On the other hand, property in its 
" Abdul Rashid v Sirajuddin (1933) 145 (C,461) 
" Krishnajiram v Md. Mashiuddin Mandal AIR, (1921) Cal. 653; see also Hakim Khan v Cool Khan 
(I882)8Cal. 826, 
"^ (47) A. Mad. 287; Sukrullah v Zakira Bibi AIR (1932) ALL 512 
'^ AIR (35) 1948 p.c. 134 (from Gudh; 30 AIR (1943) Gudh 243) 
^^  Hamilton : Hedaya, Book IXLV para 3 (Gardy's ed.) 610 
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wider sense includes all the person's legal rights of whatever description 
they may be. Under Islamic law the word property is understood in such a 
wider sense that it covers all the conceptions of property, which is 
understood in the modern society. 
In Encyclopedia of Islam the word 'mal' which is used as the 
property in Islamic law, stand for the possession. Property referring among 
the Bedouin was particularly to camels but also to estates, money and in 
any case to concrete things. 
The word is originated from the word 'ma' and 7e' means property or 
any thing, which belong to any one.^^ 
In Islam the wealth and property is regarded as a part of creation, 
since Allah (SWT) is the owner of the world, so absolute property rights are 
impossible. Religious traditions established limitations on the possession 
of land and slaves. The ownership vests in Allah (SWT) and the individual 
is only a trustee. "Islamic economics" is often based on the welfare state 
and religious antinationalistic idealism but rejected the Western 
hedonism. '^* 
The 'mal,' 'property' or 'estate', which is the subject of inheritance, is 
called 'tarka'. The word 'tarka' is derived from the word 'tark' which means 
property left. In relation to inheritance, 'Tarka' means, the property left 
behind by the deceased. 'Tarka' in AI-Bahr-al-Ra'iq has been defined as : 
"Tarka means that property, which the deceased leaves behind him 
and there is no right of another particular person attached with that 
Encyclopedia of Islam-New ed. 2000 (glossary & Index of terms Vol. MX) p. 238. 
Encyclopedia of Religion - Vol. 15 p. 364. 
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property."^^ It means that a property, with which the right of another person 
is attached, shall not form part of the estate of the deceased, until the 
liability on that property paid off. 
Hanafi School 
According to Hanafi School, "only that property is the estate of the 
deceased over which there was no right of a stranger"' Hence, the property 
over which there exists a right of stranger as mortgagee etc. shall not be 
included in the estate until the mortgage money is paid or it has been 
released from the property itself.^ ^ 
Maliki School 
According to Malikis, the right of some other person in the estate of 
the deceased attached to the property itself shall be considered as having 
excluded the said property from the definition of the estate.^'' 
Shafi-I-School 
Shafi-i as jurists said, that every thing which belongs to man in his 
life and what he leaves behind after his death whether it be the properties 
or rights, shall be called his estate, but if stranger's right is attached with 
the estate that property will not be considered deceased property, till it is 
not paid off.^ ^ 
" Ibn Nujaym, Zaynuddin Ahmad b. Ibrahim (d. 970 A.H): Al Bahr-al-Rai'q, Dar-al-Kutub-al-Kubra 
Cairo 1334 A.H., Vol. VIII, p. 489 
"^  Dr. Rchman, Taii/.iiur- A Code of Muslim l'cr.sonal Law, Vol. 11, Islamic I'ublishcrs, D-73/.I Norlli 
Nazimabad, Karanchi 33 Pakistan, p. 408 
^' Al-Abdul Sami 'Jawahar-al-Aklil Matba Mustafa-al-Babi, Cairo 1366 A.H., Vol. II p. 327 
*^ Al-Sharbini Mohd-al-Katib : Mughni-al-Muhtaj Matba Mustafa-al-Bibi. Cairo 1377 A.H., vol. Ill, p. 2 
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Hanball School 
Hanbali jurist also considered same as Hanafis. To them the estate 
is that property or proprietary right which the deceased leaves behind 
him.^^ 
Shia School 
According to Shia jurists, the property left by the deceased, should 
be considered to be his estate, but if it is submerged under debt it shall be 
the property of the ancestor merely in law. Being submerged under debt, it 
shall not devolve upon the heirs. If it is not so submerged, it shall be 
divided among the heirs, after payment of debts.^° 
In fact there is not much dispute so far as the question for the 
property of inheritance is concerned but the only difference is about the 
rights. Whether rights also included within the meaning of property or not? 
Maliki, Hanbali and Shafii all considered that the property or estate 
includes both properties and rights (except right in perosnum). Hanafis 
hesitate to include rights in estate. 
Hindu Legal System 
The ancient or earlier hymns are claimed to show, that the people 
were nomadic herdsmen having no fixed habitation, wandering about from 
place to place with their cattle - being their only property, with the 
agricultural development they settled down to permanent habitation.^^ So 
•'' Yousiif Mii.s;i (Dr.) AI-Zarkiilio-wiil-Mirath, Danil Kiilub-al-Aibi, Caiio 1960, p.72 
'" Al Hilli, Najamuddin (d. 474 A.l 1) Beirut pt. Iv, P.N. 183 
'^ Pal Radhabinod : op cit p. 39. 
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long as men knew of no means of subsistence but the chase pasturage or 
agriculture, his patrimony was a share in the soil a part of the all mend^^ 
Coulanges said about the property, '7/?e land belongs to the man 
who first cleared it as the deer belongs to the man who first wounds it'^^ 
Rig Veda speaks about, "the individual's proprietorship of a log of 
wood." (x-A 55,3) 
The idea of property begins with the development of the civilization. 
Traditional societies were based on a zero sum economy; greed was 
roundly condemned in scripture, myth and folk-lose. As time passed by, 
more specific guidance was offered. In India Kautilya Arthshastra 
described, an economy based on agriculture, guilds, family ownership and 
a bureaucratically centralized state. Most interesting thing was, that this 
text elevates the pursuit of wealth and power (artha). In contrast the law of 
Manu reverses the relationship between artha and dharma and idealizes 
more or less static economy based on caste duties {varna dharma)^^ 
Artha is defined in the Kamsutra (1:20) as education, land, gold, 
cattle, corn, domestic utensils and friends and augmenting of what is 
acquired.^^ 
The idea of property refers to the ownership of the whole complex of 
the mass of rights in rem and in personam, as man's property. The word 
property cannot be confined to the material object eg- a person may have 
"ibid p. 312. 
" Coulanges F. De : Origin of the Private Property p. 131. 
'•* The Encyclopedia of Religion Vol. 15, p. 362. 
35 vide, Hindu Dharamshastra Vol. 11 pari 1 p. 9, note 22 (quoted by V. Kane llisolry of Dharamslia.sira) 
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certain rights as lease holder or mortgagee,over the property of another. In 
this way the word property is much more comprehensive and things in 
action and obligation both are included in the definition of the term 
property. Under Roman \3L\N the right \o the performance of an act by 
another was considered as property though an incorporeal one.^^ In the 
Conveyancing Act 1882 (Sec. 11), property was defined as including any 
debt and anything in action and any other right or interest. 
The two words 'swa' and 'swami" are co-relative. The idea underlying 
both is the same and they are the two aspects of the same question 'swa' 
means what belong to a person i.e. property, swami means master or 
owner for the idea of ownership^^ It means both these are interdependent. 
These two represents the relation between the person and the thing but 
property is more than mere ownership. 
Classification of Property 
Property is generally divided by most Smrities into two kinds 
'sthatva' immovable such as land and houses and gangama-movable such 
as catties etc.^ ^ Some other Smrities divided property into three kinds 'bhu' 
(land including houses),'nibandha' (inaccurately rendered as corrdy) and 
'dravya' (gold, silver and other movable). Sometimes, however the word 
'dravya' is employed in the sense of all property whether movable or 
immovable as -
'dravya pitamahopatto gangma stharva tatha." 
^'' Sec Code Civil Art. 529. 
" See Saimond op cit, Chap. XII pp. 339-40, 9* ed. of 1937 
*^ Yajnavalakya : 11, 121. 
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Under ancient Hindu law the property is divided into two kinds-joint 
family property and separate property. Joint family property is either 
ancestral property, or property acquired with or without the aid of ancestral 
property, ox property acquired separately but thrown into the common 
stock.^^ This contains the doctrine of merger of estate by blending.''^ 
The very nature of joint family pre-supposes a continuing preference for a 
sharing of gains and losses.''^ 
Derrett said, "//? keeping with wliat I have said there is no 
presumption that a joint family has any property, it is, in its property 
aspects a reservoir into which property flows from various quarters and out 
of which rivulets flow feeding the numerous categories of members and 
dependants. It is primariiy a psychological set up and secondarily a legal 
entity."^^ The word 'ancestral property has a technical sense it belongs to 
'pitamah' i.e. paternal grandfather or great grandfather. In Md. Hussain, ^^ 
case it was made clear. The Orrisa High Court held, that there could be no 
presumption that the family because it is joint, possesses joint property. 
Even a member in a joint family may possess separate property which 
would exclusively belong to him and no other member of the coparcenary 
not even his male issue, acquires any interest in it by birth.'*'' 
Self acquired property or separate property is also called the 
'svaarjit property. It is earned by the skill and labour of the earner and it is 
^' Manu-IX 204, Quoted by V. Kane p. 576. 
•"* See^Shibaprasad v Priya Kumari, L.R. 59, A. 331 : 34 Bom. L.R. 
"" Derrett: A critique of Modren Hindu Law p. 587 
•"^  Derrett, opcit, p. 61 
'" Md. Husain v Krisiiwa Nandan 64, 1-A, 250 
44 Harihar Seethi v Ladu Kishore Setiii,(Annual, Survey of Indian Law3(2002) vol. XXXVlll, p. 401 
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absolutely one's own. Sometimes the difficulty arises when the manager or 
the coparcener of a joint family earned money on the basis of his personal 
qualities without using the joint family assests, and the question has to be 
decided whether it is his separate property or joint family assests. In an 
old case M/S Piyare Lai Adishwar Lai vs I. T. Commissioner,'^^ Supreme 
Court held, that earnings made by the manager was his separate property. 
The argument was made that the manager earned the salary, which he 
could not have earned if a large part of family's capital was not deposited 
as security. But Supreme Court held, that the earnings were the reward of 
the earner's skill and labour and not the fruit of family investment. In 
another case,^^ the plaintiff was a teacher drawing good salary and there 
were documents which revealed that he had drawn substantial amounts of 
loan from (GPF) account, the property in dispute was purchased by him in 
the same year in which he had withdrawn the loan. The properties were 
consequently held to be self-acquired and not joint family property. 
The word 'daya' has been used even in the oldest period of the 
Vedic literature 'Sarvasya dayam Vibhajantey ebhyah'.^^ 
It means a share or a reward. Daya' stands for 'dhana' follows from 
another passage of Tai. 8 (11. S, 2,7) which simply means wealth that is to 
be divided. The V. Mayukha defines 'daya' as that wealth, which is to be 
divided and which is not the wealth of re-united member. The word 'daya' 
though derived from the word 'da' means to give, does not apply to 
heritable wealth in the literal sense of gift.''^ Mit divide''^ 'daya' into two 
'^  AIR, (1968), SC 678, 
"' Supra note 44, 
"Rig. II, 32:4, p. 388. 
"* Kane V. : History of Dharmashastra Ilird ed., 1946, p. 546. 
"' Ibid p. 547. 
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varieties - 'apratibandha' (unobstructible) and 'sapratibandha' 
(obstructible). All 'daya' is sapritibandha and the ownership arises in 
another only on death of the previous owner. Dayabhaga's doctrine is 
'uparamasvatvavada' ownership arising on death. On the other hand the 
Mitakshara hold the view of 'ganamsvatavada' means the ownership arises 
by birth. Dayabhaga does not recognize that the son, grand son or great 
grand son acquire by birth any interest or right of ownership in the 
ancestral property held by father or their ancestor. But Mitakshra 
recognizes it. 
Thus we see that there is vast difference between the concept of the 
property and its ownership between the two schools of Hindu law. 
Stridhanam 
Stridhanam is the most controversial term of Hindu Jurisprudence. 
There is great difference of opinions about the Stridhana among Smrities, 
Vedas and Shastras. The germs of the Stridhana can be traced back to the 
Vedic literature. As Derrett says,^° that Indian jurists have been proud 
rightly, that at least in theory their indigeneous jurisprudence allowed 
women (Stridhanam) assets at their disposal or atleast generally available 
for their enjoyment and for their security at a time when in the west wives 
were unable to own property, separately from their husbands except as 
beneficiaries under some trust or settlement. Though Muslim women have 
traditionally enjoyed the absolute right to own and to dispose of or to 
manage the property in whatever manner they like. It is a novel feature of 
Hindu jurisprudence because Stridhana is women's absolute property with 
all rights to dispose of at her own pleasure though not in all cases, as 
°^ Derrett J.D.M. : op cit p. 195. 
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during covertures or widowhood. Sir Guroodas Banerjee remarl<s,^ ^ 
nowhere were proprietary rights of women recognized so easily as in 
India; and in very few ancient system of law have these rights been so 
largely conceded as in our own. 
Great diversity of views prevail on the topic that what constitute the 
Stridhana. As Jimutvahana says, in the Dayabhaga after finishing his 
discourse on Stridhana, "f/ius, h^s been explained the most difficult subject 
of succession to a childless woman".^^ 
By parsing of the term of Stridhana, it clearly shows that the 
meaning of the term 'StrF - means woman and 'dfiana' stand for wealth. It 
means, Stridhana signifies the woman's wealth or property. The term 
Stridhana is referred by different names - as 'manjal kani' in south, 
'bangdicholi' in Bombay, 'Kalnam' in Andhra Pradesh and 'Patribtiagam' in 
Madras.^^ In an ancient Smiriti work the literal meaning of the Stridhana 
was restricted to certain kinds of property given to woman on certain 
occasions or at different stages of her life. 
Kautilya defines, "Stridhana as means of subsistence and what 
could be tied up on the body (i.e ornaments or jeweiiary) constitute 
StridhanaJ 
Manu defines, "what was given before the nuptial fire, what was 
given on the bridal procession, what was given in token of love, what was 
'^ Sir Guroodas Benerjee : Marriage & Stridhana 5"' ed. of 1923, p. 370. 
" Muila Dinshaw : I'inciplcs of iliiidii Jurisprudence, p. 168. 
'•^  AIR (2004), p. 151. 
^Mll.2,p. 152 
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received from her brother, mother arid father, that is called the six fold 
woman's property."^^ 
Katyana defines the stridhana in most comprehensive way, 'what 
was given to women at the time of marriage before the nuptial fire is 
declared by the wise to be 'adhyagni'. "Stridhana, what was obtained at the 
time of procession from her father's house is declared to be 'adhyvahmika" 
Stridhana, what was given to a woman through affection by her father or 
mother in law at the time of doing obeisance at the feet, is said to be 
'pritidatta' Stridhana, what was given to her as the price of house hold 
utensils, of beasts, of milch cattle, ornaments and slaves is declared to be 
'sulka,' what was given to her after marriage from the family of her 
husband and also from the family of her kinsmen is declared to be 
'anvadheya', Katyana's definition have been accepted by all digests. At 
another place Katyana restricts the literal sense of the Stridhana over that 
wealth that is obtained by a woman by mechanical arts or from a stranger 
through affection. 
'Samdayika' is a synonymous of Stridhana in the technical sense. 
The Stridhana is also defined by yajnavalkya, Narada and Vishnu. But all 
these definitions only says about the kinds of Stridhana, which means what 
constitute the Stridhana. From the analysis of the above definitions it 
seems that only those properties or wealth are Stridhana over which the 
woman have absolute authority to donate, sell or enjoy, independently of 
her husband's control. To ascertain whether the particular thing is 
Stridhana or not? Three test are laid down by jurists and commentators 
which are as follows-
55 Dharamshatra - IX, 194 
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• from which source the property is acquired? 
• when the property is acquired what is the status of the woman, 
whether she is maiden, coMeriure or widow? 
• the last test is to which school the woman belongs? 
If the property held by a Hindu female is not a Stridhana then, what it 
be called. Actually the property held by Hindu woman is of two types-
women estate and Stridhana. Hindu female property is either some form of 
entitlement of maintenance of a Hindu woman from the joint family which is 
called the women's estate, or it is women's absolute property for which the 
term Stridhana (women's wealth) has been known since classical times.^^ 
V. Mayukha devides,^'' Stridhana into two kinds-'Paribhashika' (technical) 
and 'aphbhashika' (non technical), which has been already discussed in 
the passing paragraph. 
Women Estate 
The property, which is not Stridhana, is Women's estate over which 
she possesses very different rights. She is the owner of that property as 
long as she lives. She has exclusive right of enjoyment and management 
of it but her ownership is restricted. She cannot dispose of neither she can 
sell it, except in some special circumstances. On her death the property 
does not pass to her heirs, but to the next person from whom she has 
inherited it.^ ® The property obtained in lieu of maintenance would be 
divided amongst the other sharer, as it would have been if she has never 
taken it. Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow shall be limited interest 
Werner F. Menski: Hindu Law Beyond Tradition & Modernity, Oxford University Press, p. 486. 
V. Mayui<ha, p. 160 
'* Vide Siieo Shankar v Debi Sahai L.R. 301, A.202, Vide, Debi Mangal Prasad v Mahadev Prasad L.R.39, 
I.A. 121, 131-32. 
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known as a Hindu women's estate, provided however that she shall have 
the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. The Apex court in 
Kalawati Bai v Soiryabai,^^ held that under the provision of the Act of 1956, 
the limited ownership of Hindu widow would be converted into absolute 
ownership, existed when the Act came into force or there after. The 
intention of the legislature is clear that in fact a female Hindu originally had 
a limited right and later acquired the full right does not in any way alter the 
rules of succession given in sub sec (2) of section 15 of the Act of 1956.^ *^  
The topic of Women's estate will be discussed at length at another place. 
Now come to the continuing topic of Stridhana. 
Under the Hindu Law in operation prior to the coming into force of 
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a woman's ownership of property was 
limited. Great diversity of opinions prevail over the issue of Stridhana and 
woman's property in regard the absolute power of alienation. In this 
connection the main thing, which was considered, is the source from which 
the property is acquired and the status of woman as maiden, married or 
widow. No doubt it is true to say that the complexity of the shastric laws 
relating to Stridhana argues that it was never a wholly settled system.^^ 
In Prahadoeswara Mudaliar v Rajgopal PillaF an interesting 
question came before the court that, whether the property of a dancing girl 
can be treated as Stridhana. It was held that the property of a dancing girl 
is her Stridhana and will devolve upon her female issue in preference to 
her male issue. 
59 AIR(1991)SC1581. 
''" l^ lmgiit K;im v Tcja Siiigli (2002) I SCC 210 
'^ Goorodas Bannerji: op cit. 
" AIR (34) 1947, Mad. 71 (C.N.30). 
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The verses of Katyana and Narada,^^ which governed the rules of 
the rights of a female over Stridhana depend on three things the sources, 
the status and the school of women. 
''The wealth, which is earned by mechanical arts or which is received 
through affection from a stranger, is subject to her husbands dominion." 
Katyayana.^'' 
The property, which she has received from her husband, father or 
brother, or gifts from kindered, are technically, considered her Stridhana 
over which she has absolute ownership. The property given to her, by her 
husband if movable, after his death, she may dispose of it at her own 
pleasure. 
A very crucial question came before the court in the case of Rashmi 
Kumar v Mahesh Kumar Bhada,^^ whether the Stridhana property was 
exclusive property of the wife or was a joint property owned and held by 
both the spouses? All the three judges concurred on the point, that the 
Stridhana is the exclusive property of the wife. Fazal All J said, that the 
possession over Stridhana of a Hindu married female is clear and 
unambiguous. Stridhana is not a joint property of the wife and husband. By 
merely living in matrimonial home the stridhana does not becomes joint 
property of the spouses. It is also not a partnership property of the 
spouses. Though the husband in extreme distress can utilize it. 
Yajnavalkya^^ says "that the husband is not liable to return to the wife her 
"Verses 905-907,911 
'''' Dayabhaga, Cluip.4 section 1, para 19, cited by Muila (op cit) 
"(1997) 2 s e c 397 
^ Verses 11.147. 
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stridhana taken by him in a famine, for religious acts, in distress or wlien 
imprisoned." 
Status of the female also plays an important role in deciding the 
woman's right over Stridhana. In maidenhood a Hindu woman could 
dispose of her Stridhana property of every description at her pleasure. 
During the maiden-hood what the female earned, by her own labour is her 
absolute property, over which she has all the right to dispose of and to 
alienate it, minor can not dispose of her property. Married woman have 
absolute right over the property, which is called Saudayika or Stridhana in 
technical term. In BriJ Inder v Janl<i Koer^^ held that a Hindu widow has 
absolute power over every kind of property. 
Dayabhaga School allows the women to claim as Stridhana only the 
movable property that is not inherited, but given to her by her husband. 
The immovable property is excluded from the preview of Stridhana. Under 
Mitakashara school very little property is treated as stridhana. 
Christian Legal System 
Christianity is defined by Friedrich Schiermacher (1768-1834) as a 
"monotiieistic faitti. ...Essentially distinguished from others. Such faith by 
the fact that in it, every thing is related to the redemption accomplished by 
Jesus of Nazareth. ^^ 
Magnificent (Luke 1:52) stated that "God has put down the mighty 
from thrones and exalted those of low degree" The early church father 
"(1877)1 Ciil. 
68 Encyclopedia of Religion Vol. 3, p. 348. 
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rarely addressed the issue of economic justice but later on the leaders 
began to soften the hard saying of Jesus about riches. In scholastic period, 
the distribution of wealth was treated from a point of view that combined 
scripture and the writings of the church fathers with the works of Aristotle 
and Islamic thinkers.^^ 
In England a notion of property in land emerged at the end of 12*'^  
century from a mass of partly discretionary, partly customary, feudal rights 
and obligation/" Property according to Pufendrof, is founded in the 
physical power manifested in seizing in the object of property 
(occupation)^^ Bentham viewed, 'property is nothing but an expectation of 
protection created by tiie legislator and by settled practice.' John Stuart 
Mill associated property with liberty and suggested, that security of 
property is essential for man to maximize his potential for liberty. The 
communist Manifesto (1847) of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engle's held, 
'property is nothing but a device in the social warfare between the capitalist 
and proletarian classes the means by which the capitalist expropriates the 
labour of the proletahan and keeps him in slaveryJ^ 
Now in the civil law system the term 'property applies to those 
tangible things that can conveyed inter vivos and to a very few, if any 
Intangible. It includes every thing that is the object of the law of 
succession. 
Anglo American law distinguishes between real and personal 
property. The real property is land and every thing attached to it as 
'''' Ibid p. 363. 
The Origin of the Western Idea of Property are examined by Barry Nicholas in An Introduction to 
Roman Law^1962) reprinted 1987. 
" Encyclopedia Britanica; Vol. 26, p. 184. 
'' Ibid. 
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Immovable property and all other property - as moveable is termed as 
personal property. There are also two sets of laws \Q be adopted \o these 
real and personal property/^ 
The roots of American property law are in the feudal land law of 
England. Accordingly, it distinguishes real and personal property. Real 
property, is historically consisted, chiefly of feudally important estate in 
land, personal property includes such intangible as contract right including 
bank deposits, corporate stocks, industrial property including patents and 
copy rights. They are consisted of others assets like corporeal and 
incorporeal. In U.S. the rules of intestate succession are now largely the 
same for real and personal property.^ "* In the feudal age practical 
ownership consists of a life interest inalienable in most cases and of a 
reversion or remainder which again when vested, is simply another life 
interest.''^ 
in later part of the 18**^  century the Nepolean code was framed on 
individualistic principles and the right of ownership to be absolute exclusive 
and perpetual, was recognized.^^ The concept of family property is 
accepted in France and rules were made for the protection of this property 
for the benefit of future family member. The assets of family are 
considered as family property. Till then the concept of family property is 
unknown to English law.'''' 
In classical Roman Law the sum of rights, privileges and powers 
which a person could have in a thing, was called dominium, ownership Q^^ 
" Walsh W.F., Outlines of the History of English & American Law; (1626), pp. 41-42. 
•' Powell: An Inlroduclion lo the Legal System ofUnilecl Stale, p. 126. 
" Smith S.: The Development of European Law, p. 172. 
'^ Alarez A.: The Progress of Continental Law in the 19* Gen. (1819) p. 1-3. 
" "Financial Obligation with in the Family," The Cambridge Law Journal Vol. 60 (2001) part-1. 
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less frequently proprietors, in the English Bankrupty Act 1914, Property is 
defined in section 167 as-
"Property includes, money, goods, things in action, land and every 
description of estate, interest and profit present, past and future, vested or 
contingent arising out of or incident to property as above defined.^^" 
In Jones V Skinner/^ Landale M.R. has described the word 
'property" as being the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used 
in as much as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest 
which the party can have. But Bentham consider as metaphorical and 
improper the extension of the term to includes other rights than those 
which relate to material thing.^° 
The Concept of Matrimonial Property 
Traditionally under English law the married woman was subject to a 
variety of legal disabilities, which grew out of the view that husband and 
wife were one person. The legal personality of a female merged in that of 
her husband after the marriage. The husband was regarded as the quasi 
guardian of her wife. All of the woman's personal property and real 
property vest to the husband on marriage. This property is called the 
marital property over which the wife has no power.^ ^ The woman was 
cursed economically and made wholly to depend on man. She had no 
control even on her own earnings as those were all seized by the husband 
with full proprietry rights, though she would regain all the property if she 
became widow. 
'" Cited in Bans Gopal Case (1949) AIR (36) All 433. 
' ' 1835-42 R.R. 274 at p. 276 (5 L.J.N.S.) Ch. 87. 
^^  Bentham : Principles of Legislation p. 231 see Salmond Jurisprudence 9* ed. pp. 578-80. 
*' Vernier: American Family Laws (1931-38) p. 133 
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Many writers commented on the concept of Stridhana in Hindu law 
and the concept of marital property in English law. In marital property the 
personality of wife is merged in that of husband and what ever the property 
she possess goes to husband, disadvantaging...women in terms of 
property rights.®^ Though the concept of Stridhana and marital property are 
different but also resemble up to some extent. In regards to Stridhana the 
wife has absolute right subject to some exceptions and not so 
handicapped as under the concept of marital property of English Law. 
As long as western law remained under the sway of Christian priest 
woman remained without rights in those land.®^ 
In some countries and under some religious set ups though the 
situation is different, as Muslim woman owned and managed their own 
property and have absolute right to property. In Russia the wife is 
permitted to own and manage her property. In relation to property the 
Roman wife also enjoyed independence.^"* 
In the later part of the 19"^  century some radical reform were made in 
the laws related to marital property. As the consent of both the spouses 
were made necessary for disposal of property. The Fedral Republic of 
Germany in 1950 introduced legal equality in the matter of finance and 
property of the male and female. In 1965 the French Civil Code, in 1969 
Qubec Civil Code and in 1950 China made comprehensive changes in the 
laws related to property for women in terms of property rights. These 
reforms effected the other countries also and tremendous changes were 
brought in the position and power of women. 
" Werner: op cit, p. 486. 
" Encyclopedia Britanica Vol. 19, p. 80. 
'*'' Kidwai M.H. 'Woman Under different Social and Religious Laws, p. 26. 
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Parsi Law 
Under Parsi, law there is no difference between movable and 
immovable, real and personal, self-acquired and ancestral property. It 
means there is no different set of rules like Christian law or Hindu Law to 
govern these properties. Though before the amendment the laws 
governing the succession of agricultural land of a Parsi intestate was the 
subject of the Act of 1865 in which the son's share was four times more 
than the daughter and widow's share was double of daughter but the 
Orrisa High Court held that succession to agricultural land would be same 
as any other property. 
Recapitulation 
At last it can be said that the word property has different meaning in 
different times under different legal systems in different circumstances and 
even in different mythologies. Sometime it is treated as fictitious entity, on 
the other hand some one has understood the word property in terms of 
possession and ownership. Whatever the meaning is ascribed to the 
property its relation with human being is never denied. It is some thing, 
which is related to a human being, though under Muslim Law the property 
is related to Allah (SWT) who is considered under Islamic law the absolute 
owner of the world. Every thing in this world belongs to Allah (SWT) and 
man is only an agent or trustee. 
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SHARES OF FEMALES UNDER DIFFERENT LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
An Overview 
Inheritance or Succession means the devolution of property on an 
heir or heirs upon the death of the propositus. Every society has some kind 
of system, for dealing with the things or property that are in the control of 
the member who has died. It is quite complicated in every society. The 
rules and regulations which deal with the property to be distributed among 
the heirs differ according to the set ups, norms and values of each society. 
The law of inheritance is a body of principles and regulations 
governing the means by which assets and liabilities may be transferred, 
after the death, to the heirs. The concept of inheritance depends upon a 
common acceptance of the notion of private ownership of goods and 
property. In early societies a dead man's relics were buried with him as a 
ritual practice or apportioned to relations and other tribesman. The rules, 
governing the succession universally, depend upon the view of the 
deceased and the kinship as a primary consideration. Before going into 
detail about the law of inheritance we will have a look, how the law of 
inheritance has developed. 
Development of Family System 
The English word 'family' is derived from the Latin word 'familia,' 
which means 'house hold.' The organizations of household or families are 
varied from place to place. With the development of the political 
institutions, the family become a private place and characterized by 
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hierarchy, intimacy and support. In ancient Greek cities or states four level 
of kins grouping could be traced out, which are -
• the phratry (phratra) 
• the aristocratic clan (genos) 
• the kindered {anchisties) and 
• the house hold (oikos). 
The "phratries" were large tribal subdivisions, consisting of families 
claiming to common kin relation. At the apex of each "phratry", there were 
aristocratic clans that had certain hereditary rights such as the right to hold 
priestly offices. The kindered consisted of a set of relatives who can claim 
the inheritance. The partilineal kin groups were called the 'gens': Each 
'gens' had one or more recognized chiefs. Property was inherited with in 
the'gens'.^ 
The Romans distinguished two kinds of blood relatives, agnates and 
cognates. Agnates were relatives through male line and reckoned to be 
closer, because they have the right to inherit the property and the marriage 
was forbidden between them. The cognates were any other blood 
relatives.^ 
The ideals of Christianity, dominance of church and emergence of 
feudalism played an important role in shaping the medieval and post 
medieval families. With the spread of Christianity the close kin's marriages 
were forbidden and the inherited property was dispersed, which lessened 
the influence of kins based group. In the Middle Ages the women and 
' Encyclopedia Biilanica Vol. 6, p.317. 
-Ibid 
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children got rights in their own capacity independent of the head of 
household. 
The family is considered tlie basic unit of We society. Islam had 
provided an elaborate scheme for the establishment of a systematic and 
sound family life. 
After the very brief history of the family system and the development of the 
law of inheritance, we will discuss elaborately the rules governing the law 
of succession in different religio-legal system. 
Laws of Inheritance in Different Religio-Legal System 
Like all other laws, the rules governing the estate of a deceased also 
differs from place to place. Every system has their own rules and 
regulations to govern the succession suited to their socio-economic 
conditions. 
From the opening paragraph of the Sirajiyah -
"Learn the laws of Inheritance and teach them to the people, for they 
are one half of the useful knowledge." ^ 
"It is (inheritance) the most difficult subject of Hindu jurisprudence" 
Jimutvahana." 
Colbrook said, "A?O branch of jurisprudence is more important than 
the law of succession and inheritance as it constitutes that part of any 
Fatwa-e-Alamgiri, Vol. 10, Urudu Translation by Amir Ali (1982) p.421, see Sir Ronald K. Wilson; 
i nd Anglo Mohammadan Law (a digest) 2" ed. p. 283. 
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national system of laws which is the most peculiar and distinct and which is 
of most frequent use and extensive application.'"^ 
Fitz-Gerald's opinion is that, "in all system of law the doctrine of 
succession is, the touch stone of the lawyers, the legal mind delights in its 
inevitable intricacies, the layman in repelled."^ 
"All laws of inheritance are made up of the debris of the various forms 
which the family has assumed"^ 
Like all other laws the rules governing the estate of a deceased also 
differs from place to place. Every system has their own rules and 
regulations to govern the succession suited to their socio-economic 
conditions. 
By these saying of legal luminaries it is evident that the law of 
succession is the most important part of any legal system as it affect the 
interest of all description of people and deserve special notice. 
Under Islamic Law 
Great tribute is paid to the Islamic law of Inheritance not only by 
Muslims but by the western world also. As Coulson says, ''Jurisdically the 
law of succession is a solid technical achievement and Muslim Scholars 
takes a justifiable pride in the mathematical precision with which the right 
of various heirs in any given, situation can be calculated." 
' Mcnaughten W.H. : Principles & Precedents of Muslim Law (preliminary remark) p. 1 
^ Fitzgerald S.V. : Muslim Law & Abridgement, London (1931) p. 182. 
•^  See Smith :opcitp. 801. 
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William Jones "I am strongly disposed to believe that no possible 
question could occur on the Muslim Law of succession which might not be 
rapidly and correctly answered." 
A! Sirajiyah, "Islamic Law of Inheritance in its present form is a fixed 
scientific and beautiful harmonious system," 
The eminent writers and jurist because of its completeness, 
perfectness and elaborate provisions always admire the Islamic law of 
Inheritance. Islamic law of Inheritance brought many reforms in the existing 
system of succession in pre-lslamic world. In pre Islamic days the notions 
of kinship were based on blood feud, which was comradeship in arms. On 
this basis, women and children who were unable to bear arms, disqualified 
in regard to inheritance.'' Holy Quran laid down that nothing could furnish 
so strong a claim to inheritance as blood relation. This provision generally 
strengthens the family tie.^ 
"And they who believed and left their homes aften/vards and have 
striven along with you, these are also of you; but those who are united by 
ties of blood are nearer to each other, by Book of God. '^ 
By these Quranic injunctions, it is proved that Islam has brought a 
revolutionary change in the law of inheritance and gave importance to the 
family and relationship. 
To govern the Islamic law of inheritance there is a whole Surah 
(Surah Nisan) in which some injunctions are given. The Islamic Law 
introduced some changes in the pre Islamic rul^&'of ihheritance.'-As 
,. ^.i^r ' 
Op. cit Id pp. 55-66; Sec, Tayyabji ; Muslim Law p. 801. ' ) 
' Ibid p. 802 
' Quran : XXXIII, Surah Nisan ' / ' 
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by Islam the husband, wife and cognates were made entitled to 
inherit. There is no need to discuss the whole Islamic law of 
inheritance and succession with its minute details but to understand 
the women's property right it is necessary to give a brief draft of 
Islamic law of Inheritance. 
Salient Features of Islamic Law of Inheritance 
"Nemo est heirs viventis," 
Right of inheritance arises only after the death of propositus, no 
person is the heir of a living Muslim,^° the person whose property is to be 
distributed unless he is dead.^ ^ The estate vests immediately in each heir 
at the moment of the death, in proportion to the share prescribed by Holy 
Quran.''^ 
Dual Basis of Islamic Law of Inheritance 
The whole Islamic law of inheritance is based on two bases with the 
exception of Shia Law. First- Holy Quran, second - pre-lslamic customs 
and usages. The pre-lslamic customs and usages have an important place 
in the law of inheritance. The customs, which were not expressly 
abrogated by the Holy Quran, continued to prevail. The Holy Quran did not 
swept away all the existing laws of succession of pre-lslamic world.^^ 
'" Hasan Ali v Nazo (1889) 11 All 456. 
" Raziya Begum v Anwar Begum (1958) S.C.R. (India) 1111, 1137. 
'^  Dhan Pal v Faluman, AIR (1935) Lah. 203. 
" Murtaza Hussain Khan v Md. Ali Khan, ILR 33 All 532 (P.C.) 
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The Nearer in Degree Excludes the Remoter 
The preference will be decided by the nearness of the 
consanguinity.^'* 
Rule of Representation 
The rule of representation is not generally recognized in Islamic law. 
The heir's apparent right,: of succession do not pass to his own heir.^ ^ It 
means the children of pre-deceased child will not represent their father or 
mother at the time of succession.In Abdul Huq v Seetaram Sethi,^^ it is said 
that children in Islamic family were not co-owner in the sense that what 
was purchased by one person was also for the benefit of another. In this 
case, the children of the deceased Muslim were minor at the time of his 
death. Their paternal uncle on their behalf had purchased some property in 
the name of one of the minor child. It was held no rule of representation,^'' 
h recognized in Islamic law, meansJhe children of pre-deceased child will 
not represent their father or mother at the time of succession. 
Illustration:- A died leaving behind a son and a son of a 
predeceased son. The whole property will go to his son and the son's son 
will get nothing. 
''' Karamat Ali v Sadat Ali (1932) 8 Luck. 228, See also Smt. Kulsumunnisa v Sint. Ahmadi Begum AIR 
(1972) All 219, Agha Walyat v Mahbub, AIR (1942) Pesh. 83. 
" Dak.shan Chniidra v Takim Dhnit AIR (1924), Cni, 55^. 
'"(1927) 106-l-C, 76 
'^  Waliullah : Mohammadan Law p. 268 See : also Maimoona Bibi v Khwaja Mohiuddin (1970) 1 MLJ 
266, Jafri Begum v Amir Mohd Khan (1886) 7 All 842, Bhagirathi Bai v Roshan Bibi, ILR 43 Bom. 412. 
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(P) 
(Whole property) S (S) 
I 
S's (Excluded) 
Rule of Spes-Successionis 
A chance of an heir, it means there will be a chance to inherit. But 
under Islamic law, the inheritance open on the death of a person and no 
birthright or rule of representation is recognized. So there is no question of 
mere an expectation, to be an heir because it may happen that one will not 
survive the other. In the life of a Muslim no one can be a heir of his 
property.^ ® 
No Concept of Joint Family 
In Muslims there is no concept of joint family. Under Islamic law the 
property acquired by some members will not be deemed to be the joint 
family property^^ but it is not contrary to Islamic law, if a family trade is 
carrying on, for the benefit of all members.^" If the members of an Islamic 
family live in commensality they do not form a joint family. 
No Rule of Primogeniture 
The preference to eldest son in the matter of succession was given 
by near about all the legal system in ancient time, it is said that it was 
originated in the English feudal system and also prevalent among Jews.^ ^ 
But under Islamic law there is no concept of the rule to give the entire 
" Tayyabji F.B.: Mohammadan Law, liird ed. Sec. 382. 
" Abdul Saniad v Biwi Jan AIR (1933) All 206, Sec : Also Sukrullah v Zcliia Bibi AIR (1932), All 512. 
^^  Mohd Abdul Rahim v Abdul Hakim, AIR (1921) Cal. 653. 
'^ Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol. 12, p. 254. 
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estate to the eldest son excluding the other heirs or to leave them on 
whims and caprice of the eldest son. Every heir shall inherit in his or her 
own capacity. 
No Birth Right 
In Muslims the children are not born with the right of property as in 
Hindu law. Under Islamic law there is no distinction between ancestral or 
self acquired property.^^ or they do not form a coparcenary in which the 
child has property right from his birth. 
No Concept of Survivorship 
Under Islamic law there is no concept of joint family, so no 
survivorship is recognized, which is the main characteristic of joint family of 
Hindu Law. The principle is unknown to Islamic law and the heirs of 
deceased take their share as, are tenants in common and not as joint 
tenants.^^ 
Rules Relating to Illegitimate Children 
An illegitimate child and its father are not related in law so they are 
not competent to inherit from each other.^^ An illegitimate child cannot 
inherit to a legitimate child born to the mother of subsequent marriage.^^ 
Under Sunni law there is a provision that an illegitimate child can inherit 
from her mother but under Shia law he or she is not entitle to inherit from 
any parents.^^ Under Hanafi law an illegitimate child also inherits from a 
^^  Ram Abidi v Mirza Ahmad, AIR (1925), Oudh 190. 
" M. Khazir Bhat v Ahmad Dar AIR (1960) J & K 57, See : also Ma Bi v Ma Khatiin AIR (1930) Rang 72. 
" Boodhun v Jaii Khan (1870) W.R. 265. 
" Rahmatullah v Maqsood Ahmad AIR (1952) All 640 at p. 641. 
^^  Tayyabji - op. cit. p. 819. 
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person to whom, it is related through it's mother as distant kindered. The 
putative parents do not inherit from an illegitimate child under Shia Law.^ "^  
Insanity and Unchastity 
In Islamic law mental derangement is not an impediment on 
succession.^^ Wife run away from her house and live in adultery, it was 
held that she was entitled to inherit unless she was divorced.^^ 
Non-Muslim Can Not be an Heir 
"/A Muslim cannot be the heir of a disbeliever, nor can a disbeliever 
be the heir of a Muslim,"^^ narrated by Usman bin Zaid. K.P. 
Chandrashekar Appa v Govt of Mysorei^^ the facts of the case were, that a 
converted Muslim woman died, intestate leaving considerable property but 
have no issue. The brother of the wife who was still Hindu claimed her 
property as brother. It was held that brother is not entitled to succeed. A 
daughter, being a sole heir of a converted Muslim, was held to inherit the 
whole property as a heir and by way of Return.^^ In 1947, a question 
before the court was whether succession and inheritance of a converted 
Muslim be governed by Islamic law?^^ It was held that Islamic law applied 
to a Muslim not only by birth but by religion also. A converted Muslim 
would be governed in all matters by Islamic law as his personal law. 
" In Bafatan v Bi/aiti Khanam (J903) CaJ. 683, 
^^ Khyratun v Amanee, ii, W.R. 212. 
'^ Mohd Bakhsh vj^ayat Khan (1888)23, Piinj. Rcc. No. 37 (98,100). 
" Sahih -Al-Bukliari Vol. 8 
" AIR (1953) Mys. 621. 
32 Ruiananibai v Bismillabai, AIR (1993) M.P. 45. 
33 Bai Khatya v Karim Bahi, AIR (1947) Guj. 4 at p. 7. 
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Homicide 
A person, who has caused the death of another, whether 
intentionally or by mistake or by negligence or by accident, is not entitled to 
inherit the property of that deceased. '^* Though according to Sirajiyah,^^ the 
descendants of the murderer were not be excluded.Shia law excludes the 
murderer, only in the case of intentional murder. 
iVIissing Person 
The rule of Islamic law is that missing person must be regarded alive 
till lapse of 90 years from his birth, which is abrogated by the Indian 
Evidence Act. If the person is to be presumed alive his property cannot be 
distributed among his heirs, the part of the estate, which he is, entitle to be 
inherited kept apart.^^ 
Unborn Person as being Heir 
If the female relative of the deceased is pregnant at his time of the 
death, the child in mother womb will be considered competent to inherit but 
born alive and the share kept for him or her will be the maximum. 
Several Deaths at a Time 
If there are several deaths among the heirs of the deceased before 
final distribution of his estate, the shares of different heirs must be 
determined on the basis of each death working out final distribution.^^ In 
the leading case of Jafri Begum v Amir Mohd,^^ the court held that the jus 
^^ Kenchava v Girimallapa AIR (1924) p.c. 209 
" Sir William Jones op cit. 22-28. 
''Tayyiibji - op cil p. 824. 
" Mst. Jawai v Uussaiii Baksh (1922) 3 Lali. 80, 67, !C, 154. 
3 8 V ^ J T ) 
(1886) 7 All 822, 834 Moola Qasim v Moola AH AIR (1905) 32-1-A. 177-179, para 2 
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representation is being absolutely unknown to Islamic law of inheritance, 
the right of inheritance depends upon the exact time of death when the 
person, through whom the heir claims otherwise, died, the orders of death 
being the sole guide in such cases. At this time the rule that younger 
survive the elder will apply. 
After discussing the general principles of the law of inheritance. It is 
inevitable to know briefly the heirs and quantum of their shares in the 
heritage of the deceased. 
Kinds of Heirs 
''Jo benefit everyone we have appointed iieirs and sliares to the 
property, left by partner and near relatives."^^ 
The heirs are divided into three classes according to the order of 
succession. 
• Sharers 
• Residuaries 
• Distant kindered 
Sharers 
The sharers are those persons who are entitled to a prescribed 
share of inheritance by Holy Quran. They are twelve in number, four males 
and eight females. These are also called the Quranic sharers, who consist 
of those relations, which were excluded from the inheritance, under the 
customary law. Though their claims on the score of priority are not inferior 
to them.^° The male sharers are father, grandfather (paternal), uterine 
^'^ Holy Quran IV :33 
'"' Tayyabji - op. cit. p. 827 
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brother and husband. The female sharers are wife, daughter, son's 
daughter (how low so ever) full sister, consanguine sister, uterine sister, 
mother and grandmother (paternal and maternal). The fractional quantum 
of the share is also fixed by Holy Quran in Surah Nisan, which deals 
elaborately in different verses about the inheritance. The fixed shares are 
1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 2/3, 1/3, 1/6. The ascertainment of heirs, as well as allocation 
of their share is decided in every case, according to the principle of the 
school, to which the deceased belonged at his/her death. The difference of 
the School of heirs will make no effect.'*^ The quantum of the share be 
determined at each death."*^ The estate vests immediately in each heir at 
the death according to the quantum of share ordained by Holy Quran.''^ 
This ownership cannot be suspended till the payment of the debt."*"* Next to 
sharer the residuaries come and after that the distant kindered. 
Example: If only father, mother and husband are survived, they all 
are sharer and the property will immediately vest in them. In this case the 
father will inherit as residuary because there are no children. 
(Residuary) (share) 
(2/3of1/2)f\ M 1/6 (1/3 of 1/2) 
43 
llayal-iiii-Nisiin v Molid (1890) I All 290. 
Supra note 36. 
Supra note 12. 
ibbar,AIR(1943)Pesh,65. 
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Residuaries 
All those persons, whose shares are not prescribed by the Holy 
Quran and inherit the residue after the prescribed shares been given to the 
sharers, are called the residuaries. Relating to residuaries there is a Hadith 
of Prophet (PBUH) narrated by Abu Hurrairah, "The Prophet (PBUH) of 
Allah (SWT) said "w//?o are nearer to the believers than themselves and 
who so ever dies and leave property it is for the residuaries if no sharer "^^ 
It means that after allotting the prescribed shares to the sharers if 
the property left that residue will go to residuaries. Some times if there is 
no sharer the residuaries inherit the whole property. If there are widow, son 
and daughter, after allotting the prescribed share of widow (as she is 
sharer) the residue will be inherited by son and daughter (as residuaries). 
(P) - Wv8 
S 1(7/12) D 1(7/24) 
(residuaries) (residuaries) 
According to Sirajiyah there are three types of residuaries 
Residuary in their own right 
• Residuary in another right 
• Residuary together with another 
""^  Sahih Bukhari Vol.8, translated by M.M. Khan, chapter 5, Tr. No. 2309. 
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Reslduaries in their own Riglits 
Those, who are related with the deceased without the intervention of 
the females, are said to be the residuaries in their own rights. They are 
four and all are males. 
• Deceased's descendants (his) 
• Deceased's ascendants (hhs) 
• Deceased's father's descendants (his) 
• Deceased's grand father's descendants (his) 
Residuaries in Another Right 
The residuary, in another right is every female who becomes or is 
made a residuary by the presence of a male, who is parallel to her. These 
are four females: 
Daughter with son, 
• Daughter with son. 
• Son's daughter with son's son 
• Full sister with full brother 
• A half sister with father and half brother 
Residuaries together with Another 
The residuary with another is every female who becomes a 
residuary with another female; as full sisters or half sisters by father,who 
become residuaries with daughters or son's daughters.^^ 
Sir Edward Ryan: Digest of Mohammaden Law 
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Among residuaries the nearer will be preferred. There are six 
sharers who under certain conditions become the residuariesJather, grand-
father, daughter, son's daughter, full sister and consanguine sister. Father 
and grand-father sometimes inherits in both the capacities as sharer and 
as residuary. Daughter, son's daughter, full sister and consanguine sister 
are four females who inherits either as a sharer or as residuaries under 
certain circumstances. 
Distant Kindered 
About the distant kindered there is a Hadith narrated by Ibn Abbas, 
the Prophet (PBUH) of Allah (SWT) said, "g/Ve the faraid to those who are 
entitled to receive it. Then whatever remains, should be given to closest 
male relatives of the deceased.""^^ Distant kindered are meant those blood 
relations who are not competent to inherit either as sharers or as 
residuaries."^^ These distant kindered are consist of cognates and females. 
Majority of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) accepted that the 
distant kindered be entitled to get property as heir. In the absence of any 
general and special custom to the contrary, the distant kindered would 
succeed against any person whose relations are undefined.''^ But Imam 
Malik and Imam Shafai do not subscribe to this view.^° Distant Kindered 
are also of four kinds-
• Descendants of the deceased 
• Ascendants of the deceased 
• Descendants of parents of the deceased 
Siihili Riiklmri Vol. 8. Ininslatcd by M,M. KIKIII. Cliaplcr 5, k. No :^ 30<), 
Tayyabji,op cil p. 818. 
Inayat v Mst. Bhasin AIR (1928) Lah. 291 at p. 294. 
Al-Haj Mohd UUah : The Muslim Law of Inheritance 
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• Descendants of the grand parents of the deceased 
There is an acute controversy about to whom the preference should 
be given over the other. According to Abu Hanifa preference should be 
given to second class over first class then third then fourth. But Abu 
Yousuf and Mohd Hasan bin Ziyad reported from Abu Hanifa that the order 
of preference should be according to the first, second third and fourth.^^ 
The remotest relative will inherit under this head.^^ 
The fluctuation of Shares among the Sharers and Residuaries 
Though the shares of the sharers are prescribed in the Holy Quran 
and fixed, but according to the situational circumstances, sometimes the 
share also fluctuate. All the twelve sharers can not get their shares at a 
one and the same time. There are some conditions which are also 
prescribed in Holy Quran, which governs the actual succession and the 
position of sharers, residuaries and distant kindered, at the time of the 
devolution of property of the deceased. Now the position of each sharer in 
different condition is necessary to be discussed to understand the 
succession easily. 
Male Sharer 
Father - "And to parents each of them shall have 1/6 part of the 
inheritance if he has son, but if he has no issue (son) and his parents are 
his heirs then his mother shall be entitled to 1/3 and if he have brethren, 
then his mother must come 1/6 after any bequest or debts. '^^ 
'^ Al-Sirajiah^cited by Mohd Ullah. 
" Abdul Serang v Putee Bibi (1902) 29, Cal. 738. 
" Holy Quran IV : II 
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Any one cannot exclude the father 
• He is a sharer of 1/6 along with son or son's son (his) 
• He is sharer and residuary both, when there is a daughter or 
son's daughter (his) and no son or son's son. 
• He becomes residuary with mother if there is no child or son's 
child. 
Examples: 
1/6 
1. Father 
Son (his) 
2. Father 
Daughter 
1/6 
5/6 
1/2 
1/2 
(P)-
(P) 
S 5/6 
Fl/2 
Di /2 
3. Father 
Mother 
2/3 
1/3 
2/3 Mi /3 
(P) 
True Grandfather - There are Two Hadiths relating to the right of true 
grand father from Ibn Abbas, "^rand father is either treated or dealt with as 
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the father," Bukhari, from Maqbal bin Yasar. "The Prophet (PBUH) of Allah 
(SWT) gave to the grand father among us 1/6", Ibn Majah. 
• True grandfather can be entirely excluded by fatlner 
• In the absence of father the true grand father inherit like the 
father but-
o He can not reduce the mother's share to the 1/3 of the 
residue, 
o He can not exclude paternal grand father, 
o The full or consanguine brother, in existence of the grand 
father shall not be excluded and the grand father shall get 
the share equal to that of the brother, 
o Father's mother in the existence of father,stands excluded 
but she shall not be excluded by the grand father. 
Examples: 
1. Father 
Grandfather 
Son (his) 
1/6 
excluded 
5/6 
(P) 
GF(Excluded) 
Fi /6 
>5/6 
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2. Grand father 
Daughter 
1/2 
1/2 
(P) 
GF 1/2 
(F) 
D 1/2 
Uterine Brother - "If a man or a woman be succeeded oy a collateral 
relation (having left neither a parent nor a child) and the deceased have a 
(uterine) brother or sister then to each of them twain 1/6 and if they be 
more than two, then they shall be sharers in 1/3 after payment of bequest 
and debt.' •64 
Uterine brother be excluded by the child or son's child (his). 
Uterine brother be excluded by the father and grand father. 
The share will be 1/6. 
If two or more then 1/3 (collectively). 
Example: 
Father's brother 
Uterine brother 
Uterine sister 
2/3 
1/6 
1/6 
(F)—FB 2/3 
(P)—UB1/6 —USi /6 
54 Hoiy Quran IV : 11-12 
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Husband "And unto you belongeth Yi of that which your wives leave if 
they have no issue but if they have a child then to you 1/4 of what they 
shall leave after paying bequest and debts."^^ 
Husband takes % share along with children or son's children 
He takes Yz if there is no children or son's children 
Examples: 
1. Husband 
Son 
Daughter 
1/4 
2/3 (of residue) 
1/3 
(P) 
>2/3 (of v.) 
Hi M 
Di /3 (of 'A) 
2. Husband 1/2 
Daughter's son - 1/2 
(P) — 
(D) 
DS1/2 
Hi /2 
Holy Quran IV: 12 
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Female Sharers 
Wife - "And unto them (your wives) belongetti VA part of that which ye 
leave, if ye have no issue; but if ye have issue, then they shall have an 1/8 
part of what ye leave after paying the bequeth and debts. '^^ 
• The wife inherits in every situation. 
• The wife or wives take % if there is no child or child of a son 
(his). 
• The wife or wives takes 1/8 when there is a child of a son (his) 
• The word wife or widow means the wife of valid marriage. In 
case of fasid or void marriage there shall pass no inheritance 
between them. 
• The Kitabiah wife (who has not been converted) is not entitle 
to inherit each other.^'' On the basis of this difference of status 
several distinctions in law have been maintained between 
Muslim and Kitabiah wife e.g. if a Muslim wife commits 
adultery she is awarded the fixed 'Hadd' punishment but 
Kitabiah wife is not punished for adultery with Hadd.^ ® 
• In the case of divorce, if the husband has, in his sound health, 
irrevocably divorce, atonce, breaks off. The divorce having 
been effect in sound health, the husband dying during the 
wife's observance of probationary period (Iddat) makes no 
difference. The wife shall not be his heir.^ ^ 
Holy Quran IV: XII 
Abu Zchni: Ahkam-AI-larka wa! Mawaiilli, I)ai-Al-l'ikr-al-Aiabi, Cairo, pji, I'l l-i'l.', 
Rehman, Dr: op.cit.p. 479, Tanzilur 
Ibid p. 132 
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In the case of Khula, Mubarat or divorced by court degree they 
will not inherit each other. 
The pronouncement of divorce during the death illness shall 
not affect the right of inheritance of wife. 
Examaples: 
1. Wife 
Sister 
1/4 >3/4" 
3/4 (full or consanguine) 
(P) -w 1/4 
2. Wife 
Son's daughter-
1/8 
7/8 
P)-
(S) 
S'D 7/8 
4A/i /8 
Daughter - "Concerning the provision for chiidren, Allati (SWT) ctiargetli 
you to the male equivalent of the portion of two females and if there be a 
woman only, if more than two then they shall have 2/3 of the inheritance 
and if there be only one she have 1/2 ."^ ° 
• The daughter cannot be excluded. 
• If there is no son-
60 Holy Quran IV : 11 
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The daughter will take V2 of the property if she is alone. 
In case there are more than one daughter then 2/3 collectively. 
If there is a son then she will inherit as residuary and her 
share will be half of a male (brother). 
Examples: 
1. Wife 
Son 
1/8 
2/3 (of 7/8) 
(P)- Wi /8 
>2/3 D 1/3 
Daughter 1/3 (of 7/8) 
(P) 
2. Son 
Daughter 
2/3 
1/3 
>2/3 D 1/3 
3. Son's son 
2 daughters 
1/3 
2/3(Collectively) (S) 
(P) 
Di /3 Di /3 
S'S 1/3 
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There is also a Hadith relating to the rights of the daughter - from 
Jabjr bin Abdullah - "A woman came with her two daughters before the 
Prophet (PBUH) of Allah (SWT) and said "O" Prophet (PBUH) of Allah 
(SWT) these two daughters are of Sabit bin Qais who was killed in the 
battle of Uhad, their uncle has taken away the entire property and has left 
nothing for them. It is not possible to get them married without property. 
The Prophet (PBUH) answered, Allah (SWT) alone could decide". There 
after recited the Quranic verses as stated in Surah Nisan "Usi Kimullah-I-
awladikum" were revealed. The Prophet (PBUH) sent for the woman and 
the uncle and told him to give 2/3 to the two daughters and 1/8 to widow 
and to take for himself the residue."^'^ 
Son's daughter 
• 
If there is no child of the deceased then son's daughter will be 
sharer if alone 1/2 and if two or more then two 2/3 but with 
equal son's son she become residuary. 
If there is a son then children of the son will inherit nothing. 
If there is only one daughter and no son, higher son's son or 
equal son's son then she will inherit 1/6 as sharer. 
If there is more than one daughter and these have taken their 
2/3 share then son's daughter shall be excluded and get 
nothing. 
If there is lower son's son and she does not inherit as sharer 
she will succeed as a residuary. 
61 Abu Daud, Tirmizi. 
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1. 2 daughters 
Son's son 
Son's daughter 
2/3 
2/3 (of 1/3) 
1/3 (of 1/3) 
(S) 
S'S2/3 
(P) 
Dl/3 
S'D 1/3 
Di/3(2/3 collectively) 
Daughter 
Son's son 
Son's daughter 
Dl/2 
-
(P) 
1/2 
2/3 (of 1/2) 
1/3 (of 1/2) 
( S) 
S'D 1/3 S'D 2/3 
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Full Sister - "If a man die childless and have a sister Vz of the heritage 
shall be hers and he would have inherited from her if she died childless: 
and if there be two or more then 2/3 of the heritage, and if there be 
bretheren, both males and females, the male shall have portion of two 
females, Allah (SWT) makes this manifest to you that yc on not, Allah 
(SWT) knows of all things."^^ Holy Quran declares that the share of male 
child be equivalent of two females.^^ 
• If there is no son or son's son (his) father, grand father (hhs) 
or full bother, then full sister will inherit in the capacity of 
sharer, her share will be Yi if alone and 2/3 if more than one. 
With full brother she will become residuary. 
If there is son's daughter the full sister become residuary. 
Examples: / ^ t <^ L\0 
1. Mother 
Full sisters 
Uterine brother 
\\ 
1/6 
\ 
2/3 (collectively) 
1/6 
UB 1/6 
M 1/6 
-(P) FS 1/3 F'S 1/3 
'HolyQurn:IV-177 
' Smt. Halima Bibi v S.A. Fatima Bibi (1987) MLJ 353. 
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2. Daughter 
Son's daughter 
Full Sister 
1/2 
1/6 
1/3 
(S) 
S'D 
(P) 
1/6 
D 1/2 
F.Si /3 
Consanguine Sister 
• The consanguine sister will inherit V2 if alone and 2/3 if two or 
more only^if there is no child, child of son (his), father, true 
grand father (hhs), father's brother full sister and consanguine 
brother. 
• With the consanguine brother she will inherit as residuary. 
• If there is only one full sister and one consanguine sister then 
she will inherit as a sharer 1/6. 
• If there is no full sister then she will be a residuary with 
daughter or with son's daughter. 
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Example: 
1. Full Sister 
Consanguine sister 
Mother 
Brother's son 
1/2 
1/6 
1/6 
1/6 
M 1/6 
C'S 1/6 -(P)- F.S 1/2 -(B) 
>1/6 
Uterine Sister - There are two situations in which Uterine sister is entitled 
to inherit. 
If there is no issue of the deceased or his son. 
If there is neither father nor grand father. 
There share will be 1/6 if alone, 2/3 if more than one. 
Mother 
• Mother can never be excluded but her share fluctuate 
according to the situations. 
• The mother will take 1/6 share as sharer with the child or with 
sister, child (his) or with two or more brother or sister. 
• Her share will be 1/3 if there is no child (his) and sister or 
brother. 
79 
Chapter -III 
• If there is husband or a wife and both parents then the mother 
will inherit 1/3 of what remaining after satisfying the share of 
husband or wife and the residue is to father. 
• If in a place of father there is grand father mother's share will 
be 1/3 of the whole property. 
• The step mother of the deceased is not entitled to inherit as 
there is neither relationship by lineage or by affinity. 
Example; 
1. Father 
Mother 
Son 
Daughter 
1/6 
1/6 
2/3 (of 2/3) 
1/3 (of 2/3) 
'1/6 Mi /6 
(P) 
>2/3 '1/3 
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Grandmother 
The share of true grandmother is 1/6 whether one^two or more 
whether paternal or maternal. 
The paternal grandmother will inherit 1/6 where there is no 
mother, father or intermediate true grandfather. 
Maternal grandmother will inherit 1/6 if there is no mother. 
Example: Father's mother 
Mother's mother 
(Excluded by father) 
1/6 (not excluded) 
Father 5/6 (as residuary) 
(excluded by father) F'M 
"5/6 
(P) 
M'Mi/6 
(M) 
Aportionment or Computation of Heritage 
At the time of allocation of shares to the entitled heirs three situation 
anses-
• The sum of shares is equal to the heritage 
• The sum of the shares exceed the heritage 
• The sum of shares is less than heritage 
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There is no practical problem if the sum of shares and heritage is 
equal but in other two conditions the problem arises which are solved by 
the special rules provided under Islamic law by the name of Doctrine of 
Awl and Doctrine of Radd. 
Doctrine of Awl 
In the situation when the sum of the shares exceed to the heritage, 
the share of each sharer is diminished or reduced proportionately for 
example- If a lady dies leaving behind husband and two full sisters. The 
share of the husband will be Vi and sister's share will be 2/3. The total o( 
these shares will exceed the unity. 
Illustration 
Husband - 1/2 = 3/6 reduced to 3/7 
2 full sisters - 2/3 = 4/6 reduced to 4/7 
7/6 reduced to 7/7 
Explanation : The proportional shares of V2 = 3/6 and 2/3 = 4/6 the 
total will lIQ^Ne increases the denominator of 3/6 & 4/6 to make it equal to 
the numerator. 
Doctrine of Radd 
In the second situation the problem comes in this way that after 
allotting the share to the sharer some heritage is left as a residue and 
there is no residuary. In this situation the residue is returned to the sharers 
in the proportional way except in the case of husband and wife. In doctrine 
of Radd to equalize the shares to the heritage the common denominator is 
decreased. The difference between Awl and Radd is that in the previous 
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case by increasing the common denominator the sum is equalized but in 
later case by decreasing the common denominator the shares are 
equalized. 
Illustration : A Muslim dies leaving behind mother and daughter the 
Quranic shares of mother 1/6 and daughter 1/2 will not exhaust the whole 
heritage and 1/6 will left as residue. This residue according to rule of Radd 
will go by Return to the sharers by decreasing the common denominator of 
fractional share. 
Mother 1/6 = 1/6 increased to 1/4 
Daughter 1/2 = 3/6 increased to 3/4 
4/6 4/4 
In the Case of Husband or Wife 
The general exception, of the Doctrine of Radd is that this will not 
apply in the case of husband or wife. It means they will not get the residue 
by way of Return. '^* Along with the wife, the sister is not a residuary she will 
get by Return.^^ With the exception of husband and wife the distant 
kindered can not succeed so long as there is any sharer or residuary.^^ 
The doctrine of Return or Radd was discussed at full length in the leading 
case of Abdul Hamid v Piyare Mirza. According to Shia law the wife is not 
entitle to Return but the rigour of law has been modified on equitable 
consideration. It has been held that the wife even if she had no issue got 
65 
Ali Sahebvllajra Begum (1963) 2 Mys., L.J. 14 at p. 14. 
Mubarak Begum v Suhail Kumar AIR (1957) Raj. 154 at p. 157. 
Mst. Zainab v Jamal Khan AIR (1957) Nag. 428 at p. 430. See Koonasi v Datun (1884) 1 Cal. 14 (ILR). 
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all property of the deceased husband against the principle of Escheat,^'' 
and against the classical rule. In Shia law a childless widow is not entitled 
to take share in landed property.®^ But in Ali Saheb v Hajra Begum,^^ it was 
held that if there was no residuary the residue reverted to the sharer. It is 
applicable where the husband or wife is the sharer. In another case of 
Abdul Matin v Abdul Aziz^° the residue was given to distant kindered 
instead of reverting back to husband. 
Shia Law of Inheritance 
Hanafis and Ithna Asharis interpret Holy Quran, which is the basic 
source of Islamic law, differently in relation to the law of inheritance. Hanafi 
jurists interpreted the Holy Quran in a literal and strict meaning, while the 
Ithna Asharis has interpreted it in a liberal and wider sense. The second 
thing, which makes a contrast between the Sunnis and Shias law of 
inheritance, is that under Hanafi law the pre Islamic customary laws were 
kept intact which were not specially abrogated by the Quranic injunctions. 
On the other hand Ithna-Asharis had abrogated the old customary laws 
and developed a new set of principles on the basis of Quranic injunctions. 
Under Shia law the right of inheritance emerged on two bases'','' either the 
claimant is related to the deceased by sabab, which means by marriage or 
by nasab, which means consanguinity. 
• By Sabab - Husband & Wife 
• By Nasab - All relatives entitle to inherit 
"isab V Isab (1920) 44 Bomb. 947. 
'" Muzaffar Ali v Prabhavati (1907) 29 All 640. 
"•^  Supra note 64. 
^"AIK(l991)Ci;ui. 7(). 
71 Ameer Ali - Mohammadan Law Vol. 2. pp. 
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All heirs under Shia law are either sharer or residuarles. There is no 
concept of distant kindered In Shia law 72 
Comparison of Sunni & Shia Law of Inheritance 
• Under Shia law the cognates and agnates were treated 
equally in the matter of inheritance/^ Sunni prefer the near in 
degree to the more remote whilst Shias apply the rule of 
propinquity to all cases without distinction of class or sex. 
Illustration ; If a person dies leaving behind him a brother's son and 
brother's grand son and his own daughter's son. Among the Sunnis the 
brother's son being a male agnate and nearer to the deceased than the 
brother's grand son inherit in preference to others but among Shias, the 
daughter's son being nearer in blood, would exclude the others.'''' 
Examples: 
Sunni Law Shia Law 
(P) 
(D) 
D'S(excluded) 
(B) (P)-
S (inherit whole) (D) 
(B) 
S (excluded) 
S'S (excluded) D'S(inherit whole) S'S (excluded) 
^ Tayyabji : op cit p. 867, See Waliullah : Mohammadan Law (B.R. Vermas) 5"' ed. 1978 p. 400 
" Ibid p, 89-1 
'•• Syed Ameer All : The Personal Law of the Mohammadans (1880) (Comparative Sketch of the Law ol' 
Inheritance among Shia and Sunnis) p. 44. 
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Under Shia law class I heirs wholly exclude class II and III 
heirs, class \\ exclude class three. Among class III nears in 
degree exclude the remorter. 
Both Shia & Sunni law does not recognize the doctrine of the 
representation, to entitle the person to inherit, in the place of 
his father or mother. But under Shia law it is applied to decide 
the quantum of the share of any given person, under Sunni 
law it is not applied at all.^^ 
Under Sunni law a daughter's daughter as an uterine relation 
has no place in the inheritance until all the heirs and 
residuaries are exhausted but under Shia law she would 
inherit the share of her mother.^^ 
When the children of a son coexist with the children of a 
daughter, the son's children shall take 2/3 and daughter's 
children 1/3 the respective share of their parents in Shia law. 
Under Sunni law the children of a daughter are uterine 
relations and postponed until the sharers and the residuaries 
are exhausted'''' 
The Shia law recognized partly the principle of primogeniture, 
holding that the eldest son is entitle to sabre, the Holy Quran, 
the signet, the robes of honour and other vestments of his 
deceased father but not under Sunni law.''^ 
• When there is a half brother by the same mother and the son 
of a full brother, the estate goes to the half brother in Shia law 
but under Sunni law the half brother get 1/6 and the remainder 
goes to the son of the full brother.''^ 
Mtl Kli.iii M A IsLiinic l.iw ollnlicnl.mcc p 170 
'" ibid p 78 
" Ibid p 79 
'^ Ibid p 74 
' ' Ibid p 84 
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Examples: 
Sunni Law Shia Law 
(P) UBi76 (B) (P) UB (B) 
(inheritwhole) 
S5/6 S 
• 
(Excluded) 
Where there are paternal uncles and aunts they take the 
inheritance in the usual portion two to one but under Sunni law 
the entire estate will go to paternal uncles to the exclusion of 
aunts.^° 
Under Shia law the distribution of the property is according to 
per-stripe but under Sunni law as per capita.^^ 
Under Shia law the females however remote will inherit with 
the son.^ 2 
If a woman be divorced by a husband during an illness of 
which he does not recover and which eventually causes his 
death, her inheritance right will continue for the one year 
under Shia law but under Sunni law until the expiration of the 
women's period of probation.^^ 
Under Shia law there is a difference between real and 
personal estate, but not under Sunni law. If there is no child 
then Shia widow will be entitled to 1/2 of the personal estate 
only, including house hold^trees and buildings but not inherit in 
real estate, Jn case there are children then 1/8 of both 
personal and real property.^ "^  
In Shia law if a non Muslim dies leaving behind a Muslim and 
a non Muslim heir, the Muslim heir though remote in degree, 
"' Ibid p. 86 
"TayyabjiOp. Cil. p. 895 
'- Ibid p. 896. 
*^  Klian M.A. op.cit. p. 90 
^^  Ibid p. 92 
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succeed in preference to the non Muslim heir but under Sunni 
law, non Muslim will not entitle to inherit.®^ 
• Under Shia law the doctrine of increase applies only against 
the daughter and sister but under Sunni law it extends to all 
sharer alike.®^ 
• Under Shia law besides husband or wife, in certain cases the 
mother and uterine brother or uterine sister also does not 
share in the Return but under Sunni law the entire sharer 
except husband or wife share in the Return. 
• Under Shia law only intentional murderer is excluded from 
inheritance but under Sunni law any one who caused the 
murder is excluded. 
• Under Shia law the illegitimate child is entitled to inherit 
neither from father nor from mother but under Sunni law the 
illegitimate child will inherit only from the mother but not from 
the father.^^ 
• Both under Shia and Sunni law these heirs never are excluded 
from succession-father, mother, husband and wife. 
On the basis of above discussion, it can be concluded that the 
Islamic law of inheritance provides minute details about the distribution of 
heritage and as Sir William correctly said that there is no possible question 
relating to inheritance which is not rapidly answered by the Islamic system 
of inheritance. The females have got the right \.o inherit property with 
absolute power to appropriate it for the first time in the world by Islam. 
Number of females was not only made entitled to inherit but the Holy 
Qu'^diPi also fixed their shares. The^ rights \Nexe given to femaies at the 
time when the females of the rest of the world were not even entitled to 
hold the property. Though in Hindu legal system there was the concept of 
"Mbidp. 97. 
^'' Ahmad Aqil: Muslim Law (revised by Prof. I.A. IChan), p. 375. 
87 Ibid 
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stridhana but that was very complicated and not absolute and the daughter 
were not entitle to inherit the ancestral property. At last it can be said that 
Islam provides an elaborate system of inheritance, which is fixed, scientific 
and beautifully harmonized, 
B. Under Hindu Law 
Knowledge, of isolated details so long as they are not deduced from 
and connected with their under lying principles, is however as slippery as it 
is confusing and it is better to have a firm grasp over few fundamental 
principles than to collect mechanically a mass of disjointed details.^^ 
Hindu law developed as a part of religion. There is an acute 
controversy about it because custom is also acknowledged as one of the 
main source of law. Myane says,^^ ''Hindu law is the law of the Smrlties as 
expounded in the Sanskrit Commentaries and Digest which as modified 
and supplemented by custom, is administered by the court." 
The first lawgiver of Hindu law, Manu belonged to the old basti of 
Manali in Himachal Pradesh. From a small temple where there was never 
an idol, he formulates the basic postulate of the rule of law governing 
mankind, which was first written on the leaves^now known as Manu 
Smriti.^° 
The present Hindu law is an out come of ancient dharamshastras 
and their commentaries, discordant practices and conflicting decisions. As 
Derrett pointed out,^ ^ "flexibility diversity adaptality and genius for 
' Priya Nath Sen : The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence Tagores Law I.ccfure 1909. 
' Maync J.D. & Aycngar: Trcalics On Hindu Law and Usage - lO"' ed. 19.38, 
' Chaudhaiy VKS former Advocate General of U.P. : Times of India 2?"' Dec, 2004 
Derret:Opcit 1970 p. 13. 
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adjustment without changing one's entity, are the hallmarl<s of f-iinduism. It 
is properly not less a way of life than a religion," 
DefTnition o f Hmdu_The meaning of the term Hindu as commonly 
understood is stated by the court as, "it is a matter of common knowledge 
that Hinduism embraces within itself so many diverse forms of beliefs, 
faiths, practices and worships that it is difficult to define 'Hindu' with in 
precision^^ In Indian Succession Act, 1925, the word Hindu is used in 
theological sense as distinguished from a national or racial sense as it 
includes Arya Samajis^^ and Brahmos etc.^ '^  The Hindu Succession Act 
1956, The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 
1956, all prescribed three conditions for the purpose of the application of 
the Act in clause 'a' 'b' and 'c' 
• Hindu by religion 
• Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion 
• Who are not Muslim, Christain, Parsi and Jew, is Hindu. 
According to Indian Limitation Act, Hindu does not mean a person 
who is ethnologically a Hindu but also a person who has the legal status of 
a Hindu and is governed in the matter of inheritance by Hindu law.^ ^ 
Now it is well settled that the term 'Hindu' is so vast that no precise 
definition can be given. On the basis of above definition given by different 
statutes and judicial decisions, the applicability of Hindu law will decide 
whether the person is Hindu or not. Therefore, we can say that barring 
^^  Commissioner of Wealth Tax Madras & otliers v R. Sridharam (1976) Supp. SCR 478. 
''•' Msl, Sunij V Alliir 1 Pal. 706, 
"^ In Goods ofGyancndra Nalh 49 Cal. 1069. 
'^  Rajah Chattar Singh v Diwan Roshan Singh ILR (1946) Nag. 159. 
90 
Chapter -III 
Muslims, Christians, Jews and Parsis all other habitants, living in India who 
is subject to Hindu law are considered as Hindus. 
Succession means the acquisition of ownership through kinship 
to the last holder independent of any voluntary act on his part designed 
to have this effect.^^ 
Before, 1956, there was nothing at much variance in any institution 
of Hindu Law than the law of succession. No uniform system of succession 
existed even within the school of Mitakshara. The foundation of the law of 
succession was based upon the text of Manu -
''Sons take the property to the nearest sapinda the inheritance next 
belongs.^^ 
The difference between the schools and within the schools relating 
to the laws of succession, was because of the different interpretations, 
were given by the propounders of different schools. Mitakshara considers 
that the wealth becomes the property of another solely by reason of 
his kinship to the owner.®^ According to Dayabhaga ownership to a 
person's property, by virtue of kinship to that individual arises, only when 
that person's ownership comes to an end, which happens usually on his 
death.^^ It means that Dayabhaga recognized the right of heirs in the 
property of their kinsman arises on the death of that person. On the other 
hand Mitakshara considers that the accrual of ownership does not depend 
upon the cession of ownership of previous owner but they acquire the 
'' Supra note 1 p. 125. 
'^  Manu IX-187, Sec Adit Narayan v Mahabir Paiasad 48 : lA 86. 
"" Supra note I p. 126. 
' 'Ibid. 
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property at the momenX of their birth and become the co-owner of the 
same property. In Dayabhaga it is death, which confirms the ownership, 
and in Mitakshara it is birth, which confirm the ownership. 
Women's, Property Right Under Old Hindu Law 
The degraded position of women in ancient India precluded entirely 
the idea of their, having been regarded as heirs of the family property. In 
early times several writers had quoted a text from Vedas,''°° in which the 
general unfitness of woman from heritage seemed to be pronounced. At 
that time even it could not be imagined that females have any property 
right except Stridhana. Hindu law was very harsh on the point regarding 
inheritance of females. Baudhyana, reputated founder of one of the school 
of Yajurveda, excluded females from inheritance on authority of the Sruti 
text ''woman are considered to be destitute of strengtii and of a portion." 
Baudhyana says,^°^ "women are devoid of prowess and incompetent to 
inherit, women are use less." He propounded that the Vedas declared no 
inheritance to a woman. Some of sayings of Vedas relating to the 
succession will clarify the position explicitly. 
Rig Veda "speaks about tiie individual proprietorship of a log of 
wood'^°^ 
"The text of Vedas "speaks of the sons dividing father's property 
after the demise of the father."^^^ 
"' Ibid. 
'°° .Iain Prakiish Ciiand !*Womcii's i'ropcrty Right under Traditional I lindu Law, Journal of ! IJ, Vol. A5-
384 (2003) p. .i 10, 
""Baudhyana's Dharamshasia 11,22,47. 
' " -Xi ISSiS 
'°MlI:5I : 12. 
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"It speaks of unmarried daughter stayig in fanner's home and asl<ing 
for a share of father's property ^ ^'^ 
Rig Veda again syas " A begotten son does not give paternal 
wealth to his sister He gets her married."^°^ 
In the above mentioned exerts of the Rig Veda, it is evident that only 
for unmarried daughter there is a provision but for the married girl there is 
no provision. Instead brother is not bound to give her share in property, his 
only responsibility is to get her married. It is proved by these exerts that in 
primitive society, the females had no share in property. 
In post Vedic period some changes were brought and the woman 
who have not got the Stridhana from their husband or father-in-law shall 
inherit the property of their own father. It is said that after the death of 
father the son divide the father's wealth and daughters will divide among 
them the Stridhan, if there is no daughter then the son will take the 
Stridhana.^°^ 
In Smiriti period some changes had been brought but heritable 
capacity was made subject to certain conditions. The position of woman in 
the joint family was even worse and at the mercy of surviving brothers. 
The Nirukhta writer Yasha says "The wise men holds that both the 
children have the right of inheritance"'''^^ About the right of inheritance of 
widow Kane writes^°° that "Vishwarupa allowed a share of property to the 
104 
105 
U)(. 
I l l / 
1U8 
11 : 17.7. 
111:31,2 
Y;iii i; iv;il; iky;i: 
Vide L. Sarup' 
Kaneppcit p. 
11. 
's'l 
116-
fransl 
266. 
11'). 
lalion :p. 40 
93 
Chapter -III 
widows of deceased son and grandsons of the intestate when partition 
take place during his life time. Jimutvahna said that a widow of a deceased 
person who lived separately or in joint family succeeded her husband's 
estateT^ Vijnaneshwara was liberal towards woman and allowed a widow 
to be the heir of her deceased husband.^^° He also mentioned great grand 
mothers right to inherit 111 
By the above discussion it is evident that the old Hindu Law was 
very insensitive towards women. To remove all the diversities and to 
improve the condition of woman time to time some legislative steps had 
been taken e.g.- the passing of Indian Succession Act, 1865, which gave 
very limited rights of property to women. The limitation was removed by the 
passing of Married Women's Right to Property Act, 1874. After that Indian 
Succession Act, 1925, came into existence, which was confined to the 
Parsis, Christains and Jews etc and did not better for Hindu females. Then 
Hindu law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, was passed. But the 
fundamenti changes had been brought in the condition of Hindu Women by 
the Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. Sec. 3 of the said Act was the 
most important section, which specially provided provisions for the 
women's succession. But Hindu female, provided under the Act of 1937, 
was unfortunate enough to be excluded so long from the domain of Hindu 
law of Inheritance simply because they were females. "Women are devoid 
of the sense and incompetent to inherit' is the sharp edge sword that was 
used to cut their throat.^^^ 
"" Dayabhaga p. 256. 
"" Kane : op. cit. p. 260. 
' ' ' Mayne & Iyengar Op cit 
"^ Singh Raghunath "The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937", AIR (1937), p. 107 
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Though so many efforts have been made to improve the condition of 
the Hindu females but the radical changes came into being only in 1956, 
when the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, was passed by the Parliament. It 
is considered piecemeal and brought revolutionary changes in the history 
of women's property right. 
Fundamental Changes Brought by the Act of 1956 
• All schools are governed by the uniform rules of succession. 
• The heirs are divided into four groups and the preference is 
based upon the blood relationship and other rational 
conditions. 
• The female's share was made equal with her counterpart male 
member. 
• The limited estate of widow is converted into absolute 
ownership. 
• The kinds of the property as Women Estate and Stridhana are 
abolished whatever kind of property,woman possessed or 
inheritedjs her absolute property. 
• All cognates and agnates are made entitle to inherit. 
• Sec. 14 and 26 have retrospective effect. 
• In certain situation the undivided interest of a coparcener may 
devolve by succession not by survivorship. 
• An undivided interest of a coparcenary in a Mitakshara joint 
family property is made heritable and capable of being 
disposed of by testamentary documents. 
Before going into the discussion of the changes brought and 
provision made by the said Act. It is better io have a look over the 
concepts of the coparcenary, joint family and Hindu undivided family. 
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Coparcenary 
A coparcenary is a narrower body or an inner circle witli in the joint 
family and consist of only those persons who have taken by birth an 
interest in the property and also have a right to enforce a partition.^^^ It 
commences with a common ancestor and includes a holder of joint 
property up to the three degrees. No woman can be a coparcener.^ ^"^ 
But now by the amendment Act of 2005 daughter is also made a 
coparcener. 
Joint Family 
Mitakshara joint family is a broader body than coparcenary and 
includes the wife and unmarried daughter of a copacerner in the member 
of the joint family. It is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by 
the acts of the parties.^^^ The joint status being the result of birth and 
possession, of joint family property, is not necessary to constitute it.^ ^^ 
Hindu Undivided Family 
It is a normal condition of Hindu society who is joint in estate, food 
and worship. Hindu undivided family is a concept. Karta does all religious 
duties and observance.^^'' 
' " Bishnil Kumar Rai v Miner Mahendra Bai Lama & others, AIR (2005) Sikkim 33. See also Gowli 
Buddamia v C.I.T. (1966) I.S.C.R. 224. 
"'' Pushpa Devi v Commissioner of Income Tax (1977), S.C. 2230. 
"^ Sathyaprema Manjunath Gowda v CED (1977) 10 SCC 684. 
'"^  Haridas v Devkuvarban, 50 Bomb. 443 at 447. 
96 
' " I b i d 
Chapter -III 
The Position of Women after 1956 
After the passing of the Act of 1956, the situation is better though not 
best. The Act though considered as the piecemeal in the field of the 
property rights of woman but it is also criticized by eminent thinker of the 
Hindu law, like Derrett whose objection, about sections 8 to 13, is that 
there is a long list of heirs in class I and there is also no limits of agnates 
and cognates. So the rule of Government escheat is totally disappeared.^^^ 
By analysis of the certain provisions of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, 
which relates to the intestate succession and in which certain changes 
were brought by the Act, it would be clear that whether the said Act really 
improved the position of women's property right or still it need some 
changes. So to know the exact position we will have a critical look upon 
some important sections from section 6*^  to 23^^  of the Act of 1956, step by 
step. These sections have elaborate provisions relating to the intestate 
succession. 
Critical Analysis of the Certain Provisions of the Hindu 
Succession Act of 1956 
Section 6 before 2005 ''When a H'm6u male dies after the 
commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a 
Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve 
by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in 
accordance with this Act." 
"Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female 
relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in 
"* Derrett: op. cit. pp. 255-56, See also Kacharu Baban Kotthawaia v State of Maharashtra (1969) 71. 
Bomb. L.R. 663. 
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that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the 
deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property, shall devolve by 
testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act 
and not by survivorship." 
Explanation 1: For the purpose of this section, the interest of a 
Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed, to be the share in the 
property that would have been allotted to him, if a partition of the property 
had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he 
was entitled to claim partition or not. 
Explanation 2: Nothing contained in the proviso of this section shall 
be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the 
coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim 
on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 
Section 6 consists of four paragraphs. The first paragraph says 
about the devolution of Interest by survivorship in Hindu coparcenary. The 
second paragraph contains the exceptions to the survivorship by 
devolution. The third Para, which is an explanation talks about the deemed 
or notional partition and last one, barred the separated member from 
claiming the interest in coparcenary. 
Section 6 has recognized the female as an heir to inherit the 
property without abolishing the coparcenary and rule of survivorship. There 
is also an exception to the rule of survivorship in the Mitakshara 
coparcenary that if the deceased is survived by a male or female relative 
who can claim through such female then the interest of the deceased in 
the property shall be devolve by the intestate succession and not by 
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survivorship. The only male relative specified in class I who first claims 
through a female relative is the son of a predeceased daughter.^^^ 
Section 6 has brought revolutionary changes in the history of 
woman's property right but also bring a number of queries in the mind of 
legal luminaries and clerics of law which were responded by the judiciary 
time to time^legal experts also tries to explain the provisions. 
Whether the rule of survivorship really exists? The coparcenary or 
rule of survivorship is not abrogated by sec.6 but it will be futile to think a 
family in which there will be no female of class I heir or a person who have 
an interest through such females. Sec.6 says that the interest of the 
coparcener would be devolved by survivorship but if there are any female 
of class I heir or a male who claims through such female then the property 
shall be devolved according to Act of 1956 or testamentary succession and 
not by survivorship.^^° So it can be said that apparently the rule of 
survivorship is not extinguished by the Act of 1956, but in reality it hardly 
exist. There may be a reason not to abolish the rule altogether because 
the sudden change in joint family may have adverse effect upon the 
existing state of things^^^ 
The second question, which needs to be considered, is, whether this 
notional partition is treated as actual partition? Sec. 6 talks about the share 
of females without making them a coparcener, in the properi)/ of the 
deceased, which he has in the coparcenary property. The essence of 
"" I'lof. Raman S. VciikaUi: N.R. Rag havacliariar's Hindu Law VIII cd. (1987), 1».N, 926, Sec also 
Ranganathan Chettiar v Annamalai Mudaliar 80, L.E. 258 (1967) 1 MLJ 389. 
'^ ° Laxmi N Tudu v Basti Mahajan AIR (2004) Jhar 121. 
'-' Pataskar LSD 2 v 56 Col. 6996. 
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coparcenary under Mitakshara law is the unity of ownership^^^ and there is 
no question of share during the unity. Relating the coparcenary how it is 
possible to ascertain the share. For this purpose the legislature introduced 
the doctrine of notional partition, which is a legal fiction, apart from actual 
or real partition without affecting the shares or interest or status of the 
other coparceners whose interest will be demarcated on the real partition. 
The Bombay High Court^ ^^ clarified the position by saying that the idea of 
notional partition should be construed strictly just to ascertain the share of 
a deceased in the joint family property. It also talked about the position that 
in the case of only male heir,^ '^* there was no such partition. Actually to 
save the rule of survivorship this provision of notional partition was 
introduced as an exception. As Justice Patel said, that without such 
fictional partition the share of a deceased could not be ascertained which 
was necessary for the shares of females who were entitle only in his share 
in the property and not in whole joint family property as a coparcener. 
The next question which comes in mind is that How the share of a 
deceased be determined? As there is a rule of survivorship in the 
coparcenary so the shares are indefinite till the actual partition took place. 
The interest of the coparcener fluctuates with each birth and death. That is 
why the section talked about the deemed partition in which it was imagined 
that what would be the share of a deceased if the partition took place just 
before his death, subsequent fluctuation would make no effect in the share 
'^ ^ Katama Natchair v the Raja of Sivaganga (1861-) G.M. lA 543, Supreme Court Encyclopedia Vol. 3, 
p.246 
' " Shivgonda v Director of Settlement, (1992) Bom. 72 
'^ "' Rangubai v Laxaman AIR (1966) Bom. 169. 
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of deceased^^^ It is made clear by the explanation, that it is immaterial that 
the deceased coparcener is entitled to claim partition or not. 126 
Now the next question can be asked whether the devolution of 
property by notional partition be binding on the parties? Supreme 
Court gives the answer of the above question in the case of Maharshtra v 
Narayan Rao,^^^ the court observed that this assumption once made is 
irrevocable. There is a leading case of Bombay High Court Rangubai v 
Laxmanan,^^^ in which a widow and stepson survived a deceased. In this 
case there was no possibility of getting any share of the widow in a real 
partition^as the stepson as a sole surviving coparcener had inherited the 
whole and there was no one who asked for partition. Though, if the 
partition took place, she would be entitled to equal share of the son, but 
the court by the full bench made it clear that the deemed partition would be 
binding, so treated as actual partition, which got recognition in series of 
cases by other High Courts. The Supreme Court^ ^^ said that the 
interpretations of provision of Section 6^  directed to enlarge the share of 
female heirs qualitatively and quantitatively to achieve the intention of the 
legislature. 
It gives the birth to another question, whether the death of a 
coparcener would dissolve the coparcenary? In P. Govinda Reddy v 
Golla Qbulamma ^^ ° the full bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court opined 
that the coparcenary would continue till the actual partition and the death 
'^' Karupa v Palaniammal/ilR (1963), Mad. 254. 
'^ ^ Sushila V Narayan Rao AIR (1975), Bom. 257. 
' " A I R (1985) SC 716. ' 
'^ 'AIR (966), Bom. 169. 
'^' Gurupad v Hira Bai^ AlR (1978) SC 1239. 
'^ " AIR (1971) AP. 363. 
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of a coparcenary would not effect the continuance of the coparcener in any 
way. 
An other question which is necessary to be considered is, whether a 
woman be a coparcener and a Karta ? The provision of the Section 6 of 
Act said that only male member be a coparcener who has a right by birth in 
the property. Though in some states, equal coparcenary right to daughter 
has been given as in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and 
Karnataka etc., but the right conferred by these states has prospective 
effect. In a case,^ ^^ the deceased left behind his wife, one son and four 
daughters. He died before the Karnataka Hindu Succession (23 
amendment) Act of 1994, came into force by which a new section 6-A was 
inserted in the Act to give the equal right of coparcenary to the females, 
but in the given case the court held that succession will be governed by 
section 6, of the Act of 1956 and son alone was made the coparcener and 
inherited V2 and the daughter and wife inherit equally along with the son 
from the other half. 
Now come to the other part of the question according to the old 
Hindu law a woman, who is not a coparcener, cannot be the Karta of joint 
family, It is also supported by the series of judicial decisions.^^^ On the 
other hand in some cases the judiciary^^^ encourages the liberal attitude 
towards it and held,^ "^* that woman may be a Karta." Some writers also 
supported on the basis of old Hindu Law.^ ^^ 
'^'(2000) AIHC 4013 (Kam). 
' " Commissioner of I.T. v G.S. Miil^ AIR (1966) SC 24, Ram Avadh v Kedar Nath/IR (1976) All 283, 
\n 
135 
hindii V GobiiKlii,AIR (1970) Oiri 32, Siihiidco Singh v Rmii Cliiiblii ,Siiij.-,li AIR (1978) l';il. 258. 
Commissioner of I.T. v Selh Govind Ram^AlR (1966) SC 2. 
Pandurang Dhake v Pandurang Gorle,AIR (1947) Nag. 178. 
Derrett: Essay in Classical & Modren Hindu Law, New Delhi Universal Book Traders, (1995) p. 136. 
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Another question, which need our attention, is that - Whether the 
heirs mentioned in class I be represented by Karta? The answer was 
given by the Calcutta High Court,^ ^^ that there was a relation between the 
joint family property and a Karta when the partition made that relation 
come to an end though section 6 talked about the notional partition instead 
of actual partition. Karta could not be imagined in a divided property. So 
class I heir could not be represented by Karta. In a latest case,^^'' the 
question was raised about the power of Karta to dispose of the property. 
Supreme Court held that the Karta is competent to dispose of coparcenary 
property only in two conditions. 
• The disposition must be of a reasonable portion of the property. 
• That disposition must be for a recognized pious purpose or for legal 
necessity. 
This was also made clear that the permission of the class I heir is also 
necessary prior to the disposition of the property. 
The other important question is - What would be the effect of 
section 6 in relation to woman's own right to inherit? The judiciary in 
so many cases discusses this question from time to time. In a latest 
case,^^^ it is considered that a wife inherited the interest of her deceased 
husband in the family property. She was also entitled under section 6 as a 
female heir in the joint family property and continued to be the member of 
an undivided family. She had the power to dispose of her undivided 
interest in the coparcenary property by a will or sale for a valuable 
"" Naiayiiii I'rasad Ruia v Muluiii Koliaiii, AIR (1969) Cal. 69. 
' " Thimmaiah v Ningamma (2000) 7 SCC 409. 
''* Kanna Gounder v Arjuna Gounder AIR (2003) Mad 157. 
103 
Chapter -III 
consideration, though she could not make a gift without the prior consent 
of the other coparceners. 
Whether the quantum of a daughter's share in inheritance is 
really equal to her brother? Though it seems that sec 6 gives equal right 
of succession to sons and daughters but Iho actual position was vuiy 
different. There was unequal distribution of property between the male and 
female - as the daughter did not get an interest in the joint family property 
at birth as son had. (Now by the amendment of 2005 she has birthright). 
She was only entitled to inherit a part of the property, which was the 
interest of her deceased father in the coparcenary if there was a father and 
son and a daughter in the family, father and son would be a coparcener in 
the joint family property and had equal share in the coparcenary property. 
According to section the son would have taken 6 by the notional partition 
the share of the father was ascertained which in the given case was Vi and 
the other V2. From the Vi share of the father the son and daughter would 
equally inherit. Consequently the son's share would have been % and 
daughter's share would have been % of the total property.^^^ 
Example: (GF) 
(F)i/2 S 72 D 
I 1 (Not coparcener) 
S3/4 D1/4 
(1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4) 
'^' Gonslaves Lina; op cit p. 36. 
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Note;- Now the daughter will also inherit as a coparcener along with 
father and son, the ancestral property. 
Whether the provision of sec 6-A is discriminatory? A drastic 
change is introduced by the State of Karnataka '^^ ° in the field of Hindu 
female right to property by inserting sec 6-A, 'by this section a daughter is 
made a coparcener by birth and possesses all the rights equal to her 
brother. But according to clause (d) the married daughter were not entitle 
to claim such rights as the section 6-A has prospective effect. Although the 
daughter, who gets married, would get benefit of said section after the 
commencement of the Act, would get the benefit of the said section. This 
provision is challenged as being discriminatory between the married and 
unmarried daughter and against to Article 14 of the Constitution. A 
significant judgement^ "^ ^ has been given by the court that it is not 
discriminatory but to avoid the reopening of the partition which would 
resulted in a chaos in the family and unsettled things which were settled 
long ago and it is also not in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution. 
Section 6 was considered as a revolutionary piece of social 
legislation. It was one of the most important section of the Act of 1956 
dealt, with coparcenary properly of a Hindu male but neither, it had any 
concern with separate property of the Hindu male which was governed by 
Sec. 8 of the Act^nor it had any interest in governing the female estate. For 
which there was a provision in Sec 15 & 16. Though it was very important 
but it created a lot of anomalies and raised so many questions, which were 
difficult to be answered. But judiciary tried to answer the question^and gave 
'•'" Vidc^KariKilaka Acl. 2.3 of 1999, Sec. 2 
'•" Manjamma v State of Karnataka (1999) AlHC 3003 (Karn.) 
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effect to the intention of the Parliament. The problems arose because, on 
the basis of old base a new structure was tried to build. As rule of 
survivorship was not totally abolished but in practice very rarely existed. 
Though there were some problems in effecting this section but it did 
not mean that it had no importance. In the field of woman's right to 
property its importance could not be denied. As a critique it can be said 
that Sec. 6 gave a deathblow to the whole concept of joint family property 
by abolishing up to some extent the rule of survivorship. The continuance 
of joint family depended on the whims and caprice of a large number of 
persons who acquired the right to demand partition under the Act. By the 
notional partition, the status of the heirs of the deceased would be 
changed and they became the tenants in common instead of joint tenants 
with the other surviving coparceners. On the other hand the other 
coparceners continued to be joint tenants. 
It is submitted that the rules laid down in Sec. 6 were compromised 
having some of the merits and demerits which attended such adjustive 
legislation." '^*^ 
Section 6 After 2005 
The most perplex, bewildering, controversial section 6 of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956, is now stand amended by the Hindu succession 
(amendment) Act of 2005. Section 6, which brought a lot of queries in the 
mind, which was discussed above, has abolished all the anomalies, 
ambiguities and confusion. All the discrimination between male and female 
'•'^  Mulla : Principles of Hindu Law, revised by Sundar La! Desai Bombay, N.M. I'ripatlii 
Pvt. Ltd. (1982), p. 926. 
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are resolved. By the new (amendment) Act, by providing, equal rights to 
son and daughter in the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary. Like son the 
daughter is now a coparcener by birth. The provision of notional partition, 
survivorship that had created, so many problems in practice has been 
amended. The controversial share of son and daughter is equalized as she 
has got the right to inherit the ancestral property in her own right in the 
Hindu joint family, which is governed by the Mitakshara School. The new 
provision substitutes section 6 of the principal Act of 1956, which dealt only 
with property rights of male heirs. It provides that the daughters shall be 
equally subject to liabilities and disabilities in respect of said property. 
These provision which are now amended by the new (amendment) Act of 
2005 were already exist in some states which were amended by the state 
amendment Act of Kerala in 1975, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil Nadu in 
1989 and in Maharashtra in 1994. 
Uniform Succession Whether really exist after 1956 
Prior to the passing of the Act of 1956 there were variety of rules, 
which governed the Hindu Law of succession. But now after the passing of 
the enactment of 1956 there is a uniform system of succession and all the 
anomalies abrogated.""*^ But in reality there are still different rules 
governing the succession based upon sex and kind of property. As section 
6 deals with the coparcenary property, which have no place in, Dayabagha 
school because there is no coparcenary and therefore not recognized the 
rule of survivorship, which is the peculiarity of coparcenary. Sec. 8 to 13 
'^ ^ Kesharbai v St. of Maharashtra ,AIR (1981) Bom. 115. 
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deals with the general rules of succession in the case of males. Sec 15 to 
16 deals with the rules relating to succession of females. 
Section 8 says that in case of Dayabhaga school all the property of a 
Hindu male whether separate, self acquired, a share, or an interest in the 
undivided Hindu family, be governed by this section. But in case of 
Mitakshara school it would apply only in the case of separate or self-
acquired property. The kinds of property are already discussed.'''''' 
As the word 'property' is not defined in the Act. Time to time a 
question came before the court whether agricultural land includes the 
property. ? There is no definition of property under the Hindu Women's 
Right to Property Act 1937, therefore the term property has to be given its 
ordinary meaning which would include agricultural land also.^ '*^ 
Whether Section 8 prospective or retrospective? Section 8 is 
silent about its effect as section 6 & 7 clearly says that they are 
prospective in effect. In the case person died before the Act and 
succession opened before the Act, there will be no difficulty. '^^ ^ If the 
person died before the Act and succession open after the commencement 
of the Act which may happen because of widow, or the effect of section 14 
which converts the limited estates of widow into full estate. In Eramma v 
Veeruppana,^'^^ learned judges opined that the words "shall devolve" 
occurring in this section indicate that Its operation is prospective. 
" Supni nolo Cli,ipkT II, 
" " • / ( / . Vaijnath v Uwamma {1979) I SCC See also '! ukaiaii Gciibd v Laxiuaii ticiiba ladli.iv, AIR {\')9'\) 
Bom. 247. 
""^  Appa Saheb v Gurubasawwa, AIR (1960) Mysore 79. 
" ' A I R ( 1 9 6 6 ) , S C 1 8 7 9 . 
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Heirs 
Under section 8 a new scheme of heirs is listed on the basis of 
propinquity and affection. The section 8 prescribes^"^ four classes of heirs-
• The heirs specified in class I of the schedule. 
• The heirs specified in class II of the schedule. 
• The agnates of the deceased. 
• The cognates of the deceased. 
The order of the succession will be that if there is no class I heir the 
property will devolve to class II heirs, if no class II heirs then the agnates of 
the deceased and in failure of that to cognate of the deceased.^''^ 
Heirs Specified in Class I 
In class I there are twelve heirs who have preference over others 
and who inherits simultaneously and they cannot exclude other heirs of 
class I. These are as follows. 
Mother 
Widow 
Daughter 
Son 
Widow of pre deceased son 
Son of pre deceased son 
Daughter of predeceased son of a predeceased son 
Widow of predeceased son of predeceased son 
Daughter of predeceased son of predeceased son 
Son of predeceased son of a predeceased son 
Daughter of a predeceased daughter 
Son of a predeceased daughter 
Son of a predeceased daughter of a predeceased daughter.^^° 
118 Hindu Succession Acl y)^b. 
'[[ See : Her Jcsa Kachaia v Lakshmaii, AIR (1979), Guj. 45. 
The heir has been included by the Hindu Succession (Amendment)Act 2005. 150 
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• Daughter of a predeceased daughter of a predeceased 
daughter/^^ 
• Daughter of a predeceased son of a predeceased daughter.^^^ 
• Daughter of a predeceased daughter of a predeceased son.^^^ 
Among these heirs there are eight females and four males. 
M 
I 
(P) W 
(S) D (D) (S) 
ss sw SD DS 
1 
DD (SS) 
SS SSW SSD 
(Note:- New heiriare not added in this diagram) 
In this given diagram the propositus is indicated by (P) and the 
predeceased are put in bracket. It shows that a Hindu intestate died 
leaving behind a widow, a son, a daughter, and son of a predeceased son, 
a widow of a predeceased son, a daughter of a predeceased son, son of a 
predeceased daughter, daughter of a predeceased daughter, son of a 
predeceased son of a predeceased son, daughter of a predeceased son of 
152 
153 
The heir has been included by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. 
The heir has been included by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. 
The heir has been included by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. 
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a predeceased son and a widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased 
son. 
Quantum of the Share of class I heir 
The next question arises what would be the quantum of the share of 
these heirs whether it will be per-stripes or per-capita? According to the 
section 10 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, three rules would be 
followed to allot the shares to the heirs. 
• 
• 
The intestate widow or widows shall take one share if more 
than one then they will distribute among themselves the 
allotted one share. 
Son's daughter and mother, who survived the intestate will 
take one share each. 
The heir in the branch of predeceased daughter and son shall 
take between them one share. 
In the diagram given below all the twelve heirs of class I have been 
indicated: (New heirs are not included in this diagram). 
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lyii/s 
(P) Wi/8 
D1/8 ($) S1/8 (D) D1/8 (S) 
'f 
SS1/24 SW1/24 SD1/24 DS1/16 DD1/16 (SS) 
SSS SSW SSD 
1/24 1/24 1/24 
Heirs Specified in Class 11 
In this class of heirs there are nine categories. The entries in first 
category would inherit simultaneously according to per capita excluding the 
heirs of other categories. This rule of preference would continue according 
to the order of entry. These following heirs are categorized in class II heirs. 
• Father (father will inherit all the property if there is no class I 
heir excluding all heirs nnention below) 
• Son's daughter's son, son's daughter's daughter, brother, 
sister. 
• Daughter's son's son, daughter's son's daughter, daughter's 
daughter's son, daughter's daughter's daughter. 
• Brother's son, sister's son, brother's daughter, sister's 
daughter 
• Father's father, father's mother 
• Father's widow, brother's widow 
• Father's brother, father's sister 
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Mother's father, mother's mother 
Mother's brother, mother's sister 
Example; If a Hindu male died leaving behind father, son's 
daughter's son and daughter, brother and sister. In this problem father will 
inherit whole excluding all other heirs. 
F(Whole property will be inherited by father only ) 
{py B 
(S) 
(SD) 
(Excluded) (Excluded) (Excluded) 
SDS SDD 
(Excluded) (Excluded) 
Problem: Take another problem if a Hindu dies leaving behind, 
son's daughter's son and daughter, brother, sister and brother's son and 
daughter. The brother's son and daughter will be excluded and all other 
heirs will inherit simultaneously. 
(P)-
(S) 
(D) 
SDS% 
By4 
SDDy4 
SYc • (B) 
BS BD 
(Excluded) (Excluded) 
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The heirs specified \n class III 
The heirs in this class are agnates, means the persons related with 
the propositus through male without the intervention of any females. They 
may be the descendants, ascendants and collaterals. They will inherit 
simultaneously. 
The heirs specified in class iV 
In this class all cognates are made heirs. The cognates are related 
with the propositus through females. Till all the heirs of class I, II, III were 
not exhausted the cognates cannot be entitle to inherit. Agnates are 
preferred over cognates. 
Some Controversial Heirs 
Legitimate and Illegitimate Heirs: Now proceed towards some 
issues, which were raised before the court with the passage of time, 
whether an illegitimate son or daughter is included in the category of son 
and daughter, or not? Under section 3(1 )(i) of Hindu Succession Act of 
1956, the term 'child' is defined as 'related by legitimate l<insliip and 
illegitimate children are not mentioned in the list of heirs of any class of 
heirs.^^"^ 
In another latest case^^^ the right of the widow of an illegitimate child 
was questioned. The facts of this case were as such that the husband of 
the widow was the illegitimate child, so he had no right of inheritance. But 
the father in law of the widow of an illegitimate son had given some 
'^' Ramkiili V Mahila SluiyaiDvv.ili, AIR (2000) M.P 288 icc also Datldo AIIIMMIII I'.ilil v K.igliiiii.illi 
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Atmaram Patii, AIR (1979) Bomb. 176. 
AIR (2002) Kant 134. See also : Appa v Mulhani (1975) Ker. L.T. 699, 
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property to the son and daughter in law by a deed and possession had 
also been transferred. The property, which was given to the daughter-in-
law, was only for lifetime. By the effect of section 14(1) of the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956, that limited interest ripened into absolute one. But in 
this case court held that daughter-in-law with reference to section 8 means 
a legitimate daughter-in-law and the widow of an illegitimate son is no heir 
of her putative father in law. 
Remarried Widow 
Whether the widow would lost her right to inheritance if she re marry 
before the succession opened? In Ram Sharan v Ujiyaril^^^ the widow of 
\M pre-deceased son had remarried before the succession opened, it was 
held that she was not entitled to inherit. But the remarriage of the mother 
did not affect her right to inherit the property of her son^on his death as his 
heir.""^ ^ 
Remarried Widow after 2005 
The bar, of remarriage of the widow to inherit the property under 
section 24 of the Act^1956Js now been abolished by the new amendment 
Act of 2005. 
Concubine 
Concubine is entitle to be maintained by her paramour and on his 
death by his legal heirs, under the Shastric Hindu Law and this right is not 
taken away by the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. After the 
'^' (2000) AlHC 938 (M.P.) 
' " Ratni Bai v Mankuwar (1978) MPLJ 515. 
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commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, this limited nght gets 
enlarged into absolute ownership. A house is given to concubine by her 
paramour in lieu of her maintenance. She disposed of it by a sale deed. 
This right of a concubine was challenged. The court held that she was 
entitled io dispose of the house in whatever manner she liked.^^^ 
Whether full blood heirs are preferred to the heirs related to half 
blood? The answer is given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 
affirmative in a latest case of P. Jayaramiah vAra Gonda Munnarma.''^^ 
Enlargement of women's limited estate 
Nothing is much controversial than the provision of Sec. 14 of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956, which gives absolute rights of ownership over the 
properties of women in which she had limited interest before the 
commencement of the Act. Though the controversies were resolved by the 
judicial pronouncement time to time. Before going into detail it is better to 
have a glance on the process through which this controversial section 14 
have passed. 
Rao committee report 
The right of woman to hold property had always been subject of 
controversy. There is a majority of opinion that the doctrine of Hindu 
woman's limited estate has no real foundation in the smritis. It is also very 
strange that on one hand the Hindu law recognizes the right of woman to 
158 
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Prakash v Pushpa Rani (2004) A.P. 463 NOC. 
AIR (2005) (A.P.) 27 
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hold and dispose of her Stridhan property, on the other hand the same law 
finds her incompetent to deal with other kind of propertyJ^° 
In between 1954 and 1956 many legislative measures have been 
taken, to emancipate the Hindu women on the recommendation of Rao 
Committee.^^^ A Bill was drafted to abolish woman's limited estate, 
polygamy and exclusion of female heirs by male heir. The Orthodox 
Hindus condemned the Bill. The matter was again taken up after 
independence and the Bill dealing with the law of succession was first 
introduced in Rajya Sabha. 
The provision, which changes the limited right of Hindu female into 
absolute right in the estate, was clause 16 of Hindu Code Bill, which later 
came into the shape of sec 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
Section 14(1): " Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether 
acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by 
her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." 
Section 14, has swept away all the traditional limitations, on her 
powers of disposition of the property. The women's limited estate, which 
was a peculiar kind of property almost in any other jurisprudence, was 
ripened into absolute ownership by this section. She has come out from 
the state of perpetual tutelage of the old Hindu concept about women and 
got the status of full and independent ownership, with the full right to enjoy 
the property in whatever manner she like. 
'"" Sri Parlashar l l .V . : Parliamentary Debate Rajya Sabha (1955) Vol. 9, 2711,2722. 
"'' Rao Committee Report 116, 119, 120, 1947. 
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The expression covered by the words used in section 14(1) of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956 can be better understood through the 
pronouncements of the court. 
'Any Property': The words 'any property' have wider meaning to 
cover all types of property movable or immovable tangible or intangible. It 
also includes any right or interest/^^ The mode of acquisition of property is 
made immaterial.^^^ The explanation attached to the section has removed 
all doubts, which were attached to constitute the Stridhana, and for 
Stridhana the mode oi acquisition of the property was very important. 
'Possessed by female Hindu' 
In Lok Sabha a debate was held over the bill and the suggestions 
were given that instead of the word 'possessed' there should be the word 
'acquired in Section 14(1) because this word can be misused as the 
female can claim for the property as an absolute owner, given to her in 
mortgage etc. 
The emphasis is given by the Act over the words 'possessed by 
female Hindu' because it is a pre requisite to ripe the women's limited 
estate into an absolute ownership. The meaning of the words 'possessed 
by" is discussed by the Supreme Court,^ ^^ as 'tiie state of owning oriiaving 
in one liand or power'. In another case,^ ^^ the courts made it clear that the 
expression of the word 'possessed will also cover that case in which a 
' " V. Tulsamma v V. Shesha Reddy, AIR (1977) SC 1947. 
' " See the explanation attach to the section 14. 
'^ '' Gumalapura Taggina Mutoda Kothuru Sami v Setra Verravva (1959) Supp. (1) SCR 968, AIR (1959) 
SC 571 
165 Mangal Singh v Smt. Ratno, AIR (1967) SC 1786. 
118 
Chapter -III 
female Hindu owns the property, though she is not in actual or physical or 
constructive possession over the property. The court/^® also opined that 
the ambit must not be so extended to cover those cases in which, though 
the property is in possession of the widow but she has no right over that. 
The court has not given the benefit of section 14(1) in the case where the 
property was sold by the widow before the commencement of the Act 
stating that she would not be considered to be in possession.''^'' 
In a latest case of Jamuna Bai v Bhola Ram,'^^^ a widow was in the 
continuous possession since the death of her husband, along with the 
brother of her husband. The husband died before the Act of 1937 and the 
coparcenary property are inherited by survivorship and the brother was the 
only survivor. So widow had no right. But court held that she was in the 
possession of the said property and her limited interest would ripen into 
absolute ownership. 
'Female Hindu': An interesting question came before the Supreme 
Court in Beni Bai v Raghubir Prasad,^^^ whether the third wife of a Hindu 
includes the 'wife' in Hindu law to give the benefit of this section? The 
argument were given that under Hindu law one could not have more than 
one wife so the third marriage was invalid and third wife was not a wife. 
But the court held that to read 'female Hindu' as only first wife was totally 
misconceived and third wife was also a wife and would entitle to get the 
benefit of this section. Recently in Jose v Rama Krishna^^^ the question 
"'^ Erammav Verruppanna, AIR (1966) SC 1879. 
' " Kesliav v Padmavati Shanlibai & Others C.A. No. 79 of 1963 (referred in Supreme Court i'ncyclopedia 
Vol. 3, p.246 
"'" AIR (2003) M.P. 40, sec also : Narcsli Kumari v Shashi Lai, AIR (1999) SC 928, AIR (1999) SC 1 M7. 
'"'' AIR (1999) SC 1147, sec also : Narcsh Kumari v Sluisiii Lai, AIR (1999) SC 928, (fiom III'.) 
170 AIR (2004) Ker. 16 
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before the court was that whether the benefit of section 14 be given to 
daughter also and her limited interest in property would get enlarged to full 
right? The court held that the female Hindu includes the daughter also and 
her limited interest would ripen into absolute ownership. 
Whether acquired before or after the Commericomont of the Actf 
According to section 14 there are two kinds of Properly^ 
• Property acquired before the commencement of the Act. 
• Property acquired after the commencement of the Act. 
The property which is acquired before the Act, was women's estate 
or limited estate'. It is distinguished from Stridhana over which she had 
absolute right, even before the commencement of the Act. By the effect of 
the said Act, all the differences between limited estate or women's estate 
or Stridhana were abolished and all the property in which she has interest 
and that is also in her possession was made her absolute property. The 
property acquired after the Act being came into existence, is her absolute 
property with the limitation of sub section (2) of section 14,^ ^^ Sub section 
(2) has creates a great chaos and controversies and left the task over the 
judiciary to determine that in particular circumstances, the property will be 
governed by which sub-section (1) or (2). 
'Shall' be held by her as full owner there of and not as a limited 
owner'? 
Under old Hindu law, no female could be a coparcener she was only 
entitled to maintenance and residence, but no right to demand partition. 
'^' Sub. (2) Scc.24,"Nolhiiig contained in Sub. Scc.)l) shall apply to any property acquired by way ol'giJl 
under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of civil court or under an award where 
the terms of the gift will or other instrument of the decree order or award prescribe a restricted estate n 
such instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." 
120 
Chapter -III 
The widow succeeds only if there is no male issue, except in case of an 
illegitimate son of Sudra. The widow of predeceased son and the widow of 
pre deceased son's son were not entitled to inherit at all, barring the 
Bombay school. But by the Act of 1937, '^'^  some revolutionary changes 
were introduced in the field of women's property rights. Two principal 
changes brought by the Act, were - that the widow become entitled to the 
same share as her husband had, in the joint family property and got a right 
to claim partition, as a male owner, in other words she has put her feet in 
the shoes of her husband, except in Dayabhaga or the Hindu family 
governed by the customary law. 
The second change was that the widow of a deceased was made 
entitled to equal share to the son and if no male issue then would inherit 
the whole property. In all these cases the widow had only a limited interest, 
means - she has an interest in the property till death without any power to 
dispose of or alienate the property and on her death the property, would 
revert back to the heirs of the person from whom she had inherited the 
property. 
After the Act of 1956,^ ^^ absolute ownership in Austinian sense had 
been confirmed over her inherited proped)/ \o redress the problem faced 
by the Hindu female.^ *^^  
According to Austin "ownership is a riglit over a determinate tiling 
indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition and unlimited 
in point of duration:^'^^ 
"' The lliiuiii Women's Riglil Ui Properly Ael. l')37. 
' " Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
"" Pratap Singh v Union of India, AIR (1985) SC 1695. 
' " Tripathi B.N.; An Introduction to Jurisprudence, p. 394. 
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In order to get the benefit of the Act, it is necessary that the Hindu 
female have some interest or title in the property, which is in her 
possession at the commencement of the Act.^ ''® 
In Vankamanidi Venkata Subba Rao v Chatta Palli 
Seotharamartana,^^^ the question was that the right of a Hindu female 
under an instrument is, whether a recognition of a pre-existing right or right 
created for the first time? In this case, in a gift deed the interest of a widow 
was acknowledged, as a limited interest and also mentions that after her 
death it would revert to her husband's heirs. This deed was made prior to 
the Act of 1956. It was argued that it was a pre-existing right so the benefit 
of sub sec (1) be given. But court held that the deed was made in terms of 
compromise so sub section (2) would apply. 
In Raghubir Singh v Gulab Singh^^^ the court in relation to section 14 
of the Act considered three points. 
• Whether right to maintain was created by the Acts of 1937 or 
1946 or it was a pre-existing right under the Shastric law ? 
What was the nature and scope of sub section (2) of section 
14? 
How the enlargement of widows interest be effected? 
176 
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Krishna vAkhil (1958) Cal. 671. 
(1997) s e c 460, AIR (1997) SC 3082. 
"" AIR (1998) SC 2401, See also Ram Kali v Chowdhri Ajit Shankar (1997) SCC 619, Bhommireddy v 
Bhoospalli (1997) 10 SC 673, AIR (1997) SC 2311. 
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On the first point, vSupreme Court opined that the maintenance right 
was existed in the Shartic law and this Act only gave them recognition and 
statutory backing. 
About the nature and scope of sub section (2) of section 14, 
Supreme Court upheld the position of Tulsamma case,^''^ as it applied only 
to the instruments, decrees, awards, and gifts, which create a new title. 
On the third point, which was discussed elaborately in the instant 
case of Raghubir Singh,^^° the court views were in affirmative. In this case 
the husband, (of widow) had executed a will in favour of her grand child 
with the stipulation that till the life of testator and his wife they would enjoy 
full control over the property. The issue was, whether this right of widow 
would enlarge or not? As, it was not in lieu of maintenance. The court held, 
that it would be enlarged into absolute ownership. 
In another case court opined that where the widow had relinquished 
her right through a sale, her limited interest would not ripen in the absolute 
ownership,^^^ or surrendered her share in the favour of her only son.^^^ If 
the husband had created life interest by a will, only in the half share of the 
properties that would ripen into absolute one.^ ^^ But it is also not 
necessary, that all limited interest would be enlarged into absolute one. It 
depends, upon the facts of each case where the property is inherited by 
the wife in lieu of her maintenance and the husband himself has got, only a 
"'Supra note 171. 
""Supra note 188. 
"" Narcsh Kuinari v Slia.shi Lai, K\\\ (1999) SC 928. 
"^ D.V. Jagannathan v P.R. Sriniwasan (1999) AIHC 444. 
' " Yadala Venkata Subbama v Yadala Chinna, AIR (2001) SC 1664, (2001) SCC 393, See also Bhusa v 
Kashiram, AIR (1994) SCI 202. 
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life interest, over the property from his aunt, by a will in a clear and 
unambiguous language then it would not ripen into absolute one.^ ®'' 
Where in partition deed the widow take the property for life and she 
had herself directed with a clear stipulation that after her death the 
property would go to her sons, the daughter's claim was not maintainable. 
Very recently the court holds it.^ ^^ 
The section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has upgraded the 
position of Hindu female. So, far as the property right is concerned, now 
the Hindu woman is absolutely entitled, to hold the property. More over if 
she has any sort of right in the property of her husband then she will 
become the actual owner of that property because of the effect of section 
14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Provided that she is in possession of 
that property either actually or constructively. 
Succession of a Hindu female 
The Act of 1956 though considered as that it gave a deathblow to 
the old Hindu law of succession and forms a total new structure of the 
rules of succession. In reality it does not totally depart from the old values. 
As it supports different scheme of devolution of the property of Hindu 
females. However it demolishes the differences of school and sub-schools, 
it also makes no difference about the status and forms of marriages and 
paid no head to the kind of Stridhana which was the basis and the deciding 
factor in the old Hindu law of succession. However the Act still divided the 
property of a female Hindu into two categories and provides different sets 
"•' Muninanjappa v R. Mannal (2001) 5 SCC 363, AIR (2001) SC 1754. See also Gorachand Mukhcrjce v 
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Malabika Dutta, AIR (2002) Cal. 26. 
Sheri v Savitri, AIR (2005) Kant 33, See also : Laxmi Kantha v Vijay Laxmi, AIR (2004) Ker. 295. 
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of rules of succession of these two kinds. Tlie source, from which the 
Hindu female inherits the property, is still a governing factor of Hindu 
succession in case of an issueless Hindu female. Though it is immaterial 
when she died leaving behind her own issue. 
Sub Section (1) of section 15, prescribed the general rules of 
succession, which applied to every kind of property of Hindu female, which 
is capable of being inheritance but sub section (2) of Section 15 state 
about the exception, which has received a heavy criticism.^^^ It talks about 
the sources from which the property is inherited. There are also two other 
exceptions of the general rule of succession to which sections 15 & 16 will 
not apply. Which are as follows:-
• To any property which is subject of any other existing law as 
for the prevention of fragmentation of agricultural land etc. 
• Any property, which is described in section 5 of the Act. 
Section 15 says that the property of a Hindu female shall devolve 
according to the rules prescribed in Section, 16. Section J 5 has divided the 
heirs of a Hindu female into five categories:-
Class I Heirs 
The son, daughter, the children of predeceased son or daughter and 
husband are class I heirs. 
Illustration: Suppose a Hindu female died leaving behind son, 
daughter, husband and son of a predeceased son and daughter and son of 
a predeceased daughter. The shares will be as follows: 
'^ '' Shri Jain D.C. at 1968 I.S.J.J. 1-4. He shows that Mulla's explanation is impossible and hopes that 
Parliament will act to cure the anomahes (referred by Derrett - A Critique of Modern Hindu) p. 258. 
AAi»y 
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(P) H i , M'd 
S1/5 (D) Dv5 S 
S1/5 S1/10 L)i/io 
The son and daughter include the children of any pre-deceased son 
or daughter^^'' and the son and daughter by natural birth legitimate or 
illegitimate^®^ and validly adopted child.^''^ The question about the stepson 
is very controversial and raised time to time. Recently the question before 
the court,^^° was, whether the stepson of a female was entitle to succeed 
the estate as her legal heir? The appellate court with reference to the 
provision of Sec 15 & 16 of Hindu Succession Act held that stepson is not 
a preferential heir. However, this controversy was not resolved. To resolve 
the matter Supreme Court in Lachman Singh v Kripa Singh,'^^^ observed 
the distinction between 'son' and 'step son' according to the Collins English 
Dictionary - a 'son' means - a male offspring and 'step son' means - a 
son of one's husband or wife by a former union. Relying on that Delhi High 
Court held that girl had preferential right over the stepson.^^^ Instead of it 
very recently the issue is decided by Jharkhand High Court in favour of the 
step son,^^^ where the original owner died prior to coming in force of Hindu 
Woman's Right to Property Act, 1937 leaving behind his widow and two 
'*' Mannikyamma v Venkata Subba Rao (1978) 2 AN W.R. 18. 
'** Gurbachan Singh v Khichan Singh, AIR (1971) Punj. 240. 
'"' Bhagwania v Kushali (1977) M.P.L.J. 99. 
"° Bhagwan Dass v Prabhawati Ram, AIR (2004) Delhi 37. 
' ' 'AIR (1987) SC 1616 at 1619. 
"^ Prakash v Bela Sihare, AIR (1996) Del. 336. 
"^Naresh Jha v Prakash Kumar Jha AIR (2004) Jhar. 2 
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sons. The claim was made that the share of widow be inherited by her own 
son and not by stepson. But the court held that as the original owner died 
prior to the coming of the Act of 1937, so property should be devolved 
upon son and stepson equally. 
Class II Heirs 
If there is no heir in class I means no daughter, son and husband 
and the children of predeceased son or daughter then property will go to 
the heirs of husband.^ "^^  
Illustration: Suppose a Hindu female died leaving behind no heir of 
class I but a brother, a sister and a son of a predeceased brother of her 
husband, the property will devolve among them if the property is inherited 
by the deceased female from the husband or in-laws. 
(B) Si;3 (P) B 1/3 
>1/3 
Illustration:- Suppose a Hindu female died leaving behind no heir of 
class I and II the property will devolve upon the father and mother if 
inherited from parents. They will take simultaneously. 
M 1/2 1/2 
(P) 
"'Keshri v Har Prasad (1971) M.P. 129. 
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In Chatro v Sahayak Chakbandi Meerut,^^^ the question came before 
the Supreme Court that who would inherit the land of a widow landholder 
dying intestate survived by only daughter? The woman purchased the land 
in the lifetime of husband. The husband possessed some part of the land, 
as tenant, after his death the widow repossessed as proprietor holder. On 
the death of widow, the brother of husband claimed that widow had 
succeeded the tenancy so her right would not get the benefit of section 14, 
but Supreme Court held that in the absence of son the only daughter will 
inherit the property. 
From the decision of the above case we have inferred that the 
Zamindari Abolition Act will apply only when husband died leaving behind 
the agricultural land and only daughter as an heir. But where a female 
holder of an agricultural land died leaving behind a daughter as an heir 
then she will inherit the land as an heir and Uttar Pradesh Zamindari 
Abolition and Tenancy Act will not apply. 
The heir of the husband mentioned in section 15 means the heirs who 
would have succeeded under the Act if the husband had died just moment 
next after the females death.^^^ 
Class III Heirs 
The father and mother will entitle to inherit the property if there is no 
child, child of predeceased children, husband and husband's heir. If both 
parents alive they would inherit simultaneously. The father and mother 
''^AIR(1997)SCI702 
"^ Gopikabai v Bajya (1971) M.P.L.J. 335. 
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mean the natural father and mother and not step parents^^^ or putative 
father. 
Class IV Heirs 
The property will devolve if there is no heir in first three categories. 
Sub sec. (2) says that if there is no child and no child of 
predeceased children or husband, or mother or father, and then the 
property will go to one, from whom it is inherited. As if the property is 
inherited from the husband or father in law then it will go to the heirs of the 
husband. If it is inherited from the parents then it would revert back, first to 
the heir of father then to the heirs of mothers. 
Class V Heirs 
If the property comes through the natal family of the female and 
there is no heir in classes I, II, III and IV, then the property will devolve, 
among the heirs of mothers. If the number of heirs is more than one, of 
equal degree relation, then they will take simultaneously.^^^ An unmarried 
Hindu female died issueless leaving behind her, a brother and a widow 
sister in law. She inherits the property in question from her mother. 
Brother's claim to be only heir excluding widow (sister in law) as being the 
last heir of his father was not approved by the court. The court held that 
widow had an equal share in the property.^^^ But where the female has 
'•" Anhio V Baijnath (1974) Pat. 177. 
'^ ^ Mallapa v Shivappa (1962) Mys. 140. 
"'^  Yogindra Prakash Duggal v Cm Prakash Duggal (2000) AIHC 2905 (Del.) 
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inherited the property from her brother then this property will be governed 
by the rules of sec 15(a) of the Act.^°° 
Section 15 
Sub section (2) of section 15 says that: 
"Notwithstanding any thing contained in sub section (1) 
• Any property inherited by a female Hindu from tier fattier or 
Mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter 
of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased 
son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-
section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of 
the father; and-
• Any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or 
from father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or 
daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre 
deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred 
to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon 
the heirs of the husband. 
Section 15(2)(b) is engrafted to prevent the person from inheritance 
who is not even remotely related to the person, whose property is in 
question. This section ensure that the property of a Hindu female in the 
absence of children and children of predeceased children and husband 
and even parents always revert to the heirs of real owner from whom the 
property is inherited.^°^ If the property is allowed to be drifted away from 
^''° Bala Sahab v Jamila, AIR (1978) Bom. 44 
^°' Bagat Ram v Teja Singh, AIR (2002) SC 1. 
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the source, which is more important for the purpose of devolution of her 
property, the object of section 15 (2) will be defeated.^°^ 
The object of section 15(2) is to ensure that the property left by a 
Hindu female does not lose the real source from which the deceased 
female had inherited the property. If there is no children of a Hindu female 
from the husband from whom she inherited the property but from second 
husband she had children they would not entitle to inherit the property. In 
fact the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954, when originally introduced in the 
Rajya Sabha did not contain any clause corresponding to Sub Section (2) 
of Section 15. It comes to be incorporated on the recommendation of joint 
Committee of the two houses of the Parliament.^°^ 
Section 15 (2)(a) says that if a Hindu female leaves behind no heir of 
entry 1,2, & 3 then the property will devolve upon the heirs of her father or 
mother if inherited from the natal family and does not go to the heirs of 
husband,Section 15(2)(b) says that if the property inherited from husband 
or father in law then in similar circumstances it will devolve among the heir 
ofhusband.^°'' 
In Vijay Singh v Dy. Director Consolidation^^^ the apex court has 
recognized the absolute ownership of widow, who was in possession of 
property when the Act came into force, consequently, it was held that on 
her death intestate her only daughter would become full owner of property 
as class I heir. 
202 Dhanistha Kalita v Ramakanfa Kalita, AIR (2003) Gau.92. 
^"(2001) 252 ITR 324. 
^"^ Mahesh Kumar Pate v Mahesh Kumar Vyas (2000) AIHC 485. 
"^^  AIR (1996) SC 855. 
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At another place the mother became an absolute owner by virtue of 
section 14 of the Act, of the property, which she has inherited from her 
husband. It was held that it be devolved upon the son and daughter under 
the provision of section 15 (1)(a) and not under any other provision of 
law^°^ To ascertain that who will be the heir of a Hindu female under 
category (b) of section 15 (1) the time of the wife's death be considered 
instead of husband because the succession opens only at the time of her 
death.^°'' In a case property inherited by a wife from her second husband 
which become her absolute property. The widow made a will in favour of 
her son from the first husband. The heirs of her second husband made the 
claim. The court in this case held that the property will be devolved 
according to the will of the widow^°^ In this instant case the court does not 
apply the provision of sub section (2) of Section 15 of Hindu Succession 
Act 1956 and give preference to the will of the deceased. It is submitted 
that by this decision court has defeated the object of sub-section (2) of 
section 15. 
A very different type of case came to the court. The facts of the case 
were that one Yamuna Bai had 7 (seven) daughters. One of them was 
widowed at very early age and lived with her mother over twenty years. 
She had got nothing from her late husband. In such circumstances, 
Yamuna Devi had executed a will in favour of her widow daughter 
excluding all other daughters, which were challenged by the daughters. It 
was held by the court that testator and all daughters would get equal share 
^'^ Debahari Kumbhar v Sribasta Patra, AIR (1994) Ori. 86. 
^°'Seetha Lakshmi Ammal v Mutthuvenkataremma lyenger (1998) 5 SCC 368, AIR (1998) SC 1692. 
-°* Chintaramilushibai (2000) AIHC 1308 M.P. 
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and the widowed daughter would be entitled to the 1/8 share of her mother 
in addition of her own share^°^ It is a case of natural love and affection. 
Sub (2) is restricted only \.o the inheritance and does K\O{ deal the 
property acquired by any other means as through will gift or dowry. Though 
it is difficult to say why Parliament has restricted its application to the 
inherited property only, whether dowry and gifts received by a female are 
not property inherited from the father and husband.^^° It was held where 
the identity of the property was changed sub (2) would not apply.^ ^^ 
The Order and Manner of Distribution 
Section 16 is technical and explains the order of succession and 
manners of distribution among the heirs of a female Hindu. It talks about 
the simultaneous succession and support the rule of representation. It 
prescribed three rules:-
Rule 1: Among the heirs specified in sub-section (1) of section 15 
those in entry one, shall be preferred to those in any succeeding entry, and 
those included in the same entry shall take simultaneously. 
Rule 2: If any son or daughter of intestate had pre deceased, the 
intestate leaving his or her own children alive at the time of intestate's 
death, the children of such son or daughter shall take between them, the 
share which such son or daughter would have taken, if living at the 
intestate's death. 
-°'' Ramabai Padmakcr Patil v Rukminibai Vishnu (2003) 7 ACH 395. 
'^^  Ajit Singh v State of Punjab (1983) Cri.L.J (NOG 271). 
^" Veera Ragva Amma v Subba Rao (1976) AP. 337, 
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Rule 3: The devolution of the property of the intestate on the heirs 
referred to, in clauses (b),(d) and (e) of sub-section (1) and in sub-section 
(2) to section 15, shall be in the same order and according to the same 
rules as would have applied, if the property had been the father's o'^ 
mother's or the husband's as the case may be, and such person had died 
intestate in respect there of immediately after the intestate's death. 
The heirs of the father or the husband will be determined according 
to section 8. The heirs of the mother will be determined according to 
section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The heirs of mother/ather 
or husband who are entitle to inherit the property of a Hindu female 
according to section 15, are actually the heirs of Hindu female herself and 
not of the person through whom the heirship is traced^^^ In Shankarappa v 
Gauramma^^^ it was held that where a Hindu female inheriting the property 
of her parents jointly with her sister, died childless and intestate leaving 
behind a sister and the son of the predeceased sister, the surviving sister 
will take % share of the property held jointly and the son of the 
predeceased sister %. 
Some General Principles 
Sections 18, 19,20, 21, and 22 talks about the general principle of 
the succession which are as follows -
preference of full Shod over Half Blood 
-'^(1971) 3 sec 847. 
^"(1973)Mys. 142. 
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Section 18 Says that the heir who is relative to the deceased by full 
blood will be preferred in comparison of half blood,^ "^^  if the nature of the 
relationship is the same in every other respect. In section 18 the legislative 
intent is to codify the earlier rule of Hindu Law preferring relations of full 
blood to half blood. It is a substantial reproduction of the previous rules. 
Mode of Succession of Two or More Heirs 
Section 19 says that if there are two or more heirs they will succeed 
together as per capita and as a tenant in common. But if a man dies 
leaving behind three children by a predeceased daughter and four children 
by a predeceased son, the property will be divided half and half. Here the 
property will be divided as per stripes. If there are two widows, they both 
will succeed together as tenants in common and if any one of them die 
then her share will not pass to her co sharer but to her own heirs.^^^ 
Unborn Child 
Section 20 talks about the right of the child in the womb. In law he 
deemed to be present at the death of the intestate Hindu. It does not 
confine to the children of deceased or predeceased son but to any person 
who is otherwiise entitled. If the partitioned were done before his or her 
birth he or she will be entitled to reopen the partition. Section 20 extends to 
cases of illegitimate children entitled to claim. 
^"' p. Jayarmaiah v Aragonda Munemma AIR (2005) A.P. 27. 
^" Nagamma Naicker v Ponnuchunnayyyan 81, LW 23 (1970). 
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Simultaneous Death 
If several deaths take place simultaneously, how the share will be 
decided, it is prescribed in section 21 of the Act. Because of the rule of 
survivorship this question is raised in simultaneous death that, who 
survived the other for the purpose of succession. Section 21 says thai it 
will always be presumed that younger has survived the elder until the 
contrary is proved, when the matter is of relationship, age have no 
consideration but in general the younger in age be considered survived the 
elder. As where the mother and daughter, shot dead at the same time it 
will be presumed that daughter survived the mother.^^^ 
Preferential Right 
Section 22 is designed to give the benefit, to the heirs of deceased, 
to acquire the family property in preference of others. The intention of the 
legislature is to ensure that the property should remain within the family 
members rather than to go in the hands of stranger. Though this 
preferential right resembles to the right of preemption but in strict sense it 
is different. This right is only available to the class I heirs. Reversioners not 
belonging to class I heir have no preference over class II heir,^ "^" This right 
extinguished if once the partition took place and specific shares have been 
allotted,^^^ because the intention of the legislature is not to put a clog on 
the power of alienation of independent owners of the properties.^^^ It is 
personal right neither heritable nor transferable.^^" 
Padmaraja v Cyan Chandra Appa (1970) Mys. 87. 216 
-"(1997)11 s e c 310. 
^" Krishna Pada Roy v Parimai Chandra SaiiaAlR(2000) Gau. 117, See also Dhobel Rout v Paheli Raut, 
AIR (1998) Ori. 74. 
^" Bhagirathi Chetoi v Adhikanada Chetoi, AIR (1988), Ori. 285 at 288. 
"" Kamal Goal v Puroshatama Das.AIR (1999) P&H 254. 
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Section 23 Before 2005 
"The march of economic laws can be thwarted but not stopped for 
ever and the desire for self acquisition and freedom from the trammel of 
corporate life, ultimately established the institution of partition and separate 
ownership necessitated, the formulation of rules of inheritance applicable 
to property held in absolute sever ability by its own last owner" 
Section 23 was considered one of the most discriminatory 
legislative actions, which discriminate only on the basis of sex. It was 
opposite to the constitutional provision of Art 15 (1), which says that there 
must not be any discrimination on the ground of sex. It was also a violative 
of fundamental right. 
Section 23, "where a Hindu intesate has left surviving him or her 
both male and female heirs specified in class I of the schedule and his or 
her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his 
or her family then not with standing any thing contained in this Act, the 
right of any such female heir to claim partition of dwelling house shall not 
arise until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein, 
but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein." 
Provided that where such female heir is daughter, she shall be entitle to a 
right of residence in dwelling house only if she is unmarried or has been 
deserted by or has separated from her husband or is a widow. 
Said section says that where both male and female heirs of an 
intestate specified in class I of the schedule succeed. The female heir shall 
have no right to claim the partition of the dwelling house which is wholly 
occupied by the male but female heirs shall have the right to reside their till 
they are unmarried or deserted or widowed. This right to claim partition is 
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not extinguished forever but as soon as the male heirs choose to divide 
their respective share the female heirs also can claim partition. Section 23 
was designed to preserve the heritage of a Hindu Jurisprudence,^^^ which 
had considered the dwelling house as an impartible asset, and to prevent 
fragmentation it puts a rider,^ ^^ on the absolute and equal enforcement of 
female's right to claim partition. In the words of Raghavachariars "....to 
avoid confusion and cliaos in tiie family created by ttie female whose 
moorings are elsewhere on account of their marriage, seeking to tal<e 
away their shares and throw the male members into the streets. ...^^^ 
Whatever may be the object and reason^ "^* but it was discriminatory 
to oust the females from her lawful right merely because it was 
inconvenient for the male sharers. 
Before going into the detail discussion of the provisions of section 
23, it is necessary to know about the dwelling house. Dwelling house is not 
defined in the Act. The Supreme Court discusses it,^ ^^ in Narasimha case. 
In this case the question before the court was that what is dwelling house? 
Whether it includes the building, which is partly occupied by members of 
the family, and other part is in possession of some stranger? The Gujrat 
High Court opined.^^^ That if the literal meaning is to be given to the 
section which says, "wholly occupied by members of the famil/ it ceases 
to be as dwelling house and section 23 will have no application in this 
case. 
221 Mookammal v Chitra Vadi Ammal (1980) AIR Mad. 293. 
^^ ^ Anant v Janki Bai, AIR (1984) Bom. 319. 
"^ The Leading case Narashimha Mury v Sushecia Bai, AIR (1996) SC at 1831. 
^^^ The Object and the analysis of Sec.23 was discussed by Patna High Court in Raghunathan v Rambalak, 
AIR (1964) Pat. 206 and Later on by Allahabad High Court in Katara v Smt.Hoshiari(I967)Ali L.J1031 
"^ Supra 
^^ ^ Vanitaben v Divaben, AIR (1979) Guj. 116 
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Another question, which need consideration, is that whether a 
tenanted house be considered as dwelling house? The apex court said 
that" In our considered view a tenanted house is not a dwelling house in 
the sense, the word is used in section 23"^^^ The house ceases to be 
dwelling house if one of the brother parts with his share. By the majority 
opinion it was concluded by Supreme Court that the word dwelling house 
is neither a term of art nor it is synonymous of a residential house. To give 
the effect to the intention of the legislature who chooses the word dwelling 
house purposely - "status quo" should prevail as existing prior to his or her 
death.^^^ 
In this case a Hindu intestate died, leaving behind a son and three 
daughters. The son has sold half part of the house to a stranger. In these 
circumstances the house was ceased to be a dwelling house because to 
constitute the dwelling house the actual, physical and mental (animus 
possendi) possession should present in the strict sense. The second 
question, which the second question which has been controversial for a 
long time is considered by the Supreme Court in this case was whether, 
restrict female to claim partition where there was only one male heir, is 
genuine? 
Different views have been given by the different High courts through 
the passage of time. The arguments made by the courts, were generally in 
the favour that there should be no application of said section in the case of 
one male heir. As the object of the section 23 is frustrated where there is 
only one male member and it would be amounted as a complete denial of 
the female's right because if there is only one male there is no possibility of 
-" Supra 
-^ * Supra 
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the male heir to choose to divide and the female is left at the whims and 
caprice of their male counterpart. The supporter High courts was 
Bombay,^ ^^ Karnataka^^° and Orrisa.^ ^^ 
But contrary view was also given by High courts of Calcutta "^^ ^ and 
Madras.^^^ The Supreme Court put the controversies at rest ^^ '^  The apex 
court by majority opinion said according to general clauses Act, 1897, the 
language in plural would have to be read in singular also and where a 
Hindu died intestate leaving behind a single male heir section 23 would 
apply. It is submitted that the views of Supreme Court are not rightful and 
harsh towards females. 
An interesting question came before the court,^ ^^ for the consideration 
whether a coparcener can resist the daughter's claim for partition? The 
courts response is that section 23 clearly provides that it will apply only to 
class I heir and the coparcener is not a class I heir. 
In circumstances where the dwelling house is not in the possession 
of the family members the bar of section 23 will not be applicable^^^ In 
another case it was held that section 23 could not be extended to adjust 
the interest of the parties in property without destroying the dwelling house 
as a unit.^ '^' 
-^' Anant v Janki Bai, AIR (1984) Bom. 319. 
-^ ° Kasiyavva v Hanuman lappa (1984) 1 Kant. L.J. 273. 
^^ ' Mohanti Motyaiue v Oiuru Appanama, AIR (1993) Ori. 36, Hemiata Devi v Umashankari, AIR (1975) 
Ori. 908. 
-" Surya Kumar Das v Maya Dalla 86 Cal. W.N. 359, Arun Kumar v Jilendra, AIR (1975) Cal, 232. 
-" Janabai Ammal v Palahi, AIR (1981) Mad. 62. 
""•Supra.J-aS 
"^ Pulsing Ramsingh Rajput v Durgabai, AIR 91997) Bom. 201. 
"^ Puruostham Bachara v Rangabati Barik (1999) AIHC 4760 Ori. 
-" D.M. Jayamma v Munniyamma (2000) AIHC 4013 (Kam). 
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Section 23 After 2005 
A very sound step has been taken by the legislature by abolishing 
section 23 of the principal Act, which was most unfair and discriminatory. 
Now the daughters have the right to claim the partition in the dwelling 
house. The provisions, which are critically examined in passing 
paragraphs, are self evident that how much hardship, they create for the 
females. The daughters were totally at the whim and caprice of the male 
members and had no right to claim partition even in great distress. It is a 
great relief for the women folk of the Hindu society. In Hindu Succession 
(Amendment) Bill, 2004, the Law Commission of India has recommended 
in its 174 report that section 23 which disentitle a female heir to ask for 
partition in respect of dwelling house should be abolished.^^^ 
Heirs Not Entitled to Inherit? 
The Act of 1956 barred certain persons from inheritance in certain 
condition. These disqualifications are laid down by the Act from section 24 
to 28, which are as follows: 
Remarried Widow After 2005 
Section 24 of Hindu Succession Act disentitled certain widows from 
inheritance if they re-marry before the succession open. They were the 
widow of son, widow of predeceased son's son and brother's widow. But 
once succession opened and she inherited the property, she could not be 
divested from that property, by her subsequent marriage.^^^ Under the 
Hindu Woman Re-marriage Act, 1956, there was a provision that if widow 
238 jy^th -^^^ Commission Report para 1.18. 
" ' Bhuribai v Chamabai (1968) Raj. 139. 
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re-married even after the succession open, she would be divested from the 
property, she inherited from her husband. Subsequently this Act was 
repealed in, 1983. But where the marriage of widow took place prior to the 
coming into force of this Act and because of the old law the widow lost her 
right to inherit due to the second marriage, the provision of this section will 
not apply.^ "^ ^ Recently Supreme Court gave a significant judgement. In this 
case the widow remarried in 1953, which was a bigamous marriage and 
held void. The argument was given in favour of widow that void marriage 
did not attract the provision of section 2 of Hindu remarriage Act, Supreme 
Court said "voidness of marriage will not remove her disqualification to 
inherit."^'' 
A very irregular judgement was given recently by the Gauhati High 
court, which defeated the object of the Act. The facts of the case '^'^  were 
that the deceased after divorcing her first wife married the plaintiff. After his 
death the plaintiff remarried. The court held that because of remarriage 
she had lost her chastity, so not entitled to any share. It is submitted that 
the case is wrongly decided because unchastity is no bar to inherit and 
section 24 applies only to the widow of son, son's son and brother's son 
and does not divest deceased's own widow. 
Note : This controversial section 24 has now been abolished by the 
Hindu succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. Now remarriage is not a bar to 
inherit the property of her previous husband. 
'•'" Sankar Prasad v Usha Bala, AIR (1978) Cal. 525. 
'^" Velamuri Venkata Siva Prasad v Kothuri Venkatcshware, AIR (2000) SC 434 See also Ram Sahran v 
^ IJJiyari (2000) AIHC 938, M.P, 
'''' Lalramciiaimi v l.alliuiclumgi, AIR (2002) Gaii. 96. 
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Murderer 
Section 25 disqualified the person who causes the murder of the 
deceased, from inheriting the property of the murdered who by either way 
commit the murder or abate,, or help in the furtherance of the murder. For 
the application of this section, the term murderer, should be liberally 
construed and not in the strict sense as defined in section 300 of IPC.^ ^^ 
This section will apply to disqualify the person only and not his heirs.^ "^ "^  
Conversion 
Section 26 disentitles the heirs of a converted person from inheriting 
the property of any of their Hindu relative. Because of the Caste Disability 
Removal Act the effect of conversion will not disentitle the person himself 
who is converted, '^*^ section further says that if those heirs subsequently 
become Hindu the disqualification will be removed. 
Disqualified Heir be Deemed Died 
Section 27 confine to the person himself who by any reason is 
disqualified to inherit and does not affect the heir's right of inheritance in 
any way. It says that it be deemed that the disqualified person is dead 
before the intestate deceased in whose property otherwise he has right to 
inherit. 
Abolition of the Old Disqualification of Hindu Law 
Section 28 has abolished other disqualification of old Hindu law, 
which disentitle the person suffering from some diseases, from inheritance 
^^ ^ Indian Penal Code. 
^^ ^ N. Seetharamiah v Ram Krishaniah, AIR (1970) A.P. 407. 
^^ ^ Ashok Naidu v Raymond S. Mulu (1976), Gal. 272. 
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except those which are expressly mentioned in the above going sections of 
the Act. The unchastity of widow is no bar to inherit even though in the 
original Bill, the unchastity was suggested to retain.^ ""^ A Hindu was found 
to be a lunatic when succession opened. It was claimed that under the text 
lunancy must be congenital to exclude from inheritance. Under Hindu law 
lunancy is considered distinct from idiocy, it need not be congenital to 
exclude from inheritance, if it existed when succession opened.^''^ 
Succinctly it can be said that there are so many anomalies in Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956 and it is not exempted from defects but at least it 
has improved, up to some extent the Hindu female's property rights. The 
entire previous impediment's, which were imposed upon the female's right, 
are abolished now and she got absolute property right with full rights to 
appropriate it, in whatever manner she liked. In comparison of old Hindu 
law now she was in better position though not at best. 
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 
After the fifty-eight years of Independence the 5**^  September be 
remembered as a red-letter day in the Hindu Women's World. As another 
progressive attempt has been made by the legislature for the economic 
and social empowerment of women folk. Hindu Succession Amendment 
Bill, 2004 was introduced in the on going winter session of Parliament 
drafted on the recommendation of the 174^ ^^  Report (May 2000) of the Law 
Commission. The Commission pointed out that the earlier law granted 
arbitrary and unfair benefits to the male heirs of a Hindu, died intestate. It 
suggests the equal distribution of ancestral property between both male 
'^"' Clause (39) of The Hindu Code Bill 1954. 
^" Parameshwari Thayaininah v Shri Subramanium, (1960) 2 SCR 729. 
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and female heirs. It demands equal treatment and equal partnership in 
economic and social sphere. The Rajya Sabha passed this Bill on 16'^  
August 2005 and by Lok Sabha on 29*'' August 2005 and got President 
assent on 5*'^  September 2005 and came into force on 9"^  September 2005. 
It really gives a deathblow to the old Hindu law in which the females were 
even devoid of any property rights. 
By this amendment Act of 2005 many sections of Hindu Succession 
Act of 1956 are repealed or altered which were unfair towards females. 
Now the Hindu daughter of Mitakshara joint family will also be born with a 
silver spoon in her mouth. Now the daughter has all the rights and 
liabilities, which her brother has. She is a coparcener and there will be no 
notional partition, she is entitle to claim the partition in dwelling house as 
section 23 which previously disentitle the female io claim partition is 
omitted by this amendment Act. Four new heirs are included by this Act in 
Schedule of the principal Act. Among newly introduced heirs in class I, 
there are three females and one male. Section 24, which put a bar to 
inherit the property on a widow who remarries, is also been abolished by 
the new Act. Now she is entitled to inherit the property of her previous 
husband. It can be said that the new Act is a total commitment for the 
women empowerment and protection of her property rights. Now it is 
turned of judiciary to implement it and give flesh and breath to these laws. 
Christian Law 
With the establishment of British political authority in India, so many 
reforms have been made governing the family problems of the Indians 
though it is said that the Britishers had no interference in the family matters 
and their respective personal laws had governed these matters. But it is 
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not absolutely true because so many family laws were passed by the 
English Rulers as Pars! Marriage And Divorce Act, 1865, The Indian 
Succession Act, 1865, Indian Divorce Act, 1869, Hindu Wills Act, 1870, 
and Christian Marriage Act, 1872 etc. 
The British rule in India began on the legislative front with the Indian 
Succession Act, 1865 and Parsi Succession Act, 1865. These were based 
on English Law and was declared, to constitute subject, to certain 
exceptions, be applicable to all classes of intestate and testamentary 
succession. These exceptions were so wide that exclude all natives of 
India, '^'^  such as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains etc., as they were very 
sentimental about their religions. This law is applicable only to European, 
Indians-Christians, Jews, and Parsis etc. 
Indian Christian 
• Indian Christian means a native of India.^ "^ ^ 
• who is of unmixed Asiatic descent. 
• who in good faith claims to be of unmixed Asiatic descent. 
• who profess any form of the Christian religion.^^° 
This definition is taken from the Native Christian Act, 1901. But 
there, in the place of "Native Christian" the words "Indian Christian" are 
used. Native Christians are those who were converted Christian whom the 
"" Ubert: Government of India, 3"'ed. p. 36. 
'^'^  Section 2 clause (d) Indian Succession Act. 1925. 
'^° Ma Khun v Ma Ahma, 12 Rang. 184. 
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Britishers regarded as their faithful slaves^^^ An Anglo Indian does not 
come with in the definition under clause (d).^ ^^ 
Application of the Act 
The Act empowers the State Government to exclude any community 
from the operations of certain sections, which are expressly mentioned in 
section, 3 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. That are generally related to 
the domicile, marriage, intestate and testamentary succession etc. As 
section, 4 exempt the Hindus, Muslims, Buddists, Sikhs and Jains from the 
operation of section, 4 to 19. But under section 21 of the Special Marriage 
Act, 1954, the Act will apply to those whose marriage is solemnized under 
Special Marriage Act, irrespective of their religion.^^^ 
General Principles of the Succession of the Christian 
Under section 5 of The Indian Succession Act, 1925, two different 
sets of rules were made to regulate the succession of movable and 
immovable property of a Christian deceased. 
Movable property includes-standing timber, growing crops, grass, 
fruits upon and juice in, the tree and property of every description except 
immovable property.^^'' 
Immovable property means things attached to the earth,^^^ as lands 
trees, buildings etc., but it does not include standing timber, growing crops 
or grass etc. 
" '^ Mehmood Tahir: op cit, p. 99. 
-" In re. T.R. Tiiiic (1976) IMl.J 257 : 89 Mud, I,W l'17, 
"'KashibavStiipat 19Bom. 697. 
^^ ^ General Clauses Act X of 1897. 
"^ Ibid. 
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Sub (1) of section 5 says that the succession of the immovable property of 
the person, be governed by the law of the land, where the deceased had 
his domicile at the time of his death. 
Illustration: Suppose, Mr. X having his domiciled in India but he 
dies in France, leaving some movable property in France and England, 
and both movable and immovable in India. 
The succession of the whole property is to be regulated by the law of 
India but the status^ of the parties, is to be decided by the law of the 
domicile.^ ^® In the case where the deceased left both movable and 
immovable property, sub section (2) of section, 5 says that it will be 
regulated by the laws of the country in which the person, whose property is 
in question to be governed, domiciled all the time till his death.^^^ 
Illustration: Suppose Mr. X an English man, having his domicile in 
France, dies in India leaving behind both movable and immovable property 
in India. In this case the succession to movable is regulated by rules of 
France and the succession of immovable by the law of India. 
Rules Regarding Domicile 
The word domicile is not defined in the Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
In Halsbury's laws of England^^^ the word domicile is defined as ">A person 
is domiciled In that country In which he either has or Is deemed by law to 
have his permanent home." Dicey and Morris has defined domicile as, "a 
^^^ Ratan Shaw v Bamoji, 40 Bom. L.R. 141. 
" ' See the illustration no 2 of Sec. 5 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
148 
Chapter -III 
person is in general domiciled in the country in which he is considered by 
English law to have his permanent home.^^^ 
The Indian Succession Act laid down from 6 to 19 some rules, 1925, 
about the domicile of the deceased, which are as follows: 
• If a person has more than one domicile the place where he 
lives with his family be considered his permanent home to 
regulate the succession.^^° (Sec.6). 
• Unless the new domicile is acquired, the domicile of the 
Birth prevails.^^^ 
Traders or Merchant 
A, a person whose domicile of origin is in England, proceeds to India 
where he settles as a merchant, intending to reside here to the rest of the 
life. His domicile is now in India.^ ^^ 
Foreign Representatives 
But there is an exception in the case of the representatives of the 
foreign government and their family. Though they permanently resides in 
foreign country with family but because they have no intention to change 
their domicile, be considered the domicile of that government, from where 
they came to represent.^^^ 
"" Morris: opci( p, 100. 
•"" Soincrvillc v Sonicrvillo S. Vcs 758, 
'"' Sec. 9 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
*^^  See the Illustration of Sec. 10. 
263 Sec. 12 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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Children Legitimate and iliegitimate 
In the case of children, the domicile of the legitimate child be 
ascertained, by the domicile of his father, at the time of his birth and in 
case of illegitimate child according to his or her mother's domicile^^'' In the 
case of posthumous child, his or her domiciled be considered in that 
country where his or her father domiciled till death. 
Illustration: Suppose at the time of the birth of A, his father was 
domiciled in England. The domicile of A be considered in England though 
he himself was born in France if. A is a legitimate child. 
Illustration: Suppose at the birth of B, an illegitimate child, his 
putative father was domiciled in England but his mother domiciled in 
France B's domicile will be considered in France. 
• A lunatic person cannot acquire a new domicile.^^^ 
• If the domicile of the dead is not known and not proved the 
domicile of another place and he dies leaving movable 
property in India the succession will be governed by the 
Indian Law.^ ^^ 
The Effect of Marriage to Regulate the Succession 
Section, 15 says that by marriage a woman acquires the domicile of 
her husband,^^'' if she had noi the same domicile before. Section, 16 says 
that during the continuance of marriage the wives domicile follows that of 
her husband, therefore if a woman in India possessing movable property, 
marries to a person whose domicile is in England, on her death husband 
•'''' Sec. 7, 8 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
'^''^ Sec. 18 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
^^ '^  Sec. 19 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
"" Miller v Administrative General I Gal. 412. 
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be entitle to inherit her whole movable property to exclude the children 
according to English law. 
Exception: The wife's domicile no longer follows that of her husband 
if they are separated by the sentence of a competent court, or if the 
husband is under going a sentence of transportation. 
Abolition of the English Concept of Marital Property 
By the Indian Succession Act of 1925, the English concept of marital 
property was totally abolished. In English law there was a rule that on 
marriage the property of female was merged in that of husband's property 
and she was no longer, authorized to enjoy it in whatever manner she like, 
though with the approval of husband she was entitle to appropriate it. 
Section, 20 of the said Act of 1925 provides that, "no person shall by 
marriage, acquire any interest in the property of other spouse and the 
other spouse will not lost, his or her right to appropriate his or her own 
property which he or she could have done if unmarried." 
Exception: But the provision of this section would not applied if any 
one of the spouses professed Hindu, Islam, and Buddhist c Jain religion 
at the time of marriage.^^° 
Different Domiciled of Spouses 
According to section, 21 if there is a different domiciled of the 
spouses neither party shall acquires by marriage any rights in respect of 
any property of the other spouse which is not comprised in a settlement 
made previous to the marriage. 
Sub. Section (2)(b) of section 20 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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intestate Succession 
If there is no will or testamentary document left by the Indian 
Christian deceased to dispose of his property, the succession of the 
property be regulated according to the rules of the Indian Succession Act, 
1925. 
Heirs 
The Indian Succession Act, 1925, chooses the heirs on the basis of 
consanguinity and placed them into three categories:-
• Husband and wife 
• Lineal ascendants and descendants 
• Collaterals 
The relationship is decided according to the consanguinity, which is 
of two types lineal consanguinity and collateral consanguinity.^^® In lineal 
consanguinity two persons are connected in one straight line whether 
descendants or ascendants.^^° A straight line does not connect collateral 
consanguinity,^''^ but they are descendants from the same stock or 
ancestor. Though there is no consanguinity between husband and wife,^''^ 
but they are heir of each other. It is an exception of the general rule of 
succession based on consanguinity. 
Section 27 abolishes the distinction between cognate and agnate 
between half and full blood, between the posthumous and normal child. All 
are equally entitled to succeed. 
^ '^ Sec. 24 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
™^ Sec. 25 of Indian Succession Act 1925. 
^'' Sec. 26 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
^" Administrator General v Simpson 26 Mad. 532. 
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Illustration: A Christian widow has a daughter B by her first 
husband. A remarries and have two sons C and D by second husband. B 
dies intesate and unmarried leaving property. The property will be divided 
equally between A.C. and D.^ ^^  
(P) Ai/3(widow) 
(daughter from (B) C 1/3 D i/3(C,D sons of second husband) 
first husband) 
Widow or Widower 
There is no difference to the rules regulating the succession of 
widow or widower both has same rights. 
• If there is widow arid lineal descendants.^'''* 
• 1/3 will go to the widow or widower as the case may be 
• 2/3 will go to the lineal descendants 
Illustration: Suppose a Christian intestate died leaving behind a 
widow, a son and daughter, the share of widow will be 1/3 and son and 
daughter will inherit 1/3 each from the 2/3 shares of descendants. If they 
be more they will inherit from the 2/3 and the widow's share will not be 
reduced from 1/3. 
(A) W 1/3 
>1/3 Di/3 
"•'' Jessopp V Watson 1 M & K 665. 
" 'Sec . 33 (a) with Sec. 35. 
153 
Chapter -III 
• If there is widow and collateral and no lineal 
descendant.^ ^^ 
V2 will go to widow or widower. 
Vz to collaterals, if one or more they will share 
from the Vi share allotted to collaterals. 
Illustration: Suppose, A, died leaving behind widow, a sister and a 
brother and there is no lineal descendant. 
B1/4 S1/4 (P) W 1/2 
(Vi collectively collateral) 
• If there is only widow or widower and no lineal 
descendants and no coilaterals.^ ^^ 
• The whole property will go to widow or widower 
• If there is no widow or widower, no lineal descendants 
and no collaterals then 
the whole property will go to the Government 211 
Judicial Separation 
In case of judicial separation no one is entitle to inherit each other 
and they presumed to be dead for the purpose of succession.^''^ Under the 
"• Sec. 33 (b) with Sec. 35. 
"" Sec. 33 (c) with Sec. 35. 
" ' Sec. 34 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
"^ Sec. 24 of hidian Divorce Act, 1925. 
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Travancore Succession Act if the mother or the widow become entitled to 
any immovable property then they have only a life interest, which is 
terminable on death or remarriage.^''^ 
Lineal Descendants 
The lineal descendants consist of children, grand children, great 
grand children and remoter lineal descendants. The lineal descendants are 
divided into three classes— 
• lineal descendant of first degree, 
• lineal descendant of second degree, 
• lineal descendant of third degree remoter. 
Lineal Descendants of First Degree 
Lineal descendants of first degree are the children of the deceased 
himself or herself. They take equally and there would be no difference 
between son and daughter. The child does not include the illegitimate 
child^^°and the adopted child.^ ^^ 
If there is no surviving spouse and deceased has left only a child or 
children but no more remote lineal descendants through a deceased child, 
the property shall go to his surviving child or children. If they are more than 
one they will inherit equally irrespective of sex.^ ^^ 
"'' I'.l), ncviuliissdii: Cliiis(iiiii iiiw in Iiuliii ll<), 
'^"' In the Goods ol'Sarali lizra, AIR (1931) C. 560. 
- '^ Ma Khun v Ma Ahma, 12 Rang. 184. 
^^ ^ Sec. 37 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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Illustration: Suppose A died leaving behind a son and two 
daughters they will inherit equally 
(P) 
>1/3 '1/3 D 1/3 
Lineal Descendants of Second Degree 
The grand children of the deceased are considered as the second 
degree of lineal descendants. If the deceased has not left the surviving 
spouse and no children but has left grand children and no descendant of 
grand children, then whole property is shared equally. Under English law 
then property be divided as per stripe not as per capita.^ ^^ 
Illustration: A has two sons B and C both died in the life time of A, 
leaving behind one daughter from C and two sons from B. After the death 
of A the property will go to all three grandchildren equally as per capita. 
English Law 
(A) 
Indian Law 
(A) 
(B) (C) (B) 
S1/4 S-i/4 D 
'1/2 >1/3 >1/3 
(C) 
D 1/3 
283 Sec. 38 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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Remoter Lineal Descendants of Third Degree 
If there are only great grand children and other remote descendants 
of same degree, they will inherit equally.^ '^^  
Where Lineal Descendants are not of Same Degree 
If the deceased left many lineal descendants who are not of same 
degree then the property is distributed per stripes.^ ®^ According to the rule 
of representation they all will inherit the share of their parents for which 
they would have been entitled if they had survived the intestate. 
Illustration: A Christian died leaving behind four children of a 
predeceased son and one son of a predeceased daughter and one son of 
his own. The property will be divided into three equal shares then 1/3 
share of the predeceased be,divided among the four children of the 
predeceased son equally - the other 1/3 will go to the son of predeceased 
daughter and the other 1/3 be inherited by the deceased own son.^ ^^ 
(A) 
>1/3 (S) (D) 
I \ \ 1 
S1/12 D1/12 S1/12 D1/12 S1/3 
284 
285 
Sec. 39 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 
Sec. 40 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
^^'' See the Illustration of Sec. 40 
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Illustration: If a Christian left no child of his own but four children of 
a predeceased daughter and four children of a predeceased son and three 
children of predeceased son's son. In this case the property will be 
distributed into nine equal share from which 1/9 will go to each grand child 
and the remaining 1/9 will be divided among the three great grand children 
equally. 
>1/9 
(D) 
>1/9 >1/9 
(S) (S) 
D1/9 (S) D 1/9 D 1/9 »1/9 '1/9 
D 1/27 Di /27 D 1/27 
Illustration: A died leaving behind, three children of a predeceased 
son, two children of a predeceased son's son, one child of his 
predeceased daughter and one son of his own. In this case 1/3 share will 
go to his own son, the other 1/3 be divided among the three children of a 
predeceased son and two children of a predeceased son's son and the 
other 1/3 will go to the son of his predeceased daughter. 
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(S) 
(A) 
S1/3 (D) 
(S) S1/12 D1/I2 Di/12 Si/;: 1/3 
M/24 D 1/24 
Illustration: A died leaving a daughter and a pregnant wife of a 
predeceased son. Subsequently a son is born to the pregnant wife of a 
predeceased son. in this case property will be divided equally among 
these two surviving heirs. 
A 
W/S 
S1/2 
D 1/2 
Where there is no Lineal Descendants 
If there is no lineal descendants but surviving spouse the property 
be distributed to the rules laid down in sections 42 to 48 of the Act.^ '^' 
287 Sec. 41 of Indian Succession Act 1925. 
159 
'V0^' 
. ^ 
Chapter -III 
Father 
According to the provision of section, 42 of the Act of 1925. If the 
intestate leaves father and widow or widower, then father will take Vi and 
other half will go to widow or widower as the case may be. If there Is no 
surviving spouse then father will inherit the whole property.'^ ®^ Father 
excludes any other kindred.^^^ But in case there is son and father though 
both are of equal degree kindered the father will be excluded by the son. 
According to the provision of section, 42 of the Act of 1925-
• If the intestate leaves father and widow or widower then father 
will take Vz and other V2 will go to the widow or widower as the 
case may be. 
1/2 
(A) Wi /2 
• If there is no surviving spouse but distant kindered the father 
will inherit the whole excluding the distant kindered. 
F(whole property) 
(A) D.K. (excluded by father) 
288 Sec. 42 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
289 
Administrator Genera! v Anandochari, 9. Mad. 466. 
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If there is no son and father though both of them are equal 
degree kindered but the father will be excluded by the son 
and whole property will go to son. 
F — excluded by son 
(A) 
S Whole property 
No Father but Mother, Brother and Sister 
Section, 43 says about the situation, if the deceased is survived only 
by mother, brother and sister and there is no child of any deceased brother 
or sister. Father is also dead then the property be distributed among 
mother, brother and sister equally. Stepmother is not included as mother^^° 
but uterine sister is treated as a full sister. 
Illustration: A died leaving behind his mother and two brothers and 
a stepsister the property be divided into four equal part and each one will 
inherit % share.^ ^^ 
M 1/4 
(A) 
B1/4 B1/4 S'Si/4 (Step Sister) 
"" Rulland V Rutland, 2 P. Wins. 216. 
^" Sec. the Illustration of Sec. 43. 
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No Father but Mother, Brother and Sister and the Children of 
Deceased Brother or Sister 
In such a situation where the intestate is survived by mother, two 
brothers and a child of her deceased sister and two children of deceased 
step brother but no father then the property be divided into five equal 
shares. 1/5 will go to mother, 1/5 to one brother, 1/5 to another brother, 1/5 
to the child of deceased sister and the remaining 1/5 be divided equally 
among the two children of deceased bother 1/10 each. Here the rule of 
representation will apply.^ ^^ 
M 1/5 
B 1/5" Bi /5- (P)- -<SB)- (S) 
>1/10 D1/10 D1/5 
No Father but Mother and Children of Deceased Brother or 
Sister 
If there is no father, brother and sister survived. Only mother and 
children of deceased brother and sister living then the children of 
deceased brother or sister will be entitled, to the share of his father or 
mother according to the rule of representation. 
Illustration: A dies leaving behind mother and child of his deceased 
sister and two children of his deceased brother. The property will be 
divided into three equal share 1/3 will go to mother, 1/3 to the child of 
292 Sec. 44 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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deceased sister and remaining 1/3 is io be inherited by the sons of the 
deceased brother collectively^'f means J/6 by each son. 
(P) 
>1/3 
-(A) 
1/3 
(B) 
>1/6 Di /6 
No Father, Brother, Sister, Nephew or Nice but iVlother 
If mother survives the deceased only and by no one else of first and 
second degree of lineal descendant then the whole property will go to 
mother 294 
No Parents and Lineal Descendants but Grand Parents, Brother 
and Sister and Children of Brother and Sister 
In case the deceased is survived by grandfather, brother, sister and 
children of predeceased brother and sister. The children of predeceased 
brother or sister are entitled to the share of their respective parents.^^^ 
Illustration: A died leaving behind grandfather and two sister, one 
brother and three children of his deceased sister. The property will be 
divided into four equal shares. % will go to brother,% will go to each sister 
and >4 will go \o the children of deceased which they will share equally and 
grand father will get nothing because he is excluded by brothers and 
sisters. 
™ Sec. 45, see the Illustration also. 
^''' Sec. 46 of Indian Succession Act, 925. 
'^^  Sec. 47 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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>1/12 
(S)-
Si /12 
'1/4-
D 1/12 
G.F (excluded) 
(F) 
-(P) S1/4- -B 1/4 
No Parents, no Lineal Descendants and no Brother and Sisters 
In a situation where parent's brother and sisters do not survive the 
deceased and also there are no lineal descendants the property will go to 
the relatives of same degree and they will share equally.^^^ 
Illustration: A died leaving behind grand father, and grand mother 
and relative of the same degree then both the grand parents will inherit 
equally if there is uncle and aunt also they will be excluded by the grand 
parents because uncle and aunts are the relative of third degree.^^'' 
GF 
(ff) 
CM 
U&A (excluded) 
(P) 
Sec. 48 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
297 See the Illustration of Sec. 48. 
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In second situation if great grand parents and uncles and aunts 
survive the deceased then because they all are of third degree relatives 
will inherit equally. ^ ^^  
GGF 1/4 GGM 1M 
(GP) 
(F) 
~1 
U1/4&A1/4 
(P) 
Doctrine of Escheat 
If there is no one to inherit as no widow, lineal descendants or 
ascendants and distant kindered then whole property will go to the 
government.^^^ 
In case of nun 
There is no provision, which restrict a nun from the inheritance either 
in religion or in Statutes. If his wife survives a Christian male, son and 
daughters one of who is nun the court held it that nun is eligible to inherit 
the property of her father.^°° 
' Ibid. 
' Secretary of State v Girdharilal, 54 All 226. 
' G . K . Kempegowda v Lucinda, AIR (1985) Kant. 231. 
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Travancore Christian Succession Act & The Cochin Succession 
Act. 
The Indian Succession Acts which governs the succession of the 
property of Indian Christian was extended to the State of Travancore and 
Cochin by the State (Laws) Act 1951. The above mentioned Acts were 
highly discriminatory,^"^ which govern the Christians of Kerala Supreme 
Court held that, all Indian Christians be governed by the Indian Succession 
Act of 1925. 
Recently in Lan6 Board v Cyriac r/?OA77as,^ °^ Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed his earlier decision. The facts of the case were that Kerala Land 
Reforms Act made a provision that the person who had more land than a 
specified limit, will have to surrender the excess land to the government. A 
man had more land but he claimed that this belonged to his sister. The 
government claimed that under Travancore Christian Succession Act, 
daughter's share is limited to Rs. 5000/- only and she can not inherit the 
land of her father but Supreme Court held that after the death of Christian 
father the sons and daughters have succeed the property equally 
according to the provision of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
Christian law of succession is a codified law. Though it is no more a 
religious law even in Christian dominated States. It is not much 
discriminatory towards women. The old concept of marital property is no 
more in existence in this codified law and females have got absolute 
property right with independent right to appropriate it, in what ever manner 
they like. 
301 This aspect is remedied by the case of Mary Roy v State of Kerala (1986) 2 SCC, 209 
"^^  AIR (2002)5 0 3161 
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Parsi Law 
It is one of the most important and best-known religions of pre-
Islamic era. It took its name from that of its founder Zorathushtra 
(Zoroaster). The roots of the Zorastrianism can be located in an Eastern 
Iranian tribal area and basically pastoral society. The religion originated 
around 1000 BCE and developed further, under the Persian Empire. The 
problems of evil and suffering was basic to Zoroastrian thought and the 
urgent human necessity of providing an answer to the problem was 
reconciled with an abiding faith in the dignity and freedom of humanity by 
means of belief, in the so called myth of choice. The famous codes are 
"7/76 Syrian Law Books" and "The Zorastrian Madigni - Hazar 
Dadastan"^°^ 
The word 'Parsi' is originated from the word 'pars' or 'fars' a province 
in Persia from which the original Persian emigrants came to Indian sub 
continent.^°'* The expression Parsi has no religious connotation. It carries a 
more territorial connotation. The religion of every Parsi is Zoroastrian but 
it's not necessary that every Zoroastrian be a Parsi. For example, an 
Iranian who is registred as a foreigner and who is not domiciled in India but 
follows the Zoroastrian, is not a Parsi with in the meaning of the Act and 
the Parsi Matrimonial Court has no jurisdiction over him.^°^ 
The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act III of 1936 as "Parsi Zorostrian" 
have defined the word "Parsi". That cannot be confined to Indian Parsi 
"^^  Encyclopedia of Religion Vol. 15. 
^"^ Sir Dinshaw Mulla Petil v Jamsetji Jijabai, 11 Bom. L.R. 85 at 113 (quoted by Mohd. Shabbir : Parsi 
Law in India). 
"^^  Vazifdar v Vazifdar ILR (1951), Bom. 279, 52 Bom. LR 875. 
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Zoroastrian but extended to include the Zoroastrian of Iran also and that 
the court constituted under the Act has jurisdiction over them.^ °® 
The Succession of Parsis 
After the passing of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the succession 
cf the property of a Parsi was governed by the Act of 1925. There are 
special rules regulating the succession of a Parsi intestate in sections 50 to 
56 of the Act of 1925. 
Before the passing of the Act of 1925, the Indian Parsis were 
governed by the English common law in matter of succession because of 
the claiming of the English law of primogeniture by a Parsi. The Parsee 
Chattels Real Act of 1837, was passed by which the Parsis to a great 
extent were excluded from the operation of the English law. But the 
English Statute of Distribution governed the intestate succession. The 
Parsis were not satisfied with that, so they wanted their separate laws of 
inheritance because they do not want to be exploited by the laws of 
England, where wife had no power over her own property. With the result 
of their struggle Parsis Intestate Succession Act, 1865, was passed which 
introduced the widow and daughter as heir and entitled them to inherit the 
property. Before that they were only entitled for the maintenance. But 
mother and sister were not made the heirs and they were incapable to 
inherit. 
Beside all these Acts that worked for the Parsis till 1925, the rules 
governing the Parsis in the Act of 1925, are totally based on previous Act 
of 1865. The present provision of the Act of 1925, relating to the 
"^'^  Singh Jaspal - Law of Marriage and Divorce in India p. 481 (1983) Delhi, See also : Jamshed Irani v 
BanuIrani(1967)Mah. L.J. 33. 
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succession of the Parsis was passed through various amendments^°^ and 
judicial decisions.^°^ In 1939, drastic changes were made that the widow of 
predeceased lineal descendants were also introduced as heir and the 
widower were excluded from the list of the heirs. 
General Principles of Intestate Succession of a Parsi 
The Indian Succession Act of 1925 laid down some general 
principles. From sections 50 to 56 deals with the principles regulating the 
intestate succession of a Parsi. Drastic changes were introduced by the 
amendment Act of 1991, in the governing rules of Parsi intestate 
succession. 
Posthumous Child 
Clause (a) of Section 50 abolished the difference between the 
posthumous child and the child born in the lifetime of father. In the matter 
of succession both are equally treated.^°^ Though before 1939, there were 
different rules. 
Predeceased Child 
If a lineal descendant of a Parsi intestate has predeceased him then 
his or her share would be lapsed into two conditions.^^° 
• If he has left no widow or widower, or 
If he has left no lineal descendant of such predeceased 
child. 
307 Indian Succession Amendment Act, 1939, Act 51 of 1991. 
"^^  Ratan Shaw v Bamaji 40, Bom. L.R. 141. 
" ' Manchaerji v Mithabai 1 Bom. 506. 
'^^  Clause (b) of Sec. 50. 
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Prior 1991 there was another condition, which was abolished now 
that if he has left no widow or widower of any lineal descendants. 
Remarriage 
In the case a widow or widower remarry in the lifetime of the 
intestate then he or she will not be entitled to inherit and be deemed non-
existent.^ ^^ The word widov^ er is inserted by the Act of 1991. Previously 
this provision was only for the widows. The widower of a predeceased 
daughter was held entitle to share even he had remarried.^ ^^ 
Distribution of Property among Widow, Widower Children and 
Parents 
If a widow or widower and children survive a Parsi, they will take 
equal share.^ ^^ This section was very discriminatory when introduced in 
1925, towards woman. Prior to the amendment of 1939, the widow's share 
was half the share of the son but by the Act of 1939 it was made equal to 
the share of the son, and the daughters share was % share of the son. It 
was made Vz by the amendment Act of 1939, but by the amendment Act of 
1991, all sex-based discrimination had been resolved, now they all entitle 
to equal share. 
Illustration: Suppose a Parsi died leaving behind widow, son and 
daughter they all inherit equal share. 
^" Clause (c) of sec. 50 
'^^  Jehangir V Pirojbai II Bom. 1. 
^"Sec .51, l l (a) 
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P) w 1/3 
>1/3 D1/3 
In second situation if there is no widow or widower and only children 
irrespective of sex they will inherit equally.^ "^ Prior to 1939 the share of the 
daughter was % of the son, which was made of V2 and now by the Act of 
1991 equal to the son. 
Illustration: Suppose a Parsi died leaving behind only a son and 
two daughter and no widow, each will take 1/3. 
D1/3 Di M/3 '-'1/3 i-'1/3 
In third situation if the one or both parents survive a Parsi and there 
is also a widow or widower and children, the share of each parent be V2 of 
the share of each child.^ ^^ The share of the parents was introduced by the 
Act of 1939 but at that time the father's share was V2 of the son and 
mother's share was Vi of the daughter. The stepparents were not included 
in the word 'parent' in the Act.^ ^^  
•^ ''' Clause (b) of Sub. Sec. (1) of Sec. 51. 
^"Sub. (2)ofSec. 51 
"^ Rutland v Rutland 2 p. Wms. 216. 
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Illustration: Suppose an intestate Pars! dies leaving behind parents, widow, 
son and daughter. The share of the parents will be half of the child rest 
heirs will inherit equally. 
'1/8 
>1/4 
(P) 
M 1/8 
w 1/4 
D 1/4 
Section 52 was repealed by the Act of 1991, which prior to the 
amendment dealt with the succession of the property of the female Parsi 
because like Hindu Law there was two different sets of rules governing the 
estate of male and female. 
Distribution of Share of predeceased Child of Intestate Leaving 
lineal Descendants. 
If any Parsi died leaving behind the lineal descendants of a 
pre-deceased child, the share, of that predeceased child, will 
be that share, for which, he was entitled if surviving at the 
death of the intestate Parsi and that share will go to his or her 
lineal descendants according to the rules.^ '^^  The rule of 
representation will apply here. 
317 Sec. 53 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. 
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• Clause (a) says if that deceased child is son and leaves 
behind his widow and children then the share of that child will 
be distributed among them equally.^ ^® 
Illustration : Suppose a Parsi died leaving behind his son, daughter 
and predeceased son's widow, son and daughter. At first the properly will 
be divided into three equal share one share will go to son, one to daughter 
and the remaining 1/3 will be distributed among the heirs of predeceased 
son. 
(P) 
(S)-Wi/9 Di >1/3 VO;-VVi/9 U1/3 
D1/9 S1/9 
There is a proviso attached with clause (a) of section 53, which says 
about another situation in which that predeceased child has left no lineal 
descendant but a widow or widower of his lineal descendants. Then she or 
he will be entitled of 1/3 of the property.^ ^^ 
• Clause (b) says about another situation, in which the 
deceased child was a daughter her share be divided, among 
her children equally. In this clause, the widower is excluded 
from the inheritance. It is difficult to say, why there is contrast 
between two sections as 50 and the provision of this section in 
318 
319 
According to the provision of thij chapter. 
Supra note 309. 
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that section the widower is included as heir^^° even he 
remarried.^^^ 
In condition where the child of such predeceased also died in the 
lifetime of intestate his or her share will be ascertained and dispose of 
according to the provision of clause (a) and (b).^ ^^ 
If any remoter lineal descendants of the intestate died in the life time 
of Intestate his o'^ her share be ascertained as if he or she is living at the 
time of the intestate death and his or her share be distributed among his or 
her heirs.^^^ 
Before going in to detailed study of the provisions of sections 54 and 
55 it is necessary to know the heirs mentioned in schedule II part I of 
section 54 and part II of section 55. 
The Heirs of the Deceased 
Schedule II 
(Part I (Section 54) 
• Father and mother. 
• Brother and sister and lineal descendants of them as shall 
have predeceased the intestate. Other than half brother and 
sister. 
• Paternal and maternal grand parents. 
"** Clause (b) of Sec. 50. 
^^'Supra note 312. 
"^ Clause (c) of Sec. 53. 
^" Clause (d) of Sec. 53. 
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Children of paternal and maternal grand parents and the lineal 
descendants of such of them as have predeceased the 
intestate. 
Paternal and maternal grandparent's parents. 
Paternal and maternal grandparent's parents children and the 
lineal descendants of such of them as have predeceased the 
intestate. 
Part li Section 55 
Father and Mother. 
Brother and Sister and lineal descendants of them as shall 
have predeceased the intestate. Other than half brother and 
sister. 
Paternal and maternal grand parents 
Children of paternal and maternal grand parents and the lineal 
descendants of such of them as have predeceased the 
intestate. 
Paternal and maternal grandparent's parents. 
Paternal and maternal grandparent's parents children and the 
lineal descendants of such of them as have predeceased the 
intestate. 
Half brothers and sisters and the lineal descendants of such of 
them as have predeceased the intestate. 
Widows of brothers or half brothers and widower of sisters or 
half sisters. 
Paternal or maternal grandparents children's widows or 
widowers. 
Widows or widowers of deceased lineal descendants of the 
intestate who have not remarried before the death of the 
intestate. 
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If there is no Lineal Descendant but a Widow or Widower or a 
Widow of any Lineal Descendant 
If there is no lineal descendant but only widow or widower his or her 
share"^ '^* would be Vz, the other half would go to the relatives nnentioned 
above according to the order specified. The next kin would be preferred to 
those preferred in second and so on.^ ^^ 
Illustration : Suppose a Parsi died leaving behind a widow, a 
brother and a sister but no lineal descendant the half will go to widow and 
other half will be equally distributed among brother and sister. 
Sy. By, (P) Wy. 
If there is a widow or widower of an intestate and also widow or 
widower of lineal descendants then the share of his or her widow or 
widower be 1/3 and 1/3 will go to the lineal widow or widower and the other 
1/3 will go to the relatives,"^ ^^ but if there is more lineal widow or widower 
they will inherit 1/3 collectively. 
Illustration: Suppose a Parsi dies leaving behind widow, sister, 
brother and a widow of pre-deceased son the property will be divided into 
three equal part 1/3 will go to each widow and 1/3 will be distributed 
among sister and brother. 
"'• Clause (a) of Sec. 54. 
^^ ^ Clause (d) of Sec. 54. 
326 Clause (b) with (d) of Sec. 54. 
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'1/6 B 1/r (P)-
SW 1/3 
-Wi /3 
If there is only one widow or widower of lineal descendant she or he 
will take 1/3 but if no widow or widower of intestate and there is more than 
one lineal descendant's widow or widowers then 2/3 will go to them which 
be distributed equally among them the other 1/3 will go to the relatives 327 
Illustration: Suppose A dies leaving behind brother, sister, widow of 
his pre-deceased son and widower of her pre-deceased daughter. The 
brother and sister will take 1/3 collectively it means 1/6 each; the other 2/3 
will be inherited by the widow and widower collectively. 
t)l/6 bi/6 ( r ) 
1/3 collectively) 
DW1/3 SW1/3 
(2/3 Collectively) 
After deducting the share of widow or widower of all description the 
residue property will be distributed among the relatives according to rule of 
nearer exclude the remote one. The share will be equal irrespective of sex 
among the same degree of propinquity. 
327 Clause (c) with (d) of Sec. 54. 
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If there are no relatives then the whole of the residue shall be 
distributed in proportion to the share specified among them, like Islamic 
law the rule of Return prevail, in Parsi law also. 
If there is no Lineal Descendants nor a Widow nor Widower nor 
a Widow of any Lineal Descendant. 
If a Parsi dies leaving behind no lineal descendant nor a widow or 
widower nor a widow or widower of lineal descendant then his or her next 
of kin be entitle to inherit the property according to the order mentioned. 
The rule apply here will be the nearness of blood to relation to the 
intestate. The agnate will be first exhausted then cognate if there is neither 
agnate nor cognate then the widow or widower of brother and sister will be 
entitled. 
The Relatives who are not Otherwise Entitled to Inherit 
If there is no above mentioned heir then the property will be divided, 
among the relatives who are not otherwise entitled to inherit according to 
the above mentioned provisions. The rule nearer will exclude the remote 
one be applied. 
This is the whole law of inheritance of a Parsi who died intestate. But 
there are different rules, which govern the testamentary succession of a 
Parsi. The whole law of Parsi, intestate succession passed through 
revolutionary changes. The Parsi was much exploited in the British period 
by governing their succession according to the rules of common law. After 
a long struggle, the Act of 1865 was passed. That was also too much 
discriminatory towards females. Though some important amendments 
were made in 1939 but it can be said that after the amendment of 1991 it is 
evident that the female of Parsi got their due share. 
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The Parsi law recognized the rule of representation and the nearer 
exclude the remote one. Like Muslim Law it also recognized the Doctrine 
of Return. Now if any discrimination seems in succession that is the share 
of parents is half of the child but it cannot be said that it is discriminatory in 
any form because the parents have no responsibility. 
Lastly, it is inferred from the above discussion that by the 
amendment of 1991 in the rules governing the Parsi intestate succession 
provided under Indian Succession Act of 1925 is not discriminatory 
towards females. 
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COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WOMEN'S PROPERTY 
RIGHTS UNDER DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEM 
An Overview 
''The richest source of all discoveries in every empirical science is 
comparison and combination. Only by many fold contrast the contrary 
becomes completely clear; only by the observation of similarities and 
differences and the reason for both, may the peculiarity and inner nature of 
each thing be thoroughly established....^ 
When we observe different cultures which embodies different ethical 
theories and which uses such beliefs to produce different legal results, we 
are able to distinguish the respective places which ethical rules, legal 
norms or other techniques of social control hold in different societies. The 
rush of social problems and the ensuring maladjustments compelled new 
changes in the law. Sometimes the elite attempted to impose their legal 
concepts on a custom bound peasant society, which is equally true in a 
colonial situation. For instance Britishers attempted to come, to term with 
the Hindu and Muslim's legal traditions in India and in the far-flung 
Halsburg Empire before the First World War. 
According to Lepaulle,^ the unity of one legal system was more 
apparent than real. Moral economic, religious and many other forces in 
different proportions had come into play, in the composition of a legal 
' Harold Berman J,: The Comparison of Soviet & American Law; cited by Henry W. Ehramano, 
'Comparative Legal Cultures' p. 11 
Lapaulle Functions of Comparative Law: 35 Harward Law Review, 853 (1922). 
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system and all these forces must be taken into account and weighted in 
the process of comparison. 
It centered on the application of the comparative methods to the 
date provided by the different legal system of the world's past and present. 
This involved the assignment to each of a place with in a scheme of 
progress, development or evolution and the assessment of their values. 
The aim of comparative method is obviously to promote better 
understanding of the laws and legal systems of different religions. To make 
understand of acknowledged objectives of comparative law, the 
comparative analysis is necessary. By that, one always gets better 
understanding of one's own legal norms, system or structure. 
Definition of Comparative Law 
According to H. C. Gulteridge, ''Comparative law is a process or a 
method by which two or more legal systems or part thereof are compared 
with a definite aim"? 
According to O'Kahn Freund, "Comparative law is neither a 
professional tool nor an academic toy, it has a higher purpose of providing 
an insight into the social purpose of law.""^ 
About the meaning of comparative law M. Rheinstein says, "The 
term comparative law has been used for denominating the descriptive 
analytical observation of a special field of positive law."^ 
' Gulteridge H.C.: Comparative Law, An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study & 
Research, Cambridge (1946) p. 2. 
* Freund 0 ' Kahn .^Comparative Law as an Academic Subject", 82 Law Quarterly Review 45, (1966). 
^ Rheinsteen M ^'Teaching Comparative Law': Law Review 616 (1938). 
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On the basis of the sayings of these jurists, it is said that 
comparative law is a theory of evolution as stated in social term by Comte 
and Spencer or in biological term by Darwin, all against a background of 
geological and palaeontological discovery. Comparative law never 
possessed one single method accepted by all. As comparative law also 
claimed to be a science and made use of scientific theories of the time, to 
build up comprehensive picture of the natural history of the legal system, 
on evolutionary basis. 
Different families of Law 
Before comparing the position of women's property right under 
different religious laws, it is necessary to know something about the 
different families of law, in a very short glance, to which the religious laws 
are also a branch. The legal system had tried, to classify the laws into four 
major categories, to which they termed four families of laws. Though one 
cannot aspire to mathematical exactitude in the social sciences, ye\ \o 
ascertain the family of law, there are so many factors, which are taken into 
consideration such as the sources of laws, the working method of jurists, 
the philosophical, political and economic principles of the society etc. The 
religious law with which, we are mainly concerned is also among these 
four family of law which are as follows:-
• Romano - Germanic family 
• The family of Common law 
• The family of Socialist law 
• The family of Religious law 
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Romano - Germanic family 
The Romano - Germanic family of law originated in Europe in 12"" 
Century, on tiie basis of the compilations of the Emperor Justinian and 
developed a judicial science common to all and adapted to the condition of 
modern world. Through the colonization by European Nations, the Romano 
~ Germanic family of law had conquered vast territories, where the laws 
were either belonged or related to this family. Outside Europe these 
Romano-Germanic laws were though adapted but they retained their own 
indigenous institutions also, as in Muslim world and in the countries of Far 
East. French law is an apt example of Romano-Germanic family of law.^ 
The family of Common Law 
The family of common law belonged to the laws of England and also 
to the laws of those countries, which were modeled on the basis of English 
law. The origin of the common law is linked to royal power. It was 
developed as a system to re-establish peace rather than articulate a moral 
basis for the social order. The common law is very different in its concepts, 
vocabulary and method from the Romano-Germanic family. The common 
law had expanded through out the world because of colonization and 
reception. Like Romano-Germanic law, the common law was also partially 
adopted in religious world like Muslim and Hindu laws etc. It is also true 
with respect to the United States and Canada, where the civilization was 
very different in many respects from that of England.'' 
^ See : David Rene & John E.G. Briefly: Major Legal System in the World Today.' (1968) 1st ed p. 14 
' Ibid. 
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The family of Socialist Law 
The family of Socialist laws originated in the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR the old name of Russia) since the 1917, Revolution. The 
members of this socialist camp were of those countries, which formerly 
had laws belonging to the Romano-Germanic law. The distinct feature of 
Socialist law is, its revolutionary nature in opposition of the static character 
of Romano Germanic laws. The sole source of socialist rules of law lies in 
the work of the legislators, who express the popular will. The new concept 
subtracted from the realm of law, a whole series of rules which jurists of 
the bourgeois country would consider legal rules. 
The family of Religious laws 
The above-mentioned three principal families of law attracted the 
whole worid to have certain elements from one or other of these families. 
But beside these, there are other philosophical and religious systems of 
laws, which in strict sense do not constitute families as such. They are 
entirely independent of each other such as Muslim law, Hindu law. 
Christian law, Pars! law and Jewish law etc. This is the oldest family of law. 
These are not the laws, of any particular state, but it is the law of a 
community of believers and applied universally to the believers of that 
community wherever they live. These laws are mainly concerned with the 
matters of the way of life such as marriage, succession, divorce, adoption 
etc. These religious laws are actually the sum of the rules derived from the 
religion concerning human relationship. Because of its connection with 
revealed religion, it has entirely original concepts, and theory of the 
sources of law. These religious laws are different from each other and do 
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not constitute a family of law. These religious laws can be grouped as a 
family only because they are based on their religious faith. 
For the purpose of comparative study of religion the term in German 
Religious is senscfiaft and in French la science de religion, are used.^ The 
function of comparative religion, said by an early twentieth century scholar, 
"consists in placing the numerous religions of the world side by side, in 
order, that deliberately comparing and contrasting them, it may frame a 
reliable estimate of their respective claims and values."^ 
Development of Different Religious Laws 
The Romano-Germanic, Socialist and Common laws are primarily 
linked to the development of European civilization. They reflect a way of 
thinking and living, which is European. But in Asia and Africa a vast 
population have already established a form of civilization, which could not 
be considered inferior to that of the west. They also had religious beliefs 
which have to a certain extent, blocked the reception of western laws and 
legal concepts. Now we consider the development of each religious laws 
separately and very precisely. 
Development of Muslim Law 
Islamic Law, which is a body of rules, gives practical expression to 
the religious faith and aspiration of the Muslims. In the hinging of Islam in 
early seventeenth century. Arabia, the task assumed by Muslim 
Jurisprudence was, the discovery of the terms of Allah's (SWT) law for 
The Encyclopedia of Religion Vol.3 p. 578. 
9 Louis H. Jordon: Comparative Religion ; Its Genesis and growth, Edinburg 1905 p. 11. 
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Muslim society. Legal scholar had gradually built up a corpus of doctrine, 
which was elaborated and systematized in a large number of 
commentaries and the voluminous literature. The practical problem faced 
by Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his successors in their judicial 
capacity was, the relationship between Quranic laws and the prevailing 
customary laws. ^ ° 
The conflict and tension apparent mainly in the system of 
inheritance, as the patrilineal pre-lslamic Arabian society had confined the 
succession to the male agnate relatives. Contrary to it Islam emphasized 
upon the closer family tie, in which the female was given a higher and 
more responsible status. Holy Quran had given the rights of property to 
certain females for the first time in the era of woman world. The females 
have their prescribed Quranic fractional shares in different capacities as 
wife, daughter, mother, sister and grandmother etc. The new Quranic heirs 
and the old customary heirs were merged into a composite system of 
succession. As in Sad's case the brother of the deceased was allowed to 
inherit along with the new heirs wife and daughters. Under customary law 
the brother was alone entitle to inherit the whole property, the wife and 
daughter have no share in this case. 
Derrett says, ''Holy Quran expressly declares that a brother does not 
inherit when the deceased is sun/ived by a child."^^ The word 'child' was 
apparently taken to mean 'A7?a/e chilcP, so that a brother would be excluded 
from succession by a son of the deceased but not by a daughter. Such 
consideration makes it clear that the early authorities interpret the Quranic 
precepts in the light of the accepted standards of customary law. The 
'" Derrett J.D.M.: An Introduction to Legal System, 1st. ed. Indian Reprint (1999), p. 54. 
"ibid p. 58. 
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Quranic heirs were simply superimposed upon tiie customary system and 
confined strictly to the portions prescribed for them by the holy Quran. This 
restrictive interpretation of the Quranic provisions and the perpetuation of 
the traditional standards of customary law was by no means confined to 
inheritance, but was a central feature of general legal development in the 
Medinan period. 
The Development of Hindu Law 
The Hindu law exists, since the origin of Indian Civilization. It is one 
of the oldest laws of India. Laws which regulate the life of the believers 
mentioned in the Vedic literature of about 1500 BC. Though the exact date 
of its origin is missing in the traditional materials. Some fundamental rules 
of law are available, which have spiritual backing between 200 AD and 500 
BC.^ ^ The earliest lawgivers were Manu and Smritikars. Manu chose, the 
visionary of ultimate truth to formulate the basic postulate of the rule of law 
governing the mankind. 
The laws were developed with the development of civilization, 
because of the patriarchal system; only male agnate had the right to hold, 
to inherit and to dispose of the property. But at the time when the Western 
world was totally unknown to the concept of women's property right the 
Hindu and Muslim law/:gave some property right to females. In Hindu law it 
existed in the form of Stridhana, though very limited rights had been 
attributed to them and that also can be exercised only to a certain type of 
property called Stridhana. On the other hand Muslim females had more 
and absolute rights in relation to property. 
'^  See Nickman N.A. & Mckeon R: The Edicts of Ashoka, (Chicago London), Phoenix 1966. 
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When the Portuguese, the French and the Britisher acquired some 
Indian territories, the Dharamshastras were injected with the principles of 
their respective laws. The Dharmashastras were reanimated so far as the 
natural conservatism of lawyers and special caution of Privy Councilors 
was allowed^^ After the Independence of India, new codified laws were 
passed and it would not be wrong to say that old Hindu law rarely existed 
in matters of succession, marriage and adoption etc. 
The Development of Christian Law 
The Common law system came into being in England largely as the 
result of the activity of Royal courts of justice from the time of Norman 
Conquest. It is called the Anglo Saxon law and is very little known. The 
mission of St. Augustine of Centerbury converted England to Christianity in 
597. Just as in continental Europe, laws were drafted shortly after the 
conversion. Ecclesiastical courts were set up to apply common law, 
common to all Christianity. But again like other countries these laws were 
very similar to other barbarian laws and regulated very limited aspects of 
that social relationship to which our present idea of law now extends. '^* 
Christian law does not occupy a place in the world comparable to 
that of Muslim and Hindu laws because of two reasons. Unlike Muslim law, 
the Christian law has none of the feature of a revealed law nor does it 
again like Muslim Law purport to regulate totality of human relationships. 
Compared to Muslim law, it is \IQX\] ixQi^xx\QX\\3x\j and, essentially the public 
law of that particular society made up by the Roman Catholic Church. 
Cannon law has generally left the regulation of private laws and other 
" Derrett,op cit p. 83 
''' Rene David,op cit p. 26). 
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matters relevant to public law to the laws of individual states. In these 
areas Cannonists are content to formulate certain principles, which in order 
to satisfy Christian morality, of secular laws put into effect, and which in 
any case the faithful must observe. ^ ^ 
In Christian world there was no concept of women's property right till 
the 19^ *" century. Even the assets, which the female possessed before 
marriage, were merged in the property of her husband after marriage, to 
which they termed as marital or matrimonial property. Over this property 
the females have no independent right. They could not appropriate it 
without the consent of her husband. In 19**^  century, laws were made and 
the females were given their own independent property rights. 
The concept of women equality has been constantly tinkered, 
tempered and fiddled with quite frequently, the fact is that it has 
been evolving throughout human history. The women's rights have 
been intricately tied to the laws, customs and religio>is throughout 
the ages. The Holy Quran the Bible, the Vedas, the Babylonian Code 
of Hummurabi and the analects of Confucius are the source through 
which the religious laws are governed. These religious laws define 
and demarcate the people's rights, duties and responsibilities. In 
India generally these laws fail to give women their due. Though the 
law exists but women are afraid to seek remedy through law 
enforcing agencies. There is a large gap between the law, social 
attitudes and beliefs, which acts as barriers in the enforcement of 
laws for women's emancipation. Because of the complexity of the 
social institutions like marriage, adoption, divorce and succession 
'^  Ibid. 
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the women empowerment is not possible. The succession law is also 
discriminatory. Consequently, divorce remains theoretical possibility 
due to women's economic dependence on men and the social 
ostracism suffered by divorced women. India is an agricultural state. 
Gender equality in agricultural land can enhance women's right and 
can accord a better social status in the family. Property may be 
helpful in eradicating the domestic violence, dowry deaths and 
reduce family's poverty. It will be helpful in acquiring education and 
means of livelihood. Studies have already shown that women's risk 
of physical violence from husband is dramatically less if they own 
land or house. 
Social justice is an inseparable component of women's right 
and equality without which it is empty and meaningless. Equalities in 
basic liberties, equality of opportunity for advancement and positive 
discrimination in favour of women ensure social justice and human 
rights. In her milieu, human rights expect a change in the perception 
and the value characteristics of Indian culture. Social justice, 
women's empowerment and equal status of women are easily said 
than put in practice. Especially in the society ridden with orthodox 
and conservative ideals and ideologies for which religious sanction 
and support are not lacking. In such societies any improvement in 
the status of women is almost impossible without the co-operation 
and change of hearts from the part of men. 
With this background and on the basis of the discussion in the 
previous chapters an effort is made to compare firstly, the general rules of 
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the law of succession secondly the shares of females In different 
capacities in different laws, to understand the actual position. 
Comparision of the General Rules of Succession 
Islamic Law 
Islamic law of 
inheritance is based 
on Quran and pre-
Islamic Customs 
which were not 
abrogated by the 
Holy Quran . 
The nearer in 
degree excludes the 
remoter , 
Rules of 
representation is 
not applied in 
general under 
Muslim law , 
Hindu Law 
At present the Hindu 
law of inheritance is 
governed by the 
Hindu Succession 
Act of 1956,'^  in 
India. If the Act is 
silent then by 
Mitakshara and 
Dayabhaga school of 
Hindu Law. 
Same rule applied to 
Hindu except in the 
case of coparcenary'/ 
Rule of 
representation is 
recognized in Hindu 
law. 
Christian Law 
The provisions of 
the Indian 
Succession Act of 
1925 in India govern 
succession of a 
Christian Intestate. 
The nearer in degree 
exclude the remoter 
one . 
Rule of 
representation is 
recognized , 
Parsi Law 
In India the 
provisions of Indian 
Succession Act ^1925 
now govern the 
Parsis intestate 
succession. 
The nearer in degree 
excludes the remoter 
one . 
Rule of 
representation is 
recognized. 
'* Now the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. 
Now the daughter is also made a coparcener. 
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There is no concept 
of joint family in 
Christian law, 
There is no concept 
of joint family in 
Muslim law . 
The right to inherit 
the property arises 
only on the death of 
the propositus. 
The concept of joint 
family is the salient 
feature of Hindu law. 
There is a difference 
between the two 
main schools of 
Hindu law. In 
Dayabhaga the right 
to inherit arises on 
the death but in 
Mitakshara it arises 
on the birth of the 
coparcener. Here the 
word 'coparcener' 
includes both son and 
daughter. 
The right to inherit 
arises on the death 
of propositus. 
There is no concept 
of joint family in 
Parsi law, 
The right to inherit 
arises on the death of 
propositus. 
Rule of 
primogeniture is 
not recognized in 
Muslim law at any 
time. 
It prevailed at ancient 
time in Hindu law 
but not at present. 
Rule of 
primogeniture is not 
recognized at 
present. 
Rue of primogeniture 
is not recognized at 
present. 
There is no concept 
of the rule of 
survivorship in 
Muslim law. 
It is a salient feature 
of Hindu 
coparcenary. 
There is no concept 
of the rule of the 
survivorship. 
There is no concept 
of the rule of the 
survivorship. 
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An illegitimate 
child is not entitled 
to inherit his or her 
father's property 
but he or she is 
entitle to inherit 
mother's property 
(Shia law is an 
exception) the 
father of an 
illegitimate child is 
not entitled to 
inherit his son or 
daughter only 
mother is entitled. 
Like Muslim law an 
illegitimate child is 
only related to 
her/his mother and is 
entitled to inherit 
each other U/sec 
3(1 )(j) of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. 
By virtue of Section 
16 of Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1956, 
an illegitimate son 
has been conferred 
the status of a 
legitimate son and he 
also has a right of 
survivorship. 
The succession to 
the immovable 
property is regulated 
by the law of the 
place where the 
person domiciles at 
the time of his death 
and the domicile of 
the person of 
legitimate birth, is in 
the country in which 
his father domiciled 
at the time of his or 
her birth but the 
domicile of an 
illegitimate child be 
determined by the 
domicile of his or 
her mother. 
The Act is silent at 
this point 
Under Muslim law 
a non Muslim can 
not be the heir of a 
Muslim intestate 
Under Hindu law 
conversion is not a 
bar to succession but 
the children of the 
converted person 
would not be entitled 
to represent his father 
The Act is silent at 
this point 
The Act is silent at 
this point 
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The murderer is not 
entitled to inherit* 
if predeceased or if 
born after 
conversion, unless 
such children or 
descendants are 
Hindu at the time 
when the succession 
opens. 
Under Section 25 of 
Hindu Succession 
Act 1956, a murderer 
or the abettor is not 
entitled to inherit the 
property-
The Act is silent at 
this point * 
The Act is silent at 
this point, 
The posthumous 
Child is entitled to 
inherit but born 
alive • 
The posthumous 
child is entitled to 
inherit but born alive. 
If several death 
took place 
Under Hindu 
Succession Act of 
Section 27 of the 
Indian Succession 
Act,1925 abolish the 
distinction between 
posthumous and the 
child born in life 
times of his or her 
father, all are 
equally entitled to 
inherit. 
The Indian 
Clause (2) of section 
50 of Indian 
Succession Act, 1925 
abolished the 
distinction between 
posthumous and the 
child born in the life 
time of father, all are 
equally entitled to 
inherit. 
Succession Act^l 925 
The Indian 
Succession Act J 925 
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simultaneously and 
is difficult to 
ascertain who 
survive the other 
the rule younger 
survived the elder 
will apply. 
1956 same provision 
like Islamic law is 
provided. 
is silent at the point is silent at the point. 
In Muslim Law the 
property is 
immediately 
devolve among the 
surviving heirs and 
the subsequent 
marriage of the 
widow will not 
affect the 
inheritance 
Under Section"* 24 
of Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956 the son's 
widow, son's son's 
widow and brother's 
widow would be 
disentitled from 
inheritance if they 
have remarried 
before the succession 
open but widowed 
mother and step 
mother are not 
disqualified from 
inheritance even if 
they have remarried. 
Now by the new 
amendment Act of 
The Act is silent at 
the point 
In the case the 
widow or widower 
remarried in the 
lifetime of the 
intestate he or she 
will not be entitled to 
inherit, Under 
Section 50 clause (c) 
of Indian Succession 
Act, 1925. 
This section 24 is abolished by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005. 
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2005 section 24 is 
omitted 
There is no 
difference between 
self-acquired or 
ancestral property 
movable or 
immovable 
property, 
Both self acquired 
and ancestral 
property is treated 
dilTerently but no 
difference between 
movable and 
immovable. 
Under Section 5 of 
Indian Succession 
Act , 1925 two 
dilTerenl sets of rules 
were made to 
regulate the 
succession of 
movable and 
immovable property. 
No difference 
between movable 
and immovable, real 
and personal, self-
acquired and 
ancestral property. 
There is no 
difference between 
the governing rules 
of succession of 
male and female 
intestate. 
The inheritance of 
Hindu male's 
property would be 
governed by the 
provision of section 8 
of Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956 and the 
female's property 
would be governed 
by the provision of 
section 15 and 16 of 
Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956. 
No different rules 
governing the 
succession of male 
and female 
intestate. 
No different rules 
governing the 
succession of male 
and female intestate. 
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Comparison of the Shares Allotted to Females in Different 
Capacities under Different Laws:-
Table -1 
Mother, grand mother, great grand mother, step mother and mother 
of illegitimate child 
Islamic Law Hindu Law Christian Law Parsi Law 
The true mother 
is always entitled 
to inherit if 
survived the son 
or daughter. 
The mother's 
share shall be 1/6 
if there is 
daughter or son or 
son's issues or 
(wo brothers or 
two sisters of any 
sort^ of the 
deceased or one 
brother and one 
sister. 
The true mother as 
class 1 heir is 
always entitled to 
inherit if survived, 
the son or 
daughter. 
The true mother is not 
always entitled to 
inherit the property of 
her deceased son or 
daughter. 
There is no 
difference in the 
share of class I heir 
they shall get equal 
share. 
If there is no 
daughter or sons 
or son's issues or 
'I'he true mother is 
entitled to share if 
there is no lineal 
descendants, widow 
and father but brother 
or sister her sluirc 
shall be equal. 
The true mother 
is always entitled 
to inherit if 
survived the son 
or daughter. 
If there is widow 
or widower 
children and 
parents the 
mother's share 
siiall be Ihc hall" 
share of each 
child. 
If there is no class 
I heir only mother, 
she will inherit the 
If there is mother, 
brother or sister and 
children of 
The Act is silent 
at this situation. 
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two brother or 
two sister or one 
brother and one 
sister then she is 
entitled to 1/3 of 
entire property. 
In case there is 
only husband or 
wife then after 
deducting the 
share of husband 
or wife, the 
mother shall be 
entitle 1/3 share 
of the remaining 
estate. 
Stepmother is not 
entitled to inherit under Hindu law 
the property of 
his stepchild. 
whole property. 
The wife being 
class I heir will 
inherit with mother 
if no other class I 
heir survived. In 
the case of 
husband if there 
are no children the 
whole property 
would go to 
husband. 
Same provision is The Act is silent 
predeceased brother or 
sister then mother and 
living brother and 
sister will inherit 
equally and the 
children of 
predeceased children 
will take the share of 
their parents. 
The mother is 
excluded by the 
presence of wife or 
husband. 
The Act is silent 
at this situation. 
The Act is silent. 
Mother of an 
illegitimate child 
Same provision in 
Hindu Law. 
Same provision is in 
Christian law. 
Same provision 
is in Parsi law. 
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is entitled to 
inherit the 
property of her 
child. 
Hindu Law. Christian law. is in Parsi law. 
If there is no 
mother then grand 
mother paternal 
and maternal shall 
be entitled to 1/6 
share, paternal 
grandmother is 
excluded by 
grandfather. 
Great 
grandmother is 
entitled as distant 
kindrered. 
If there is no class 
I heir and no 
father, brother 
sister and their 
descendants and no 
lineal descendants 
of children then 
grand father and 
grand mother will 
be entitled to equal 
share. 
If there is neither 
lineal descendant, nor 
parent, nor brother nor 
sister but grandfather 
or grand mother and 
uncle and aunts their 
grand parents will 
inherit equally 
excluding the uncle 
and aunts. 
The great grand 
mother (hhs) is 
entitled as distant 
kindered. 
If there is no 
lineal 
descendants, 
father mother, 
brother, sister but 
leaves widow or 
widower or 
widow or 
widower of lineal 
descendant after 
allotting their 
share the residue 
will go to grand 
parents equally. 
If there is neither 
lineal descendant, nor 
parent, nor brother, 
nor sister and 
deceased left only 
great grandmother 
uncle or aunts they 
If neither lineal 
descendant nor 
widow or 
widower of lineal 
descendant 
father, mother, 
brother, sister 
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will inherit 
share. 
equal paternal and 
maternal grand 
parent, children 
of grand parents 
then great grand 
parents are 
cnlitlcd to share 
equally. 
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Table - 2 
Widow, widow of predeceased son, widow of pre deceased son's son 
(his), widow of brother 
Islamic Law Hindu Law Christian Law Parsi Law 
In the case there 
are children or 
child then she shall 
get 1/8 of the 
estate. If more then 
they will inherit 
1/8 collectively. 
Widow of valid 
marriage shall inherit 
equal share along with 
the children and 
children of predeceased 
son and predeceased 
son's son. 
Widow of valid 
marriage is entitled to 
1/3 if there are any 
lineal descendants. 
The widow of 
valid marriage is 
entitled equal 
share along with 
children. 
Widow of valid 
marriage is 
entitled, if there is 
no issue, to get % 
of the estate. If 
more than one they 
will inherit VA 
collectively. 
In case there is no heir 
of class I she will 
inherit the whole 
property. 
If he has left no lineal 
descendant but 
kindered then Vi share 
will go to widow, if 
no issue and no 
kindered then whole 
property will go to 
widow. 
If there is no lineal 
descendant and no 
widow or widower 
of a lineal 
descendant the 
widow shall take 
half of the estate. 
If there is widows 
or widowers or 
only one then she 
will take 1/3 of the 
estate. 
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Widow of void 
marriage is not 
entitled to inlierit. 
A kitabiah or non 
Muslim widow is 
not entitled to 
inherit. 
Widow of a 
predeceased son is 
not entitled to 
inherit. 
Widow of 
predeceased son is 
not entitled to 
inherit. 
The widow of void and 
voidable marriage are 
not entitled to inherit. 
Widow of a pre 
deceased son is entitled 
the share of her 
husband along with the 
children equally. 
If there is no child then 
the widow of 
predeceased son ip 
entitled to the whole 
share of her husband. 
The widow of void 
marriage is not entitle 
to inherit. 
Act is silcnl at (his 
point. 
The widow of a 
predeceased son will 
inherit her husband 
share equally along 
with children. 
If there is no child the 
widow of a pre 
deceased son is 
entitled to inherit the 
share of her husband. 
The widow of 
void marriage is 
not entitle to 
inherit. 
Act is silent at this 
point. 
The widow of a 
predeceased son is 
entitled to the 
share of her 
husband along 
with the children 
in equal 
proportion. 
If intestate leaves 
no lineal 
descendants 
widow or widower 
of lineal 
descendant such 
widow or widower 
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The widow of pre 
deceased son's son 
is not entitled to 
inherit. 
She be entitled to the 
share of her husband if 
alone and will enjoy 
equal share along with 
children. 
She be entitled the 
share of her husband 
if alone and enjoys 
equal share along 
with the children. 
shall receive 1/3 
of the estate. 
With children she 
will enjoy equal 
share of her 
husband but if 
alone then 1/3 of 
the estate. 
The widow of The widow of brother 
bother is not 
entitled to inherit. 
is entitled to inherit in 
some situation. 
The widow of brother 
is entitled as a distant 
kindered. 
If the entries of 
schedule II part I 
are exhausted and 
up to the sixth 
entry of part II 
then brother's 
widow is entitled 
to inherit. 
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Table 3 
Sister, Consanguine Sister and Uterine Sister 
Islamic Law Hindu Law Christian Law Parsi Law 
Full sister is not 
entitled to inherit 
in the presence of 
son (his) or the 
father (hhs). 
Full sister is not 
entitled to inherit if 
class I heir and 
father present. 
In the presence of 
children and widow 
the full sister is not 
entitled to inherit 
In the presence 
of children and 
widow or 
widower the full 
sister is not 
entitled to 
inherit. 
If she is alone and 
no son (his) and 
father (hhs) then 
she will inherit Vi 
of the estate. 
If she is alone and 
no heir of class I 
heirs and also father 
she inherits the 
whole property. 
If there is no lineal 
descendant and 
father but another, 
brother and sister 
they will succeed. 
If there is no 
lineal descendant 
father and mother 
a widow or 
widower and full 
sister and 
brother, then 
after allotting the 
share of widow 
or widower the 
residue will be 
inherited by the 
brother and sister 
equally. 
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If they are two or 
more and no son 
(his) and father 
(hhs) then she will 
get 2/3 of the 
estate. 
If two or more than 
two they will share 
equally. 
If no father but 
mother, a brother or 
sister and children 
of any deceased 
brother and sister 
living then mother, 
brother and sister 
succeed equally 
with the children of 
predeceased 
brother. 
If there arc two 
or more sisters 
and no above 
mentioned heir, 
or brother they 
will succeed 
equally. 
If no son and 
father only brother 
then she will 
become residuary. 
If there is brother 
also they will share 
equally. 
If there is only 
brother and sister 
and no father, 
mother, they will 
inherit equally. 
If there is no 
above-mentioned 
heir but only 
brother and sister 
they will inherit 
equally. 
If no son, father 
and brother but a 
daughter or son's 
daughter she will 
get the residue 
after their shares 
are allotted. 
If there is son's 
son's son, or son's 
daughter's daughter 
they will entitled to 
equal share. 
In presence of child 
the sister is not 
entitled to inherit. 
In the presence 
of any lineal 
descendant the 
sister is not 
entitled to 
inherit. 
Consanguine sister 
is not entitled to 
Consanguine or half 
blood sister is not 
Consanguine sister 
is not entitled to 
Consanguine 
sister is not 
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inherit in the 
presence of two 
lull sister. 
If there is one full 
sister and one 
consanguine sister 
(he full sislcr shall 
take Vi and 
consanguine 1/6. 
entitled to inherit in 
the presence of full 
sister. 
If there is any 
brother or sister of 
full blood present 
the brother and sister 
of half blood be 
excluded. 
inherit in the 
presence of any 
lineal descendant 
and ascendant 
widow or widower. 
In the presence of 
full sister half sister 
is not entitled to 
inheril. 
entitled to inherit 
in the presence of 
any heir specified 
in schedule II 
part I and part II 
up to entry sixth 
In the presence 
of full sister half 
sister is not 
entitled to 
inherit. 
If there is only 
consanguine 
brother and 
consanguine sister 
then she will 
inherit as 
residuary. 
Where there is a 
brother of half blood 
and sister of full 
blood the former 
will not be excluded. 
If there is no father 
but mother and full 
brother and 
consanguine sister 
each would inherit 
equally. 
If there is no heir 
specified in 
schedule II Part I 
and no heir up to 
the entry of sixth 
in second part 
then only half 
sister is entitled 
to inherit. 
Consanguine sister 
with true daughters 
and grand 
daughters become 
residuary. 
In the presence of 
child or grandchild 
the consanguine 
sister be excluded. 
In the presence of 
true daughter and 
granddaughter the 
consanguine sister 
is not be entitled to 
In the presence 
of true daughter 
and 
granddaughter 
the consanguine 
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residuary. 
If there is no issue 
of the deceased or 
of his son, no 
father or no grand 
father and there is 
one uterine brother 
and sister they 
shall take 1/6 each. 
If there is no heir of 
class I and no father 
and full brother and 
sister then half sister 
is entitled to inherit 
inherit. 
Uterine sister is 
entitled to inherit 
when thbre is no 
lineal descendant or 
ascendants. 
sister not be 
entitled to 
inherit. 
Uterine sister is 
entitled to inherit 
only when no 
lineal descendant 
or ascendant. 
If they are two or 
more uterine sister 
then they will get 
1/3 which be 
divided equally 
between brother 
and sister. 
Same as above. Same as above. Same as above. 
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Table - 4 
Daughter, Son's daughter and Daughter's daughter 
Islamic Law Miiulii Law Cfiristiaii Law l*aisi Law 
If there is no son 
and daughter is 
alone, then her 
share is half of the 
estate and the other 
half will go to 
distant kindered. 
If there is no other 
class I heir and 
daughter is alone 
then she would 
inherit the whole 
property. 
If there is no son 
and no remote 
lineal descendant 
(his) then the 
surviving daughter 
will alone be 
entitled to inherit 
the whole property. 
If no son and no 
remote lineal 
descendant and 
widow or 
widower or 
father and mother 
then the 
surviving 
daughter will 
alone be entitled 
to inherit the 
whole property. 
If there is no son 
and daughter are 
more than one 
their share would 
be 2/3 of the 
estate, which they 
will divide equally 
If there is more than 
one daughter they 
would inherit 
equally 19 
r.*-v-» /-v •^r^ ^Ur 
If there is no son 
and no remote 
lineal descendants 
and widow but 
more than one 
daughter they will 
inherit equally. 
If there is no son 
and no remote 
lineal descendant 
and widow but 
more than one 
daughter they 
will inherit 
>/-TT . O i l l r 
' After the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005. 
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among them. 
If there is son and 
daughter then they 
would inherit as 
residuary. 
If diere is both son 
and daughter they 
would inherit 
equally. 
If only son and 
daughter survived 
they would share 
the property 
equally. 
equally. 
If only son and 
daughter 
survived they 
would share the 
property equally. 
If there is one 
daughter and no 
son and a son's 
daughter, the son's 
daughter is entitled 
to inherit the share 
of 1/6. 
If there is one 
daughter and no son 
but son's daughter 
she be entitled the Vi 
share (which is of 
her father if he 
would have been 
alived). 
If there is one 
daughter and no 
son but the son's 
daughter, both will 
inherit equally. 
If there is one 
daughter and no 
son and a son's 
daughter, the 
son's daughter 
will take half 
estate. 
If there is no 
daughter or son, 
the son's daughter 
would inherit like 
daughter. 
If there is no other 
heirs the son's 
daughter would 
inherit the whole 
If there is no 
daughter or son but 
the son's daughter 
and no other heir of 
lineal descendant 
she will inherit the 
whole property. 
If there is no 
daughter or son 
but the sons 
daughter and no 
other heir of 
lineal descendant 
then she will 
inherit the whole 
property. 
If there is more 
than one daughter 
If there are two 
daughters and one 
If there is more 
than one daughter 
If there is more 
than one 
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and one son's son 
and son's 
daughter. She will 
inherit the 1/3 of 
1/3, means 1/9 of 
the estate. 
son's son and one 
son's daughter the 
two daughter will 
take 1/3 each and the 
other 1/3 be 
inherited by the 
son's son and son's 
daughter 
collectively. 
and son's son and 
son's daughter 2/3 
will go to two 
daughters and the 
remaining 1/3 be 
equally inherited by 
son's son and son's 
daughter. 
daughter and 
son's son and 
son's 
daughter2/3 will 
g*' to IWO 
daughters and the 
remaining 1/3 be 
equally inherited 
by son's son and 
son's daughter. 
If there is a 
daughter, son's 
daughter son's 
son's son and 
son's son's 
daughter, the son's 
son's daughter be 
cnlitlcd 1/9 share 
and son's daughter 
1/6. 
If there is a 
daughter, son's 
daughter, son's son's 
son and son's son 
and son's son's 
daughter the 
daughter shall take 
1/3, the son's 
daughter shall take 
1/3 and other 1/3 be 
equally inherited by 
the son's son's son 
and daughter. 
If there is a 
daughter^ a son's 
daughter, son's 
son's son and son's 
son's daughter then 
1/3 will go to 
daughter, 1/3 to 
son's daughter aiul 
the remaining 1/3 
be inherited by 
son's son's son and 
son's son's 
daughter equally. 
If there is a 
daughter, a son's 
daughter, son's 
son's son and 
son's son's 
daughter then 1/3 
will go to 
daughter 1/3 to 
son's daughter 
and the 
remaining 1/3 be 
inherited equally 
by son's son's 
son and son's 
son's daughter 
Md each. 
210 
Chapter -IV 
If there are two 
son's daughter, a 
son's son's 
daughter and a 
son's son's son, 
the two son's 
daughter will take 
2/3 and son's son's 
daughter and son's 
son's son shall 
take 1/6 share. 
If there is two son's 
daughter, a son's 
son's daughter and a 
son's son's son, the 
two son's daughter 
will take 1/3 each 
and the other 1/3 be 
inherited by son's 
son's son and son's 
son's daughter 
equally, it means 1/6 
each. 
If there is two son's 
daughters, a son's 
son's daughter and 
a son's son's son 
the two son's 
daughter will take 
2/3 and son's son's 
daughter shall take 
1/6 share each. 
If there is two 
son's daughters, 
a son's son's 
daughter and a 
son's son's son 
the two son's 
daughter will 
take 2/3 and 
son's son's 
daughter will 
take 1/6 share 
each. 
Some Comparative Illustrations 
Illustration No. 1 
A female died leaving behind her husband, two daughters, and 
two sons of a pre-deceased son, brother, mother, stepmother and a 
widow of her brother. The deceased had inherit&^the property from 
her father. Divide the property among her heirs according to rules of 
Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Parsi law. 
Under Muslim Law 
In this given illustration according to Muslim law of inheritance, 
the property of Muslim female intestate shall be devolved upon the 
mother, husband and two daughters. The stepmother is not 
considered as mother and has no inheritance rights. Brother and the 
211 
Chapter -IV 
widow of brother are also not entitled to inherit being distant kindred 
in the presence of sharers. As under Islamic law there is r\o rule of 
representation recognized, so the sons of pre-deceased son are also 
not entitled to inherit. 
Under Muslim Law, in the presence of any child the husband's 
share will be 1/4. Because of the presence of the daughters the 
mother's share will be 1/6 and the two daughters will inherit the 
maximum share of 2/3. 
In the above illustration the sum total of 1/4 + 1/6 + 2/3 
exceeds the unity. Therefore by applying the doctrine of Awl 
(increase) the share of each sharer will be reduced proportionately. 
Husband 1/4 = 3/12 reduced to 3/13 
Mother 1/6 = 2/12 reduced to 2/13 
2 Daughters- 2/3 = 8/12 reduced to 8/13 
13/12 13/13 
WB— 
(excluded) 
S'M-
(excluded) 
B 
(excluded) 
D 4/13 
(pr 
(S) 
-M 2/13 
H 3/13 
D 4/13 
(excluded) (excluded) 
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Under Hindu Law 
In this illustration the property of female Hindu shall be devolved 
upon husband, two daughters and two sons of the predeceased son being 
heir in clause (a) of sub section (1) of section15 of Hindu Succession Act 
of 1956. Stepmother, brother and widow of brother will not get anything 
according to the rule 1 of section 16 of the Act of 1956. The two sons of 
the predeceased son would get the share of their father according to the 
rule 2 of section 16 of the Act 1956. The rule of representation is 
recognized under Hindu Law. The proportional share of each heir would 
be-
M S'M— 
(excluded) (excluded) 
WB B-
(excluded) (excluded) 
P)- H 1/4 
D 1/4 (S) D 1/4 
ss 1/8 ss 1/8 
Under Christian Law 
According to Indian Succession Act, 1925, which governs the 
Christian Succession the property of a female Christian intestate shall be 
devolved upon the husband two daughters and the sons of the 
predeceased son. Mother, stepmother, brother and the widow of brother 
will get nothing. According to section 33 read with section 35 the share of 
the husband would be 1/3 and other 2/3 be divided among other heirs who 
are deceased daughters in this case. 
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WB— 
(excluded) 
SM — 
(excluded) 
— B 
(excluded) 
D 1/5 
py 
(S) 
— M 
(excluded) 
H 1/3 
D 1/5 
ss 1/10 SS 1/10 
Under Parsi Law 
In the given illustration the property of a Parsi female intestate, shall 
be devolved upon, mother, husband, two daughters and the sons of 
predeceased son. Stepmother, brother and the widow of the brother will 
get nothing. According to sub-section (2) of section 51 the share of mother 
(or each surviving parent) would be the half share of each child. Clause (a) 
of sub section (1) of section 51 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 says that 
husband and each child will inherit equal share. In the view of section 53 
the children of the predeceased child would get the share of their parents 
collectively. The proportional share of the husband in this illustration would 
be 2/9, mother 1/9, each daughter 2/9 and each son of predeceased son 
1/9. 
WB— 
(excluded) 
S'M— 
(excluded) 
— B 
(excluded) 
py 
M 1/9 
H 2/9 
D 2/9 (S) D 2/9 
SS 1/9 SS 1/9 
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Illustration No. 2 
A, a male died in 1987, leaving behind son, daugliter, father and 
widow of a predeceased son. Divide his property among the heirs 
according to Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Parsi Law of succession. 
Under Muslim Law 
According to the Muslim law of inheritance the property of Muslim 
intestate in the given illustration shall be devolved among the son, 
daughter and father and the widow of the predeceased son will get 
nothing, as there is no rule of representation is recognized in Islamic Law. 
The proportional share of the father in the presence of children will be 1/6 
and residue of 5/6 will be divided between the daughter and son, according 
to the rule of that the share of the daughter be the Vi of the son. Here the 
daughter in the presence of son be residuary and not inherit as a sharer, 
(where her share is fix according to Holy Quran). 
Father - 1/6 
Son - 2/3 (of 5/6) = 5/9 
Daughter - 1/3 (of 5/6) = 5/18 
Widow of - excluded. 
Predeceased son 
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F1/6 
(P) 
D 5/18 5/9 
Under Hindu Law 
WS 
(excluded) 
In the given illustration according to Hindu Succession Act of 1956 
the property will be devolved among the son, daughter and widow of 
predeceased son equally and the father will get nothing. Clause (a) of 
section 8 of the Act of 1956 says that the property of male Hindu dying 
intestate shall devolved-firstly upon the heirs, being the relatives specified 
in class I of the schedule. The son, daughter and the widow are the 
relatives who are specified in class I of the schedule. So they inherit 
simultaneously and in equal share. If there is no heir in class I then the 
property shall devolved in the heirs specified in class II. Father being class 
II heir shall get nothing in presence of class I heir. 
SW 1/3 
F (excluded) 
(P) 
>1/3 D 1/3 
Under Christian Law 
According to Indian Succession Act, 1925 in the given illustration the 
property of a Christian intestate shall be devolved among the son, 
daughter and the widow of predeceased son and the father in the 
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presence of lineal descendant would get nothing. The heirs will inherit the 
property in equal share. 
F (excluded) 
(P) 
SW1/3 S1/3 D1/3 
Under Parsi Law 
Under the provision of Indian Succession Act, 1925 the property of a 
Parsi intestate in the given illustration shall be devolved among all the four 
heirs who survived the intestate. According to sub clause (a) of section 51 
of the Act of 1925, the father's share would be the half of each child. The 
son and daughter shall inherit equally. The widow of the predeceased son 
shall receive the share of her husband which he would have if survived the 
deceased. It means here the share of son daughter and the widow of 
predeceased son is equal and the father's share shall be half of each child. 
F1/7 
I 
(P) 
\ 
I 1 I 
SW2/7 S2/7 D2/7 
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Illustration No. 3 
A male intestate died leaving behind a daughter, mother, widow 
son's widow and father. Divide the property, supposing the intestate^<V he 
is Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Parsi. 
Under Muslim Law 
In the given illustration the property of a Muslim intestate be divided 
according to Islamic Law of inheritance among the daughter, mother, 
widow and father. The son's widow will get nothing, as the rule of 
representation is not recognized in Islamic law. The Proportional share of 
the daughter would be Vi as there is no son; the mother's share would be 
1/6 in the presence of child. Father's share also is 1/6 in presence of child. 
The widow's share would 1/8 in the presence of child. 
Daughter 
Mother 
Father 
Wife 
1/2 
1/6 
1/6 
1/8 (No change in wife's share) 
Here the shares does not complete the unity and by applying the 
doctrine of Return or Radd the residue will be proportionately revert to the 
heirs. It is a rule that the wife or husband in the presence of child or 
children not entitle \o the return. Therefore in the given illustration the 
residue will be distributed among daughter, mother and father. 
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Daughter 
Mother 
Father 
1/2 -
1/6 -
1/6 -
3/6 -
1/6 -
1/6 -
5/6 -
3/5(of 7/8) 
1/5 (of 7/8) 
1/5 (of 7/8) 
5/5 
"1/5 
( P ) -
D3/5 
M /5 
-w 1/8 
Under Hindu Law 
In the given illustration according to Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the 
daughter, mother, widow and son's widow will inherit the property 
simultaneously in equal proportion because they all are the heirs specified 
in class I of schedule. Father being class II heir will be excluded. 
M 1/4-
(P) 
F (excluded) 
-W1/4 
D 1/4 SW 1/4 
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Under Christian Law 
In the given illustration the property of a Christian intestate shall be 
devolved among the widow, daughter and son's widow. Mother and father 
are not entitled according to the provision of Indian Succession Act, 1925 
to inherit the property in the presence of child or children (how low so 
ever). Section 33 clause (a) says that in the presence of lineal descendant 
the share of widow shall be 1/3 and the other 2/3 be distributed among the 
lineal descendants. Here the proportional share of a Christian wife would 
be 1/3 and the other two third 2/3 be equally divided among the daughter 
and the widow of son. The widow of son will be entitled to the share of her 
husband if survived the intestate. 
(excluded) F- M (excluded) 
(P) -Wi/3 
D 1/3 sw 1/3 
Under Parsi Law 
According to Indian Succession Act, 1925 the property of a Parsi 
intestate in the given illustration shall be divided among the father, mother, 
widow, daughter and son of widow. All the heirs are entitled to inherit their 
due share. According to the provision of clause, of sub section (1) of 
section 51 the widow and each child would receive his due share equally. 
Sub section (2) of section 51 says that the share of parents Jf survived the 
decease,would be V^ of each child. 
220 
Chapter -IV 
1/S" 
(P) 
M1/8 
- W i M 
D, / I SW 1/4 
Illustration No. 4 
A died leaving behind widow, mother, father and brother. Divide the 
property according to Muslim, Hindu, Christian and Parsi Law. 
Under Muslim Law 
In the given illustration under Islamic law the widow's share in the 
absence of children would be maximum which is 1/4 and the mother's 
share would also be maximum that is 1/4 of the remaining 3/4 . The father 
will inherit as a residuary. 
Widow 
Mother 
Father 
1/4 
1/4(ofy4) 
as residuary 
M 1/4(of3/4) 
(P) 
Under Hindu Law 
F (as residuary) 
-w 1/4 
In this given illustration according to the provision of Hindu Law, 
which is governed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the property of 
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deceased will be divided among the widow and motlier equally being class 
I heir. Father being class II heir shall get nothing because in the presence 
of class I heir the heirs of class II are not entitled to inherit. 
(excluded) F M 1/2 
(P) W 1/2 
Under Christian Law 
In this given illustration the property of a Christian deceased be 
divided among the father and the widow as under section 42 of Indian 
Succession Act, 1925, in the presence of father the mother is not entitle to 
inherit. Under section 33 clause (b) if the deceased has no lineal 
descendant but left widow and kindered to him the 1/2 property will go to 
widow and the other 1/2 to kindered. In the given illustration the father 
excludes the mother so here the 1/2 property will go to father and other 1/2 
to widow. 
Fi/2 M (excluded) 
(P) W 1/2 
Under Pars! Law 
In the given illustration the property of a Parsi be distributed among 
all the heirs. According to section 51 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 the 
parent's share shall be half of each child the widow and children will inherit 
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equally. In this given illustration there are no children so all the heirs would 
inherit equally. 
F1/3 M1/3 
(P) w 1/3 
In the above discussion we have seen that how the shares and the 
sharers fluctuated according to the provisions of different religious laws. In 
different situations the proportional shares are different within one religion. 
As in Hindu Law, generally nnother is entitled to inherit but in case female 
intestate the mother is not entitled. In Islamic law the father is always 
entitled to inherit. In each law there is discrimination among the shares of 
the heirs. 
Recapitulation 
On the basis of the above comparison it is evident that the female's 
property right to inherit is discriminatory in every system in some form or 
the other. What ever is the reason behind this discrimination .Females are 
not treated equally and therefore suffered a lot. As in Muslim law the share 
of female is always half of her male counterpart except in the case of 
uterine brother and sister. In Hindu law there are different set of rules to 
govern the Hindu female even after amendment of 2005, though the Hindu 
Succession (amendment) Act, 2005, has brought revolutionary changes in 
the era of women's property right and abolished near about all the 
discrimination. It has included four new female heirs in the schedule, which 
are mainly concerned with the daughters. This Act not only recognizes the 
share and rights of daughter equally with that of son but also has given the 
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lineal descendants of daughter equal rights, which the lineal descendants 
of son possess. This Act has gain warm welcome in the women folk lets 
we wait and watch how much effective it may be proved in practical life 
and how the old ages social ethos would be changed. In Christian law 
though it is codified law,the mother is not entitled to inherit the property in 
the presence of father. It is argued that these discriminations are based 
because of the prevailing conditions of each society. This cannot be 
justified and attempt should be made to equalize the female to their male 
counterparts. As recently under Hindu law the daughter is given an equal 
share to her brother in the ancestral property also. The other laws must 
take an inspiration from it. 
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JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
An Overview 
"If the law be dishonestly administered the salt has lost its 
flavours... if the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is its 
darkness"^ Lord Bryce. 
Justice is supposed to be the key word for every country and 
for every government. In a democratic set up the importance of 
judiciary has been multiplied. In the words of Bryce "there is no 
better test of excellence of a government than the efficiency of its 
judicial system."^ 
Democratic governance over the centuries has emerged as the 
most successful political experiment in the history of human 
civilization. Democracy encompasses in its fold the dignified 
existence of all human beings advocating liberty, equality, and 
justice as pre requisites to enable every human being to live and 
progress with self-respect and dignity. In its onward march 
democracy has attuned itself to the native realities and emerging 
situation in individual countries. India has attained freedom after 
centuries of foreign subjugation. It was a great challenge for 
independent India to evolve system of governance with diverse 
language, culture, religion and stages of development in consonance 
with tradition and values. 
' Lord Bryce James: Modem Democracies, Vol. II, p. 484, London, Macmillan Co.Ltd. (1923). 
-Ibid p. 421. 
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A strong independent judiciary, subscribing to the highest 
ethical values J s the greatest strength of the democracy. It is 
needless to say that in a democracy covered by "the rule of law, 
judiciary is the sentinel on the qui-vive to protect the rights of the 
citizens and to hold the scales even between the citizens and the 
state". 
India a sovereign socialist, secular and democratic Republic 
enumerated the powers and responsibilities of the organs of the 
state to be the facilitators of national weal. The spirit of the 
constitution clearly delineates harmonious relations among the 
various organs. 
Judiciary, which is the interpreter of the Constitution and the 
custodian of the rights of the citizens, it must be independent and 
impartial. Judiciary have the mandate only to interpret the laws not to 
lay down general norms of behaviour for the government and the 
people to be considered binding on all as the law of the land. The 
scope of judicial review, thus, is confined to seeing whether the 
impugned legislation falls with in the competence of the legislature or 
is consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution and its other mandatory provisions. Some issues on 
which differences have crapped up relate to the powers of courts to 
review the laws. 
The debate on judicial activism has gained ground in recent 
years, eliciting both admiration and criticism from various quarters. 
There is difference of opinion among the critics, some critics have 
the views that in 'judicial activism' sometimes the judiciary is 
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transgressing its prescribed jurisdiction and entering in the domain of 
the legislature and executive. Some others feel that if the other 
organs of the state are found to have fallen short in the discharge of 
their constitutional obligations, the judiciary is well within the rights 
to take the necessary corrective action. In this context, it is most 
important that every organs of the government have to look 
judiciously at different perceptions of specific issues and ensure that 
there is no injustice prevalent in the society. 
Inspite of the plethora of progressive and protective 
legislations, we have failed to up lift the socio economic and political 
status of woman and to place them at par with their male counterpart 
in different walks of life. In such a situation the role of judiciary in 
providing social justice to woman become decisive. The Indian 
judiciary has played a creative role in this regard.^ 
Judicial activism has introduced and elaborated the new ideas, 
notions and conceptions in the process of deciding the case at 
hand.'' Because it is the duty of apex court to fashion itself as a 
forum of not only to deliver a justice and pay merely a lip service but 
it must become a forum of articulating, remolding and reinventing the 
mechanism and the rights to deliver justice to millions of starved and 
shackled women. For the maintenance of purity in administration of 
the justice, probity and rectitude of conduct of the judiciary should be 
laudable. "To keep the stream of justice clean and pure the peoples 
of higher echelons must be endowed with sterling character, integrity 
and upright behavour, erosion there of would undermine the efficacy 
^ Muthamma v Union of India, AIR (1979) SO, 1868 at 1870. 
"* Upendra Baxi: Democracy, Equality and Freedom,^  1978. 
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of the rule of law and the working of the constituting itself. These 
persons must not be mere men of clay with all the frailties and 
foibles, human failing and weak character that may be found in those 
in other walks of life. They should be person of fighting faith with 
tough fiber not susceptible to any pressure, economic, political or of 
any sort." Before passing through the role of judiciary in improving 
the socio-economic conditions and the property rights of women, it is 
necessary to have a glance over the historical background and a 
very short look over the development of the Indian legal and judicial 
system. 
Historical Background 
The roots of the law and legal system are deeply buried in the past. 
It is the fruit of the endeavours, experiences, thoughtful planning's and 
patient labour of a large number of people through generation. Law cannot 
be understood properly when divorced from the history and the spirit of the 
nation whose law it 
In India, with the beginning of the British period, our tradition of 
the hoary past perished away. Though the application of the 
personal laws in the matter of marriage, divorce, adoption, 
inheritance and succession were kept untouched. The Hindus and 
Muslims were governed by their own respective personal laws with 
the help of native officer. But with the passage of time the English 
judges felt that they must understand the XQ3\ nature of the law. So 
many law books were translated into English in the guidance of the 
experts. The most famous work in the field of Hindu Law is A Code 
of Gentoo Laws published at London in, 1776. In the era of Muslim 
228 
Chapter-V 
law, the Hedaya^ is famous. With the passage of time the English 
Judges were able to understand the languages, habits and traditions 
of Indians and administered the laws, without the help of Maulvies 
and Pandits (the native law officers). 
Development of the Indian Legal System 
In the 17*^  century A.D, the Britishers brought their English 
Common Law and their own traditional system, into its 
administration. At first, the English judicial system was designed at 
the Presidency Towns and dealt with the Englishmen. But with the 
march of time the adjustment had been made to provide the justice 
to the Indians also. To begin with Madras, which was the first 
Presidency Town, it extended to the whole India, with the usurping 
political power in various parts of the country.^ Under the plan of 
1772, by superimposing English administration on the pre-
established system of Qazis Courts, Warren Hastings set up, what 
the legal historian now call, the Adalat System.^ The civil and 
criminal high courts set up, under the system, were called Sadar 
Diwani Adalat and Criminal Court. To function at the district level the 
Mufasil Diwani Nizamat Adalat was designated. In 1774, Calcutta, 
Bombay and Madras, each had a Supreme Court under the British 
Parliament's Regulation's Act of 1773. With their jurisdiction defined 
by relevant laws often over lapping and give rise to conflicts. These 
courts of higher jurisdiction Sadar Diwani Adalat, and Sadar Nizamat 
" Jain M.P.: Indian Legal History p. 583. 
^ Ibid p. 11 
Mehmood Taiiir : Islamic Law in Indian Courts Since Independence p. 
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Adalat were separately set up, for the acquisitions of tine Britisii in 
North India.^ 
Role of Judiciary In Developing the Different Laws 
Introducing social reforms, through law, is always problematic 
because of its acceptability and implementation. Reform law is always 
imposed law because they are the product of some elite whose value 
system and culture is different from the masses. These reform laws 
prevailed for centuries and hollowed by the religion, through its course of 
maturation, depicts the sentiments of millions and symbolizes as their 
cultural identity and their very life. 
The impact of the changes can be perceived by the role of 
judiciary in interpreting and implementing the law. The best laws can 
be rendered meaningless by ineffective implementations by the 
justice delivery system. As law is always, in a general statement and 
there are so many cases which cannot be covered within the general 
terms. At this time the role of judiciary is, to keep its eyes on the 
whole system and scenario as well as on the particular case. If the 
court focuses only on the particular people before it, it may do justice 
in that particular case and yet make, very poor general policy. 
So it is often said that hard cases make bad law. Sometimes 
the judiciary is confronted with very peculiar situation, where it has to 
correct the Parliament's technical error. It has to give effect to the 
intention of Parliament. The public expects that the text of a statute 
be construed literally, but some time the judiciary has to interpret it 
liberally in the wider interest of public as in Monika Gounder v 
Ibid. 
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Arunachala^ where it was decided by the full bench of Madras High 
Court. On the death of sole surviving coparcener, the widow of a 
predeceased coparcener did not take from him, by survivorship. The 
result was that she could never have more than half the estate. This 
decision was given after a long time of the Act of 1937.^° 
Many cases are perfectly and correctly decided on a technical 
basis but are wrong in principle. A case, which is certainly bad law, 
when looked as a piece of judicial therapy for an unhealthy society, 
on the other hand when viewed through telescope of stare-decisis, it 
may be very sound. The two distinct criteria the technical and social 
sometimes meet happily and the decision, passes both the test. 
After the above discussion, it is evident that how important 
role, the judiciary or judicial method of any legal system; play in 
developing and moulding any particular law or legal institution. Now 
we will see how judiciary has affected the Indian legal system of 
Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Parsis since British period till now. 
islamic iaw 
•"O ye who believe, be maintainer of justice, bearer of 
witnesses for Allah's (SWT) sake though it may be against your 
ownselves or your parents or near relations, be he rich or poor. Allah 
(SWT) is most competent to deal with them both, therefore do not 
follow your low desires, lest you deviate and if you serve or turn 
aside then surely Allah is aware of what to do."^^ 
^ (1964) 2 MLJ 519 F.B. (cited by Derrett): op cit p. 26. 
'" Hindu Women's Right to Propeity Act, 1937. 
" Al Quran IV : 35. 
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"Be just that is next to piety and fear God, For God is 
well acquainted with all that ye do."'^ 
Under Islam the concept of justice is equality. There should be no 
discrimination and impartiality between the high and low, prince and 
peasant, white and black, Muslims and non-Muslims, male and female. In 
equal situation equals should be treated equally. 
In Islamic terminology the function of the administration of 
justice is called 'qada'. According to Muslim jurist the judicial work is 
a part of great responsibility, entrusted by Allah (SWT) to human 
beings. It is one of the foremost duties after the belief in Allah (SWT) 
and one of the highest forms of worship.^^ 
According to Ibn Farht/n^'* "The Qada is to act as an 
intermediary between the creator and the creature in order to 
perform and execute among them the orders and commandments of 
the creator through the Divine Book and the Sunnah." 
About the importance of the administration of justice, 
Mohammad Shahir Arsalan reported,''^ "a complaint of mal 
administration, and disruption in politics was once made to Sir, W. 
Churchill. He replied that if there was no disruption in the 
administration of justicejhere would be no fear upon Britain." 
'^  Al Quran V : 9. 
" AI Sarakhsi: AI Mabsut, XVI: 59 (Shamsal Din) K. al Mabsut (30 pails) Dar-al-Maiifali, neimt. 
Ibn Faiiiun : Tabsirat-al-Hukuni (1 Usul-al-Aqdiyali wal Manaliiji -al-Ahkani, on the iiiaigiii oll'allial 
Ali—al-Malik (Vol. 2) Matbaah Mustafa-al-Bibi-al-Halabi, Egypt; 1356, H : 1937 A.C. 
'^  Md. Shahir Arsalan; Al Qada wal Qudat, p. 8 Dar-al-Irshad, Beirut 1389 H. 
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The knowledge of the law, for the proper administration, is 
necessary. In support of it, two cases of Islamic law held in the 
period of Hazrat Ali, can be cited. 
A woman came to Hazrat Ali at the time when he is about to 
ride his horse. She said, "Commander of faithful, my brother has died 
leaving behind him two daughters, mother, wife, twelve brothers and 
myself and six hundred dinars but my brothers have given me only 
one." Hazrat Ali replied, "They gave you justly" and drove his horse 
away.^ ® This landmark judgement shows, the command of Hazra^Ali 
over the law of inheritance, because it involved an intricate question 
of law. 
The other case is, that two friends sat to have a lunch, one had 
fives loaves, the other three. On their invitation, a stranger ate with 
them. He gave eight dirhams to them, who have five loaves took five 
dirhams and three dirhams gave to other. But the later one 
demanded half. Hazrat Ali solved the dispute. He said, that 
according to justice the later one is entitled only one dirham.'^^ 
To understand, the real spirit of Islamic law this brief discussion was 
necessary. The law and justice cannot be maintained without being fully, 
conversant of the law. How the Islamic law is administered today and what 
justification is done with the lav;,is a question of great importance. Keeping 
this background in mind, we will see the contribution of Indian judiciary, in 
the field of the woman's property right in Islamic perspective. 
In Pre-lndependence Period 
Haji Syed Mohsin Amin, Amute ; Qadwatha Muhayyii-al-Ugul p. 136, Chapakhanah Islamiyah, Tehran 
1333. 
" Al-Muhib-al-Tabari; Al Riyad-al-Nadirah fi Manaqib-al-Asharah, Matboah Dar-al-Tahif 1372 H. 
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The pre independence period was the period of British rulers in 
India. Here I will not go in the history of Mughal period or before that. 
I have to cover from the British period because there is a pragmatic 
reason to confine, the study to the British period only. As the present 
judicial system is, what the Britishers had created. It is also 
necessary to see, whether it has any co-relation, continuity or 
integral relationship, with the pre-British institutions. 
The personal enactment, which the British Indian legislators 
gave to this country, were legislated by them wholly in English, in 
letter and spirit, in form and substance, in style and format. They 
were interpreted by British Indian courts exclusively in accordance 
with English judicial precedents, and English principle of 
interpretation of statutes,^° 
Though, the policy of Britishers was, that the Muslims and 
Hindus would be governed by their own personal laws. The Privy 
Council, itself warned the courts that they are not free to deduce any 
rule of law, based on the Quranic text and reported Hadith. In Abdul 
Fata Mahammad Ishak v Russomoy Dhar Cliowdry^^ and Baker All 
Khan v Anjuman Ara Begum,^° the court cautioned, that fundamental 
principles of Islam and the religion are so intermingled, that it would 
be extremely dangerous to draw a fresh logical inference from old 
and undisputed texts. But this role of Privy Council hindered the 
'* Mehmood Tahir: Personal Law in Crisis p. 103. 
" 22, lA 76. 
°^ 30, lA 94. 
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development of Muslim law. The, eminent jurists also criticized the 
role of judiciary. Fyzee states.^^ 
"This attitude, natural enough in India where the majority of 
Muslims, being orthodox were averse to any change in the 'Holy 
Quran' Shariat is the result of the combinod offocls of tlio doctiino of 
'taqlid', as understood by the later jurists and the common law 
doctrine of precedent, which tells the judge to interpret and followed, 
rather than create and expand the law. It has had during the two 
centuries of British rule, the effect of keeping the law stationary and 
static except for two broadening influences legislation and the 
healthy introduction of principles of English equity." 
In this way, the well-recognized principle of Ijtihad was not 
prevalent in the British period. Thus, Muslim jurists were denied the 
right of independent inquiry and were bound by the doctrine of taqlid, 
which stopped the growth of law. But it does not mean by the above 
discussion, that there was no application of equity, justice and good 
conscience, in the case of a Muslim. Actually there was not much 
distortion of Muslim law in British period. To know, what is the 
contribution of Britisher to Muslim law, the case study is necessary. 
The most important and famous case in the field of Muslim law 
of inheritance was, the Patna case,^^ which tells the 
misadministration of British judicial system. This case was bitterly 
criticized and created terror in the heart of the people. Even Warren 
"' Fyzee : Out line of Mohamniadan Law, 51 (1974). 
22 Willson : Anglo Mohamniadan Law p. 102. 
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Hastings commented adversely on the way, the Patna Council had 
acted. He wrote to the Council, "/ can not but take notice of the great 
irregularities, in ttie proceedings of tfie law officers, whose business 
was solely to have declared the laws. The Diwani Court was, to be 
judge of the facts, their takings on themselves to examine witnesses 
was entirely foreign to their duty. They should have been examined 
before the adalat." 
Though, the Patna case was decided according to the Muslim 
law of Inheritance but the afterwards proceedings of the 
implementation of the decision, was wrong, harsh and out of the 
jurisdiction of the court. The facts of the case were - Shahbaz Khan 
had no issue so he expressed his desire to adopt his nephew 
Bahadur Beg and hand over his property but before it was done, he 
died. Then, the dispute arose between the widow and the nephew. 
The widow claimed the whole property, on the basis of a gift and 
nephew on the basis of adopted son. The proceedings were wholly 
entrusted to the native law officers. There were many irregularities 
during the proceedings of the case, as no witness was examined on 
oath and Begum's claim was rejected. As there is no adoption in 
Islamic law, the claim of Bahadur Beg was also rejected and 
according to the law of inheritance of Muslims, the shares were 
allotted to them YA to the widow and VA to the Shahbaz brother (the 
father of Bahadur Beg). 
The whole proceedings were exparte, without any notice being 
given to the Begum. The Begum was not satisfied with the decision 
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and approached, to the Supreme Court. By this way the case 
became more critical. 
The action was tal<en against Bahadur Beg and the law 
officers, on the basis of the proceedings, which were illegal and 
unwarrantable. Therefore, the Begum was held, entitled to the whole 
property on the basis of gift deed. In this case, the Supreme Court 
had also been criticized, for taking cognizance of the acts done by 
the law officers, in the discharge of their judicial functions.^' This 
case was decided in 1777, 1778 & 1779. 
Another important case of law of inheritance was Rajah Deedar 
Hussain v Ranee Zahurunnisan^^ In this case the Shia sects of 
Muslims were, first time made entitled to govern the succession by 
their own law of inheritance, till then, they were the subject of Sunn! 
law of inheritance. There are outstanding differences in the scheme 
of inheritance under these two sects of Islamic law. Arnould J lucidly 
describes the historical origin of these two sects.^^ 
The justice equity and good conscience was applied in the 
case of Munshee Buzloor Rahim v Shamsunnissan^^ By this case the 
controversy arose whether the Muslim law be overridden by the rule 
of justice, equity and good conscience and that conflict was resolved 
by the court in the case of Mohd Kaden v Ludden^^ that the personal 
law could not be overridden. 
" JainM.P.: opcit, p. 89-93. 
'^' 2M I.A. 441 (1841) See Hayatun Nisa v Md. Ali Khan, 71 lA 73-74 
" Advocate General of Bombay v Mohd Hussain Hussaini (1866) 12 BHCR 323. 
^*11 M.I.A. 551 Fyzee Cases 281. 
"ILR 14 Cal. 276, 286-7. 
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Another controversy, about the adoption of the old and new 
juristic interpretation of the Holy Quran, arose in the case of Mohd 
Jaffer Bindaneem v Kulsoom Bi Bi,^^ The dispute, in this case, was 
related to the maintenance of widow, in addition of her share in 
inheritance. The Privy Council has adopted the juristic opinion of 
Hedaya and Imamia, which condemned any such right of widow and 
rejected the re-interpretation of Ameer AN J, which was in support of 
this widow. This judgement was bitterly criticized by the legal 
luminaries and jurists of that time and later on. I also agree with the 
view of Daniel Latiffi^^ that the Quranic verses be interpreted in "a 
healthy and humane principles for the protection of widows." 
The views, of Sir Sulaiman J, in this connection are excellent. 
He opined that, it is the duty of courts in case of divergent opinion, 
when it seems impossible to ascertain the comparative, merits of the 
authorities, the view which is more in accordance with equity, justice 
and good conscience,^° should be adopted. 
In Mirza Hashim Mishkee v Agha Hussain, the views, on the 
spirit of Islam, given by Chari J was strongly criticized by Tayyabji 
and other legal cleric and fuqahas, while speaking about the spirit of 
Islamic law, he had over looked the important consideration, when 
he put forward the position of Hanafi law in relation to female share. 
It is one of the fundamental principles that males take twice as much 
as females. If such was the principle no explanation forthcoming why 
cognate like uterine brother and uterine sister, grand parents (in 
^'24 I.A. 196. 
^' Daniel Latlff: Change and the Muslim Law (ILI) Islamic Law in Modem India 99-102 (1972). 
^^  Aziz Bano v Md. Ibrahim Hussain ILR (1925) 47 All 823. 
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circumstances in wiiich the Holy Quran makes them sharers), take 
equal shares. The real principle, as explained above, is that newly 
entitled heirs (other things being equal) take half as much as old 
established heir whether male or female. It is accidental, that all 
female heirs are newly introduced heirs because before Islam, there 
was no concept of woman's property right at any place of the world, 
except in Hindu law where Stridhana prevailed. That is why, it is 
considered that it is the rule of Islamic law that male take twice of 
female but where both male and female were newly introduced, there 
is no such distinction between their share.^^ He further says, that all 
the newly introduced heirs by Holy Quran encroached the right of 
male agnates. The spirit of the innovation may be expressed in the 
formula:-
"L/A7to her, that hath not and unto the relations of, shall be 
given: and from him that hath shall be taken a little (or may be the 
whole) of what he seemth to retain."^^ 
The distortion of Islamic law was not done consciously or 
deliberately by Britishers but the fact is that they were ignorant and 
not conversant of Arabic and Persian. So they have to rely on the 
translated work of Hedaya or Fatwa-e-Alamgiri. About Hamiltons 
Hedaya, Maulvi Mohammad Rashid of Burdwan pointed out, some 
mistakes and notified its to the then. Chief Justice T.H.Harrington, 
who however chose to keep mum.^^ These distorted principles of 
Muslim law were gradually compiled in books like W.H. Mc. 
'^ Tayyabjrop cit p. 805. 
^^  Ibid p. 807 
" Mehmood Tahir : Op cit p. 52. 
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Naugthan's Principles and Precedents of Mohammaden Law, N.E. 
Baillie's two volume's of Digest of Islamic law, Fitzgerald's 
Mohammadan law. An Abridgement and R.K. Wilson's Anglo-
Mohammad law etc.^ "* about the distortion of Islamic law and Hindu 
law Justice V.R. Krishana Iyer himself admitted, in the case of 
Yousuf V Sowramma.^^ 
"Marginal distortions are inevitable when the Judicial 
Committee in the Downing Street has to interpret Manu and 
Mohammadan law of India and Arabia," 
But the contribution of the British judicial system is also 
adorable. In Durga Das v Mohd Ali^^ and AH Zamin v Akbar Ali^^ a 
childless widow was held entitled to a share in movable property and 
in case no other heir to return also in immovable property.^^ In 
Gulbaro v Akbar Khalid^^ a lady was authorized to a decree for 
possession. 
In Hasina Bibi v Zubaida Bibi""^ the reason was given to the 
rule of reducing share of widow from 1/4 to 1/8 that it was done for 
the benefit of sons and daughters but where there is only a daughter 
whose share is also prescribed the court held that no reason to 
reduce the widows share. At this time we took the spirit of the law 
rather than the letter of it. The case should be decided on the equity, 
justice and good conscience. The Privy Council applied--? 
^^  Ibid p. 54. 
" (1970) KLT 477. 
'''AIR (1925) All.522. 
" A I R (1928) Pal. 411. 
''AIR(1935)Oudh78 
" A I R (1936) Peshawar 178. 
^^ 43 lA 294. 
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''The rules of equity and equitable considerations commonly 
recognized in the court of Chancery in England are not foreign to the 
Mussalaman system, but are in fact often referred to and invoked in 
adjudication of cases." By the above discussion it can be deduced 
that the judiciary have the mixed role in relation to women's property 
right, some time it held the case, taking the literal meaning of the law 
of inheritance. But some time it go beyond the limits and not hesitate 
to bestow the mother's full share instead of the presence of 
daughter. Actually what distortion of Islamic law was done in the 
period of Britishers that was not intentional? Instead the steps taken 
by the judiciary or British rulers were precautionary not to disturb the 
established law. As there was a system in Common Law, that the 
courts were bound to follow the precedent established by the 
superior courts. Though by this step the development of Islamic Law 
was much affected and some bad precedent, which were 
established, be continued till now. 
In Post Independence Period 
After the independence, the law relating to women's property 
right has passed through different channel of judicial process. 
Generally, the judiciary, in independent India, has adopted and 
based its decision upon, what the British judges said and decided in 
their period. The judiciary hesitated to put its own construction and 
deduced analogical reasoning from the original sources. There are 
very few judges, who bother for the real justice and deviate, from the 
old established authorities. The reason, behind it, is that the 
personal law is so sacrosanct, that no interference with in be 
241 
Chapter -V 
permitted. But it is the matter of regret that the anti women's 
customs allowed to prevail, inspite of the pro-women provisions of 
Islamic law. For example, the custom of excluding the females from 
inheritance is still prevailing in many parts of India even after the 58 
years of Independence. 
The anti women customary laws, which disentitle the females 
from inheritance makes the judiciary confused. Some cases have 
been decided in favour of females and customary law was not 
allowed to prevail. But in so many cases the judiciary favours these 
customary laws. So to understand, why customary laws are so much 
favoured in independent India we will go little back and begin it with 
the British period again. 
In Hira bai v Sonalee^^ the question before the Privy Council 
was, whether Khojas, Cutichs, Memons and Bohras who are 
converted Muslims and still follow their Hindu customs, specially in 
matter of inheritance, which exclude females from inheritance^ be 
governed by Islamic law or customary law? . In this instant case a 
Khoja girl claimed her share in her father's property under the 
provision of Islamic law. But her claim was not accepted and the 
custom got preference over the Islamic law. Commenting on this 
decision Rankin J, observed.'*^ 
"This is a very important decision so far as it removed all 
danger tiiat the law of India should attempt to enforce any standard 
of Islamic Orthodoxy it must command approval." 
^'ind. Dec. (O.S.)IVIOO 
42 Rankn; Custom and the Muslim Law in British India, 25; Transaction Grotius Society, 89 (1939). 
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In the above-mentioned case Privy Council has given many 
arguments in support of customary law. This decision was affirmed in 
the case of Khatu Bai v Mohd Ataji Abu,"^^ who were the Halai 
Memons of Porbandar. 
Later on the Privy Council itself in Jwala Buksh v Dharma 
S/ng^,"'' was doubtful to admit the custom against Islamic law and in 
Jammya v Diwan,^^ the custom, excluding daughter from inheritance, 
was not allowed against the women's right of inheritance. But in M6. 
Ibrahim v Shaik Ibrahim,'^^ \he position was again reversed and Privy 
Council clearly stated - that custom would get precedence over the 
Islamic law, governing the succession in a particular community of 
Mohammadan as Mappilla community."'' 
In the case of Punjab, Kumaon Hill and Oudh,''^ the custom got 
preference and the females were allowed to be excluded from 
inheritance by the Privy Council. Though in Abdul Hussain v Sona 
Dero,"^^ in absence of a clear proof of a custom the females were 
allowed to inherit. 
Upon this anti-woman attitude of Privy Council, there was 
chaos and distress amongst Muslim females and the right thinking 
Muslim males also. Muslim Women Organizations and Jamait-ul-
Ulma-e-Hind made much hue and cry. The result of that is, the Act of 
••^ 50 LA. 108-111. 
"'^ (1866) 10 MIA 511, See also: Sumiast Khan v Kadir Dod khan, IFB Ruling N.W.P. (1866). 
'''(1901)ILR23A1120. 
''^AIR(1922)P.C. 59. 
"• JainM.P.;opcitp. 619. 
"' Roshan Ali Klian v Chowdhry Ashar All (1929) 57 JA 29. 
"•MSI.A. 10 (1917) Fyzce cases 94. 
243 
Chapter - V 
1937.^° It was presumed that ail controversies would come to an end. 
As according to the provision of section 2 of the Act of 1937, Islamic 
law of inheritance would be compulsorily applicable \o all Muslims 
but of the provision of Section 3 of the Act of 1937, allowed the 
customarily laws application in case, of will if one had not choose for 
the application of Islamic law. This created confusion and set at 
naught the general provision of the Shariat Act relating to 
compulsory application of Islamic law in respect of inheritance.^^ 
During first Decade of Independence 
With this background we will proceed with the decision of Post 
Independent judiciary, which also have a mixed reaction. In some 
cases, the anti customary laws were allowed to prevail on the other 
hand in some cases they were not allowed. The same position of 
British period exists till now after 5d years of independence. 
In the case of Sahul Hamid v Sultan,^^ the question before the 
court was about the concept of joint family, (in which the 
coparcenary exists) whether exists in Muslim law or not? The court 
held, that Muslim law does not recognize the joint family of Hindu 
Jurisprudence. As a coparcener the Hindu females are not allowed \o 
inherit, but now by the amendment Act of 2005 the daughter is also 
be a coparcener and allowed to inherit the ancestral property along 
with the son. 
^^  The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937. 
'^ See- Mehmood Tahit: Muslim Women in India (Religion and Law Review) VI: 1 (1977). 
" A I R (1947), Mad. 287. 
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In Allayar v Rambhau,^^ the question, about custom of 
coparcenary property (in which woman can have no share) was 
disallowed, which prevail among some Khojas Ismailies from the 
time in memorial. 
Under the provision of Section 43 of Indian Succession Act, 
1925 the mother of the deceased is wholly excluded by the lineal 
descendants of any degree and in their absence by the father. In 
Shaik Mehboob Alarm v Raze Begum,^^ the court held that Indian 
Succession Act, 1925, has superseded the Islamic law and 
accordingly the provisions of the Act would prevail, where they come 
in conflict with Islamic law. 
In Rahmatullah v Maqsood Ahmed,^^ an illegitimate child was 
held not to inherit with legitimate child as, uterine brother. In Imam v 
Amir,^^ the Madras High Court rejected the settlement deed of the 
successive life estate in favour of male descendants, which 
exclusively excludes the rights of females. 
In Hooriya v Munna,^^ no custom, to exclude females from 
inheritance, is allowed, to prevail. On the other hand, in Bai Asha v 
Biban,^^ the custom was allowed to prevail. In Abdul Jabbar v 
Chairman District Council Kucheryl,^^ because of the absence of 
clear proof of custom, the anti woman custom was not allowed to 
govern the law of inheritance. 
" A I R (1948) Bom. 162. 
^•'AIR (1950) Lah. 12. 
"AIR (1952) All 640-41. 
'^  AIR (1955) Mad. 621. 
" A I R (1956) MB 56. 
^'8 (1956) 59 BLR 470. 
' ' AIR (1957) Nagpur 84 at p. 85. 
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In Mubarak begum v Sushil Kumar,^° it was held that under 
Islamic law, a sister can inherit in both the capacity, as a sharer and 
as residuary, along with the widow of the deceased. In Abdul Kafoor 
V Abdul Razak,^^ the court has favoured the female, and held, if the 
daughter has agreed to leave her share before the succession open, 
it cannot be called a family arrangement and it would make no effect 
upon her right to inherit. In Mohd Sandhukan v Ratnam.^^ the Madras 
High Court has held that a custom, which excludes only females from 
inheritance, could not be allowed. 
During Second decade of Independence 
The attitude of the judiciary towards females was not at much 
variance, in this decade also. Like the pre independence and the first 
ten years,this second decade also has mixed reaction and in many 
cases anti-customary laws were got preference over Islamic laws, 
which are pro-woman. In Saira bai v S.S. Joshi,^^ the grand 
daughters were held entitled, to inherit as sharer with the widow of 
the deceased. This judgement is really appreciable. In Khazir v 
Ahmad,^^ the court has rejected to apply the rule of survivorship to 
the property of Muslim deceased. In Aziz Dar v Mst. Fazli,'^'' the 
customary law of Kashmir, which excludes the daughter from 
inheritance, was allowed. In Noor Bano v Deputy Cust. General, 
E.P.,^^ the question, once again, came before the court for 
^^  AIR (1957) Raj. 154 at p. 157. 
'"'AIR (1959) Mad. 131 at p. 135. 
" A I R (1958) Mad. 144. 
" AIR (1960) M.P. 260 at p. 262. 
^''A1R(]960)J&K.57. 
" A I R ( 1 9 6 0 ) J & K . 53 
'^ '•'AJR(I966)SC 1937. 
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consideration, about the customary law of Khojas governing 
succession and this ruling of Supreme Court is really significant. The 
Supreme Court relied on Mulla's text that: 
"Effect of the Shariat Act is to abolish, (except as to 
agricultural land and other matters to which the Act does not apply) 
the customary law of succession of Khojas."^^ 
AH Saheb v Hajra Begum,^^ in this case the question before the 
Mysore court, was about the doctrine of 'Return' according to Islamic 
law neither wife nor husband, is entitled to return when there are 
distant kindered and if there is no distant kindered, then the property 
will go to government, to avoid the government Escheat, the property 
could be reverted to the husband and wife only, if there is no distant 
kindered. In this instant case, one Ali Saheb died, leaving behind the 
widow and two daughters of his predeceased daughter. The widow 
gives the whole property to her nephew. The grand daughters 
claimed as distant kindered. The court held, that the wife is only 
entitled to her share and remainder be divided among distant 
kindered. 
During the Third decade of Independence 
Not much improvement can be found in the attitude of judiciary 
during the third decade of the independence and mixed reaction is 
evident and no concrete efforts were made by the judiciary to over 
come the grievance of Muslim females. On the other hand because 
of the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu females 
^^  Mulla : Principles of Mohammaden Law 239, (15* ed. 1961) 
*^ AIR (1968) Mys. 351; (1968) 2 Mys LJ 14. 
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were in better position than earlier. The judiciary is also inclined 
towards the improvement of their conditions. 
In another case,^^ an interesting question before the court was 
whether the husband or wife are entitled to inherit each other in dual 
capacity? It means as a husband or wife and as a distant kindered. 
This case was wrongly decided by the divisional bench and corrected 
by the High Court. It was held that they could inherit each other in 
dual capacity, as sharer and as a distant kindered. As a husband he 
is sharer and as distant kindered he is entitle as residuary. 
in Mumtaz Begum v S. Amanatullah Khan^° the question again 
related with the exclusion of the Kashmiri girls from inheritance 
though the case was decided in favour of daughter because of non-
proving of the establishment of custom and not because of the 
contrary, to the text of Holy Quran. It means if it was proved that this 
custom exist from the time immemorial, it will make no effect that the 
particular custom is unconstitutional and un Islamic and hammered 
upon the genuine rights of females relating to property. 
In Bai Khatija v KaimbhaiJ^ again the conflict of custom and 
Islamic law relating to the succession of Sunni Bohra arose. In this 
case, steps, taken by Gujarat High Court, are appreciable. It says, 
that in order to secure "uniformity" which, the Bombay High Court, 
' ' AIR (1970) Cal. 387 at pp. 388-89 (D.B.). 
70AIR(1973)J&K.28. 
71 AIR (1974) Guj, 4, See Mehmood Tahir: op cit, pp. 202-205. 
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was so concerned with the Shariat Act^should be extended to the 
whole of India. 
During the fourth decade of Independence 
In this decade the judiciary leaned in the favour of Muslim 
females and some cases were decided according to Islamic Law 
which is pro-women in opposition of the customary law which still 
prevail in India and which totally excluded the females from 
inheritance. 
In the case of Ghulam Hasan v Mst. Saja^^ Jammu and 
Kashmir High Court has admitted the Islamic Law and awarded 1/3 
share to daughter in opposition of customary law of inheritance. 
Jammu & Kashmir High Court has admitted the Islamic law and 
awarded 1/3 share to daughter. 
In Narunnisa v Shaikh Abdul HamidJ^ one, Abdul Ghani died 
leaving behind five sons and two daughters. One of his son S.K. 
Abbas claimed his share 2/12 according to the rules of Islamic Law. 
The defendant contended his share, on the basis of a will, in which 
Abdul Ghani has bequeathed his whole immovable property to him. 
The question, before the court, was whether the will is valid which is 
made without the consent of other heirs and what will be its effect if 
not valid? 
'^AIR(1984)J&K27. 
" AIR (J987) Kant. 222. 
249 
Chapter -V 
The court held, that it is an established law, that a bequest to 
an heir, either in whole or in part is invalid unless consented by the 
other heirs and if any one is consented, the bequest is valid to that 
extent only/'* It means to the share of that particular heir. In this 
instant case, one sister has given her consent but the other kept 
mum. Though she has the knowledge of the executing of the will. But 
it was held; that her silence is not an implied consent, cited Mulla -
where a will contained a bequest excluding the females could not be 
considered. Mere silence cannot be considered as an implied 
consent, so she is entitled to her share.''^ 
In S.A. Halima Bivi v S.A. Fatima BiviJ^ one Abdul Qadir and 
his wife Zuleka Bivi had executed a settlement deed, in favour of his 
two daughters, S.A. Fatima Bivi and Halima Bivi. The son of Halima 
Bivi on behalf of her mother and aunt enjoyed the whole property. 
The income of the said property was being divided between them. 
The dispute arises between them when the delivering of the income 
was stoped. S.A. Fatima Biwi filed the suit for division of property. 
The court considered so many issues and also various aspects of 
Islamic law relating to the right of property were discussed. Throwing 
light over the concept of the property, the court said, "in 
Mohammadan family there is a presumption ttiat the cash and house 
hold furniture belongs to the husband." This decision is contrary to 
letters and spirit of Islam, since Muslim law does not make any 
distinction between movable or immovable property so far as the 
'" Mchboobi v Kanipaiah AIR (1953) Mys. NOC 705. 
" Mulla, op cit p, 138. 
'^  AIR (1987) Mad. 129. 
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question of inheritance is concerned/'' Thougli the case was decided 
in favour of sister. 
In the case of Zulekha Bibi v Mst. Sabna BibiJ^ it was held that 
in the absence of son, the daughter is entitled to share the property 
to the extent of half. This decision was held perfectly applying the 
Islamic law of inheritance. 
In Abdul Matin v Abdul AzizJ^ one intestate Muslim Abdul 
Ghafur died leaving behind only two daughters who took the property 
in equal share. After some time one sister has sold her share to the 
other sister who became the absolute owner. Halima died in 1957, 
leaving behind her son, Abdul Matin, a sole heir. In 1953, Salima 
also died leaving behind no heir except husband, Kitab Ali and Abdul 
Matin her nephew. Kitab Ali sold all the property of Salima, which 
was challenged by Abdul Matin, being the distant kindered. Gauhati 
High Court held that according to Islamic law, if the heir is husband 
or wife only, the residue will not revert to them but will go to the 
distant kindered. It makes no difference that her mother herself has 
sold the property to him. 
A very peculiar case of eunuch was decided in 1990.^° There is 
a custom in the community of eunuch that the heir of eunuch is 
another eunuch. They follow the system of Guru and Chela and there 
was a custom that the property of the Guru be inherited by the 
Chela, if eunuch. In this instant case the will executed by Munnilal (a 
" (1933) 145 Ind. Cas. 461; AIR (1933) Rang 393; (1885) ILR 11 Cal. 597; (1889) ILR 11 All 456. 
'^  (1987) 13 All LR 38 (All) 
" A I R (1990) Gau. 70. 
"" Illiyas V Badshah AIR (1990) 334 M.P. 
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Muslim) in favour of Abdul Ghafoor (not an eunuch), was challenged 
by the chela Badshah alias Kamlajan, in whose favour Munnilal 
previously executed the will but subsequently, he changed his will. 
As Munnilal was suffering from cancer and in that hot days no 
service or help was rendered by Badshah, instead Abdul Ghafoor 
took care of him and also spent money on his treatment. In these 
circumstances Munnilal revoked the first will. The question before 
the court was that under Muslim law one cannot bequeath the 
property more than one third without the consent of his heir. The 
disputed property was inherited by Munnilal on the basis of above 
custom from his Guru Nasiban, another eunuch. The case was 
decided \r\ favour of Badshah. \i is submitted that the decision is 
doubtful as the case must have been decided according to Islamic 
law and in it there is no provision of Guru and Chela. As in Islamic 
law there are elaborate provisions about the succession of eunuchs®^ 
During the fifth decade of Independence 
Syed Fatehyab AH Mirza v Union of India,^^ two important 
questions were involved in this case, (i) whether the marriage with a 
Jewish lady be considered as an apostasy? (ii) Whether the spouses 
of Muta marriage were entitled to inherit each other? On first 
question the court held that Islamic law permits to marry with a 
Kitabiyah so it would not amount as an apostasy. This decision is 
appreciated by Tahir Mehmood.®^ On the second question the court 
*' Hamilton, Hedaya, (1994)2"''ed. Vol. IV Book Lll 1 p. 704. 
'^  AIR (1991) Cal. 205 at pp. 222-223. 
" Mehmood Tahir :op cit, p. 146. 
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held that generally Muta marriage creates no right of inheritance but 
if there is a clear stipulation of such type then there is no bar. 
In Mohan Lai v Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay,^^ it was 
held by the Supreme Court, that in partnership between father and 
son, after the death of father both widow and son are entitled to 
equal share. It is vgry difficult to say that on what basis the widow 
was held entitle to the equal share with her son. As it is neither an 
Islamic law nor customary law. It seems that in favouring the females 
the court has gone a step further. 
In Maqsooda Begum v Shanawaz Khan,^^ two questions were 
raised before the court. 
(!) Whether the full sister has any interest in the 
deceased property, in the presence of widow and 
two daughters? 
(11) Whether in the presence of widow and daughters, 
the sister can be the legal representative of the 
estate of the deceased brother? 
Answering the first question the court held, that though, the 
sister is not a sharer but she is entitle to inherit the property as a 
residuary and after the allotment of the shares of the sharers, the 
widow and two daughters, the residue would go to the residuary, the 
sister. 
*^  AIR (1991) SC 479 p. 480. 
^^AIR(1991)J&K8. 
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About the second question, the court held, that there is no bar 
on sister to be a legal representative. In this case the Islamic law of 
inheritance is discussed in detail. It is very hard to say that in the 
presence of children and widow the sister may be a representative. 
Though the court had not any objection to it. 
In Rukmani Bat v Bismillah Bai^^ the deceased Babu, a 
converted Muslim, had only one daughter as heir. The claim was 
made by the niece of Babu^ Rukmani Bai that she should be 
considered as heir of Babu, as Babu was a bachelor and never 
married with the mother of Bismillah Bai. But it was proved that Babu 
had married with the mother of Bismillah and had two children with 
this union. The son predeceased him and only daughter survived, so 
she would be the sole heir of Babu and therefore would inherit the 
whole property, as there is no distant kindered. The property will 
revert to the daughter applying the doctrine of Return. There is a rule 
that a non-Muslim cannot be the heir of a Muslim in Islamic law of 
inheritance. The Hindu niece of Babu is not entitled. 
In Newanness v Sheikh Mohammad,^^ one Haji Ihsan died 
leaving behind his widow, two daughters, two sons and the children 
of predeceased son. The property, in question, was inherited by Haji 
Ihsan from his predeceased son. In this case the Islamic Law of 
inheritance was discussed at length. After sometime the widow, the 
two surviving sons and one of the surviving daughter and one of the 
children of a predeceased son also died. Now the inheritance had to 
be divided between the daughter of Haji Ihsan and the children of his 
''*AIR(I993)M.P.45. 
" AIR (1996) SC 702 pp. 702-703. 
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predeceased son. This was an appeal case. The Supreme Court's 
judgement of this case (as reported in AIR) is very confusing as 
rightly commented by Tahir Mahmood. The court, relying on the 
authority of Mulla, determined the sharer.°^ Trial court has 
ascertained the shares, that out of 1/6'^  share, the widow and two 
daughters would get equal respective shares under law. 1/3^ ^ 
remained as residue. According to Mulla where descendant like son, 
son's son and ascendants like father and grandfather are not present 
then the descendants of father will take, as firstly full brother then 
sister. In default a daughter or son's daughter or daughter's son. In 
this instant case since only two daughters were survived among the 
five daughters left behind, the full sister takes the entire residue, 
which is 1/3'^share.^^ 
In 1999 the Gujrat High Court also decided the case of a gift 
deed in favour of the female.®° 
The Current Position 
In ^amW Ahmad v Vlth ADJ Moradabad,^^ the court held, that 
the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reform Act, 
1950, override the rules of the succession of Muslim law. Section 
171 of U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act of, 1950 is quite discriminatory which 
gives strong preference for male agnates and always got judicial 
support. 
'* Mulla Op cit 18"'ed. 
*' See Shahid's Muslim Law Digest p. 163. 
'° Nooribibi v Ayeshabibi AIR (1999) Guj, 27. 
"(2001) 8 s e c 599. 
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In a very latest case of 2004, Ashabibi v Faziyabi^^ihe question 
before the court was whether the widow of predeceased son entitled 
to inherit their mother-in-law? 
The facts of the case were that one, Muslim lady Chotima died 
in, 1986 and her son, Abdul Samad predeceased her in, 1985, 
leaving behind two widows and their children. The widows claimed, 
their share in the property of Chotima, on the basis of a will, which 
was made by the Chotima in favour of her predeceased son and 
secondly on the basis of that, the property in question was 
purchased with the financial help of the predeceased son. 
In consideration of will, the court found no evidence but there 
were suspicious circumstances, so it was not considered as a valid 
will. On consideration of second question, whether, they are entitled 
to inherit or not? It is a well-settled rule of Islamic law of inheritance 
that the right to inherit arises at the death of ancestor,^^ no birthright 
is recognized^'* and also no theory of representation.^^ It is the clear 
rule of Islamic law that if any child dies before the opening of the 
succession his or her heir cannot claim his or her share.^^ On the 
basis of these judicial decisions and on the authorities of the text of 
Islamic law, the court held that the widows are not entitled to share 
any property in this instant case.^ ^ This decision was very harsh 
towards females. 
'^  AIR (2004) Knat 476 para 17,18. 
' ' 'AIR(19. '^3)SC298. 
''A!R(1982)Patna89. 
''AIR (1970) Mad. 200 
''AIR(1961)Ori.92. 
" A I R (1951) SC 327. 
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Hindu Law 
In Pre Independence Period: 
The courts rendered a yeoman service to the cause of personal 
laws especially, relating to the women's right of property. In the 
period of Britishers, the Hindu law underwent transformation at the 
hands of British courts. Mr. Derrett a great critic of Hindu Law, has 
glorified his countrymen for presenting the English ruler in India as 
'Patrons of Shastras'. He has given in one of his book a long list of, 
about fifty Sanskrit legal treaties which he claims, are attributable to 
British influence or patronage or possibly written in response to 
British request or encouragement^ ® William Jones judge of Supreme 
Court of Fort Willaim at Calcutta, himself admitted: "pandits deal out 
Hindu law as they please and make it at reasonable rates when they 
can not find it ready made ^ ^ 
In 1828 Governor Eliphinstones had remarked, 'the 
Dhramshastras, as it is understood, is a collection of ancient treaties 
neither clear nor consistent in themselves and now buried under a 
heap of more modern commentaries, the whole beyond the 
knowledge of perhaps the most learned Pandits and every part 
wholly unknown to the people who live under it."^°° 
The British judges used to consult the Pandits, attached to the 
courts. In the case of difference of opinion, on the point of law, the courts 
consulted the other Pandits. Sir Francis Mcnaugthen consulted 51 Pandits 
''^  Derrett, J.D.M; Religion, Law and the State in India p. 225 (1968). 
'^ Jain M.P.; op cit p. 583,3"" Ed. 1972. 
"* Ibid p. 588. 
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on a question of inheritance, in the case of Gurubullub v Persond in 1834. 
Hindu law came to be administered by the courts, in British India, they 
have faced with a number of problems, and some cases took very long 
time to dispose of.^ °^ 
A judge, in order to be able to discharge his duties properly 
and effectively, has to understand the psychology, the sociology and 
the climate of the state in which he functions. Administering Hindu 
Law in India the problem with the Britishers was that they were 
totally unaware of the surroundings and sociology of the Indian 
society. There are many sub-schools, by which the Hindus were 
governed, and they were quite different with each other. 
In British period, though the Supreme Court leaned, towards 
the application of the laws of the particular school, to which the 
parties belonged. In Bai Kesarbai v Hansraj Morarji,^^^ the question 
was, whether a co-widow could succeed the property of a widow 
dying issueless, in preference to her husband's brother and brother's 
son. The case was decided, according to the harmonious 
construction between the Mitakshara and Mayukha School. 
The earliest, reported case of Dayabhaga, was D.D.R. Dassi.^°^ 
In that case the widow succeeded to the exclusion of mother 
(father's widow). The conflict was between the father's widow and 
the widow of the deceased. 
'*" Rungama v Acchana 4 M.I.A. 1. 
' "^33^176, 187. 
' " (1774) Mort Montr 353. 
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In Perammal v Venkatammal,^^'^ the court held that the mother 
stands, next in order of succession on failure of other heirs and can 
succeed only in the absence of a widow. Once again the judciciary 
favoured the widow instead of father's widow. In Huroosundry v 
Rajeshsurrie,^^^ and Ballamma v Puttaya,'^^^ the widow was held, not 
entitled to inherit that property which was not vested and possessed 
by the deceased husband at his death. In Sondaninoy Dassee v T. 
Chandra,"^^^ the restrictions on the right, to partition on issueless 
widow, was released by the court. In Suraneni v Suraneni, the 
question before the court, was whether according to Mitakshara 
School, if the agreement of partition has taken place, but actual 
separation is not carried out, the widow could succeed the husband 
property in preference to other surviving co-sharer? The court held 
that the widow was entitled. Though it seems that the Privy Council 
had perpetuated the traditional system but somewhat soften its 
rigours. 
One of the most serious deviations of the Privy Council from, 
the Mitakshara view was regarding the status of Hindu women. The 
Privy Council took, a much more rigid and narrow view of the 
women's position, based on the old texts of Manu, Katyanyana and 
Yajnavalkya ignoring the interpretation like Vijnaneswara. By this 
way the judiciary has narrowed down the concept of Stridhana, the 
absolute property of the women.^°^ Yajnavalkaya had defined, 
'°'(1863)1MHCR223. 
"'^1865)2,W.R.321. 
""'(1894) ILR 18 Mad. 168. 
'"^(!876) ILR 2 Cal. 262-271, Sec also D. Natli v Cliiiilamaiii (1903) ILR 31 Cal. 241 
'"^  Sastri G. Sarkar: A Treaties on Hindu Law p. 58-59. 
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Stridhana restrictively but Vijnaneswara gave it expansive meaning 
and include in it, every l<ind of property acquired by a woman from 
any source whicii was judicially recognized in India by several 
courtsJ°^ On the other hand the Privy Council in a series of 
pronouncement,^^° refused to accept Vijnaneswara's view of 
Stridhana. Perhaps the Apex Court found, Vijneshwara's view too 
radical because, in England, until 1882, the position of married 
women, in the matter of their rights to property, was very 
unsatisfactory and the Married Women's Right to Property Act, 1882, 
alleviated their position.^^^ 
In the British period though the, Hindu Law was much distorted 
but in respect of widows property right, it always have a soft corner. 
The problem to administe.'- the Hindu law was that, at the time there 
was no uniformity among Hindu laws of succession because of many 
schools and sub-schools which have their own rules relating to 
succession. In Hindu law very few females are entitle to hold and 
inherit the property. The rights given by Hindu law to the females 
were also not absolute and so many impediments were imposed on 
them. As the policy of Britishers was non-interference in the matter 
of personal laws, the judiciary found it's difficult to apply justice, 
equity and good conscience. 
'"''SalcmavLutchmanalLR(1898)21 Mad. 100,103, 104. 
"° Mst. Thakur Daylee v Rai Balk Ram 11 M.l.A. 139, Bhawandeen Dubey v Maina Bai 11, l.A.A. 487 
Chotey Lai v Chunnoo Lai 6, LA. 15. 
' " JainM.P. :opcitp. 598. 
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In Post Independence Period 
After independence the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal 
attitude towards the women's right to property in comparison of the 
Privy Council. In independent India much emphasis was given on 
gender justice and equality. Many legislative steps had also been 
taken to modernize, unify, democratize and secularize the Hindu 
family laws and especially to emancipate the Hindu female.^ ^^ 
Judiciary was also inclined towards the empowerment of women 
particularly in the sphere of economic era. Several provisions of 
these reformatory legislations have been challenged but upheld by 
the courts from time to time.^ ^^ 
During the first decade of Independence 
The Judiciary had played a very creative role because the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which is considered a piecemeal in the 
field of women's property right, was not passed and female's had 
very limited property right, but whenever the matter came before the 
court, it did not hesitate to favour the females. Even in 1951 the 
Supreme Court held that the female could be a shebait. 
On an issue whether the property includes the right of succession to 
shebaitship or not? In Angurbala Mullick v Debarata Mullick,'^^'^ the Apex 
Court gives its favour to the female. The court said that there is nothing in 
the Act,^ ^^  under Sec. 3(1) by which an inference can be drawn that a right 
"^ 3 Law and Soceity Review. 
"•' Kurain Augusty v Devassy Alley AIR (1957), Fran Pauline Lucas v Jersome Pascal AIR (1977) Mad. 
270. 
' " AIR (1951) SC 293 : (1951) 1125; (1951) SCJ, 394. 
' " The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. 
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of succession to shebaitship does not fall with in the definition of property. 
If there is no legal objection to a woman being a shebait, why she should 
be excluded from succeeding to the same. 
In 1953 on the issue of the inheritance by prostitute, the court 
held,^^^ that though under Hindu law a maiden was a preferential heir 
to her married sister. But this rule did not apply to a daughter who 
was admittedly married to an idol and who lead a life of a prostitute. 
In 1955, Supreme Court,^ ^^ upheld the validity of customary law 
prevailed among agriculturist jats in Punjab where daughter succeeded 
self-acquired property of her father in preference to collaterals. 
In 1957, just next year of the passing of the Act^ ^® of 1956 the 
question before the court was whether Section 14 of the Act is 
retrospective in operation? This question arose because generally a 
substantive law is not retrospective in operation, unless it is specifically 
made so. But Sec. 14 appears, on its face, to be retrospective, when it 
declares, that the property acquired, before or after the commencement of 
the Act, shall be held by her as an absolute property and not as limited 
owner. But this retrospectively of the Act, is given to the acquisition of the 
property and not to possession,^^^ it was held by the court. 
In an other case ^^ ° the court had made it clear, that for the 
application of Section, 14 of the Act, it was necessary that the 
"^ Sarawathi Ammal v Jagadabe! and another (1953) SCR 939. 
"^ Gopa! Singh and others v Ujagar Singh and otliers (1955) 1, SCR 86 : 1954 SCJ 562. 
"" Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
'^ •^  Smt. Kmala Devi v Bachulal Gupta AIR (1957) SC 434, (1957) SCR 452. 
''" Guinmalapura Taggiana Matada Kotterswami v Setra Veerawa and others (1959) Supp. SCR 968 AIR 
(1959) SC 577. 
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property must be in possession of Hindu female, at the date of the 
commencement of the Act, whether actual, physical or constructive. 
To favour the women's property right in 1959, the Supreme 
Court held,^^^ that even if a custom under which a sister may claim to 
succeed to the property of her brother in preference of collaterals, 
has not been established, she was made entitle to claim the 
inheritance, under section, 5 of the Hindu Law of Inheritance 
(Amendment) Act of, 1929. Under this Act a sister was a preferential 
heir of her brother against his collaterals. 
During the Second decade of Independence 
In second decade the judiciary had got the weapon of the Act 
of, 1956 to favour the females and generally the court interpreted the 
provisions of the Act, to give more and more rights to females. But 
sometimes-contrary views were also taken. Because in favouring 
females it cannot go against the express provision of the laws. In 
1962 the Supreme Court held,''^^ that, where a Hindu holding 
occupancy right under the Zamindari, died leaving no son behind 
him, daughter could succeed to him though with limited interest. 
Supreme Court was not always bent to favour the woman. In 
1966, on the question whether widow is a karta of joint family. The 
apex court held, since coparcenership is an essential condition for 
the membership of Hindu joint family and a widow is not a 
coparcener, so she could not be a karta of joint family.^^^ At another 
'^' Ujagar Singh v Mdt. Jeo AIR (1959) SC 1041. 
'^ ^ Sunka Villi Suranna and others v Goli Sarhisajue and others (1962) 3. SCR 653; AIR (1962) SC 342. 
' " Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P. v Seth Govind Ram Sugar Mills AIR (1966) SC 24. 
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occasion, on the question wlietlier widow acquiring property under 
the Act, could claim partition, Supreme Court^ '^^  did not give full 
effect to the statutory conferment upon the widow, of the same right 
of claiming partition as a male owner. 
In 1968, the Supreme Court had to consider the question, 
whether after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
the widow got rights of full ownership and could alienate the 
properties without the consent of the male member of the family. It 
was held,^^^ that she had become full owner, by virtue of the 
provision of section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. At another place the 
Supreme Court had, the task of interpretation of the scope of clause 
(D) of Sec 8 of the Hindu Law of Women's Right Act (Mysore Act No. 
X of 1933). In this instant case the apex court had widely interpreted 
the scope of said section. The Supreme Court held that this section 
cannot be narrowly interpreted as giving a right, to only those 
females, who happen to be related to one or the other of the last two 
male coparcener, and the expression, mother, would include a step 
mother and step grand mother also, where the step grand mother 
was a sole surviving heir, she was made entitled to share in the joint 
family property.^^^ 
On the issue of a possession of a widow as trespasser, in 1970 
Supreme Court held, that before any property could be said to be 
possess by a Hindu female as required in Sec. 14(1) of the Act two 
things were necessary to be considered. 
'-'' Satrughan Isser v Sabijpari AIR (1967) SC 272. 
'-^  Sukh Ram and another v Gauri Shankar and another AIR (1968) SC 365. 
' " Nagindra Prasad and others v Kemponan Jamma AIR (1968) SC 209. 
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(I) She must had a right to the possession of that property 
(II) She must have been in possession of that property either 
actually or constructively.^^'' 
In y\]a\ Pal v Dal Consolidation,^^^ the Supreme Court 
interpreted the word'possession' in wider sense that the term 
possession is co-extensive with the ownership. But in Dindayal and 
other V Raja Ram,^^^ Supreme Court on the issue of trespasser had, 
held that she could not be held, to acquire any right under the Act, 
where she had possessed property as a trespasser. 
During the Third decade of Independence 
The attitude of the judiciary was not much changed in this 
period and the mix attitude remained constant. Wherever the issue 
was not in direct conflict with the express provision of the law, the 
court always had tried to favour the females. 
In Sasanka v Amij,a^^° the question before the court was, 
whether an apostate widow or daughter in law could claim the 
benefit of the Act of 1937? The answer was in negative because the 
benefit was only to Hindu female when she converted to another 
faith, she was not a Hindu, so the benefit of the provisions of the Act, 
could not be given to such a woman. Sec. 26 of Hindu Succession 
Act made the position clear. But in another case of a Christian 
' " Mangal v Rathno (1967) SC; Mahesh v Raj Kumari (1996) SC 869. 
'-^1996)SC 146. 
'-' AIR (1970) SCi019, Sec Ram Pakhi v Amar Singh 1983, P&H 156; Sumcr Chandra v Sardha Ram 
(1991) P&H 103. 
"''AlR(1974)78,Cal. W.N. 1011. 
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female who married with a Hindu male under the Special Marriage 
Act, 1872, was consider to be entitled to a share as a predeceased 
son's widow, from the property of her father in law as an heir. It 
seemed that the apex court favoured the females where there was a 
little chance or capacity to interpret the provision to empower the 
female in economic sphere. 
In Tulassamma v Sesha Redday,^^^ The Supreme Court, had 
recognized, that Sec. 14(1) must receive 'most expansive 
interpretation'. The facts of this most important case, in which the 
Supreme Court had propounded so many principles which are as 
follows:-
The husband of Tulassamma, Venkata Sesha Reddy died, leaving 
behind Tulassamma as his widow in the state of jointness with his 
stepbrother, V. Sesha Reddy. Tulassamma, filed a petition for 
maintenance which was passed as an exparte decree. A settlement 
took place out of the court under which, Tulassamma was allotted 
the disputed property as a limited interest only. Tulassamma 
remained in possession of the property till the passing of the Hindu 
Succession Act of 1956. By two-registered deed, Tulassmrna leased 
out some of the properties, which was challenged, on the basis that 
her interest would not be enlarged into an absolute interest, under 
sec. 14(2) of the Act of 1956. The Munsif Court accepted it. Then 
Tulassamma went to District Court, who reversed the findings of the 
trial court and held that sub sec (2) of Sec. 14 had no application 
because the compromise was an instrument in the recognition of a 
' ' ' AIR (1977) SC 194. See also Vajiya v Thakarbhai AIR (1979) SC 993. 
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pre-exising right. In second appeal the High Court of Andhra 
Pradesh upheld the decision of trial court. At last in Supreme Court 
P. N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta and S.M. Fazale Ali JJ reached at the 
conclusions that -
• Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty 
formality. It is a tangible right against the property which 
is recognized by the Shastric Law. 
• Sec. 14(1) and the explanation attached with it should be 
given, widest possible meaning, in favour of female, to 
achieve the object of the Act of 1956, which is to abridge 
the stringent provisions, against proprietry rights, which 
were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual 
tutelage. 
• The nature of the sub. Sec.(2) of Sec. 14 is as an 
exception to sub Sec. (1). This proviso should not be 
construed in a manner so as to destroy the very purpose 
of the Act. 
• Sec. 14(2) applies to instrument, decree, awards, gift 
etc., which creates a new right, or interest in favour of 
female, where the instrument only confirm the pre-
existing right it has no application. 
• The use of express words in the explanation to Sec. 14(1) 
that 'property acquired by a Hindu female' at partition; or 
in lieu of maintnance' or 'arrears of maintenance' etc. 
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clearly makes sub. Sec. (2) inapplicable to these 
categories of property. 
• The expression "possessed by" should be given a broad 
meaning and wide connotation which includes the actual 
as well as constructive possession and symbolic 
possession. Judiciary also leaned towards this attitude 
from the beginning.^^^ But this widest interpretation could 
not by any way extended to such an extent as to include 
the trespasser.""^^ 
• The words " restricted estate" used in Sec. 14(2) are 
wider than limited as indicated in Sec 14(1) and they 
include not only limited interest but also any other kind of 
limitation that may be placed on transferee (female). 
Applying the principles enunciated to the facts of the present 
case the judges find -
• that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant 
Tulsamma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified 
by the court. 
• that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the 
properties and there was a clear restriction prohibiting 
her from alienating the properties. 
lU Kotlumswami v Vccravva AIR (1959) SC 577, Radlia Raiii v Hanuman Prasad AIR (1966) & 216; 
Mangal Singh v Ratno AIR (1974); Kuldip Singh v Surain Singh (1968) SC D, 881; Badri Prasad v 
Kanso Devi AIR (1970) SC 1963 etc. 
' " Dindayal and others v Raja Ram AIR (1970) SC 1019. 
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• that despite these restrictions she continued to be in 
possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 
1956 came into force and 
• that the alienations which she had made in1960 and 1961 
were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the 
properties. 
It was therefore, clear that the compromise by which the 
properties were allotted to the appellant Tulsamma, in lieu of her 
maintenance, were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance, 
which was a pre-existing right and therefore, the case of the 
appellant would be taken out of the ambit of Section 14(2) and would 
fall squarely with in Section 14(1) read with the explanation there to. 
It is a landmark judgement of the court. 
It is submitted, that the Supreme Court has misconceptualised, 
sub section (2) of Section, 14 as a proviso of the first sub section 
because both the clauses have different purposes. It is further 
submitted that the language of the proviso is wide enough and does 
not bar its application to the preexisting rights of the widow. 
Another thing which draw the attention is, that Supreme Court 
in considering the words 'possessed by' takes the meaning 'the state 
of owning' or 'tiaving in one's tiand' or power which is not relevant 
because the legislature deliberately avoid to use the words 'owned 
by' in place of possessed by' in Section 14(1) of the Act of 1956. 
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Since the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there has been 
influx of cases each year under Sec. 14 and generally courts are liberal in 
favour of women, upholding the decision of Tulasamma case. 
During the Fourth decade of Independence 
It can not be said that the role of judiciary is not creative and pro 
woman. As it can not deviate from the express provisions of the codified 
law like previous decade there is not much improvement in this decade 
also and the cases are decided with the mixed reaction, some in favour 
and some in against but the majority of the cases are decided in favour 
than against. 
In Dipo V Wassan Singh''' the property, inherited from paternal 
ancestor, is an ancestrol property, as regards the male issue of the 
propositus. But if a person inheriting such property has no son, son's 
son or son's son in existence, at the time when he inherits the 
property, he holds the property as absolute owner there of. In this 
instant case, the last male holder of the property had no male issue 
and no surviving member of a joint family, who could take the 
property by survivorship The court held it, that the sister of last male 
holder has preferential right against collaterals. 
In Shambhu Chandra Shukia v Thakur Ladle R. Chandra,'^'^ the 
question before the court was whether the widow can transfer her 
shebaitship right by a will? Justice Per Mukharji, said, "that 
^^* (1983) 3 s e c 376-378; AIR (1983) SC 846. 
' ' ' (1985) 2 s e c 524, 533; AIR (1983) SC 905; See also Ram Ratan v Bajrani Lai (1978) 3 SCC 236; K.K. 
Ganguli v Paiina Bciiciji (1974) 2 SCC 563. 
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shebaitship is a property which is heritable. The right of a female to 
succeed to the religious office of shebaitship is already recognized 
by the Act of 1937. Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 
enlarge the limited right of a Hindu female to the absolute right, and 
there is no bar against alienation, which was imposed by the 
founder. 
Amar Singh v Asstt. Director of Consolidation,^^^ in this case 
the nature of right and interest of a Hindu widow in her deceased 
husband's estate vesting in her was recognized. 
During the fifth decade of Independence 
In this decade the judiciary had passed some very significant ruling. 
As to favour female, it has extended the ambit of section, 14 even to 
include the wife of bigamous marriage as wife. In this decade the 
International provisions were also taken into consideration and tried to 
implement. 
In Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri Swaminath Swami,'^^^ a 
very significant judgement was given by the court because it had not 
only recognized the absolute ownership of females, over certain 
properties but also discussed various International Conventions as. 
The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and other constitutional 
provisions to emphasize the concept of equality of gender. In 
'•^ '' (1988) 4 s e c 143, 146, AIR (1988) SC 2020. 
' " AIR (1996) SC 1697; See also Nazar Singh v Jagjit Kaur AIR (1996) SC 855; Vijay Singh v Dy. 
Director Consolidation AIR (1996) SC 146, Laxmappa v Batawa K.T. Chavdi AIR (1996) SC 3439. 
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Raghubir Singh v Gulab Singh,''^^ Supreme Court has reaffirmed and 
reiterated the females limited estate into absolute one. 
In the case of Beni Bai v Raghubir Prasad,'^^^ an interesting 
question came before the apex court whether under Hindu Law the 
term 'wife' includes the third wife or not? As in Hindu law no bigamy 
is permitted so the third marriage is void, then the question arose 
that the benefits given to wife could be given to the third wife also ? 
The facts of the case were that the third wife in favour of her 
daughter executed a will. The Supreme Court held, that to read a 
'female Hindu' as only wife was totally misconceived. It is apparant 
that the attitude of the judiciary towards females was generally 
lenient and pro-women. 
In Naresh Kumari v Shashi Lal,^^^ the court held that if the 
widow had relinquished her right, through the sale deed, her limited 
interest would not ripen in the absolute ownership or where she 
herself had surrendered,'"''^ her share, in favour of her only son, the 
benefit of section 14 of the Act of 1956, could not be given to her. 
Here though the decision was not pro women but according to law. 
In Velamuri Venkata Sevaprasad v Kothuri Venlosteshwra,^"^^ 
the Supreme Court, on the point of the remarriage of the widow, 
gave, another significant judgement, 1856 says that the widow on 
remarriage. Section 2 of Hindu Widows Remarriage Act would be 
'^ * AIR (1998) SC 2401; See also Lachho Devi v Balbhadra Rao (1998) AlHC 3696; Banarshidas v 
Madhav Rao AIR (1998) P&H 98. 
" 'AIR (1999) SCI 147. 
' ' ' " A I R (1999) SC 928. 
'^' D.V. Jagannathan v P.R. Sriniwasan (1999) AIHC 4444 Mad. 
'^ ^ AIR (2000) SC 434; See also Ram Sharan v Ujiyari (2000) AIHC 938, M.P.; Laltha Chungi AIR (2000) 
Gau. 96. 
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deemed to be dead. The facts of this case were that a widow 
remarried in 1953 prior to the Act of 1956 though her marriage was 
bigamous under the Madras Hindu Bigamy (Prevention and Divorce) 
Act, 1949 so void. The question before the court, was, whether such 
widow was entitled to inherit or not. The court held, that voidness of 
marriage could not be termed, as absolute nullity and also could not 
be taken into consideration to aid the conferment of right. The court 
held, that she was not entitled to inherit. Here the judiciary did not 
allow to take undue advantage of the Act of 1949 of Madras and 
applied the clear provisions of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act. 
The Current Position 
In Palchuri Hanumayamma v Tadikamalla Koltingham'^'^^ such a 
situation had emerged which was unforeseen by the legislature. As a 
result of enlarging the widow's limited estate the original intent.of the 
testator to give equal benefit to the third branch of his family, had 
been nullified. In this case by a registered will the appellant, 
maternal grand father provided that his wife R "shall enjoy all my 
movable and immovable properties till her death," without making 
allocations. After the death of R each of these three daughters were 
to be given clearly identified share in the property. In 1944, one of 
the three daughters, the mother of the appellant, died. The appellant, 
till her marriage, lived with her grand mother R. In 1955, R with a 
partition deed had transferred the shares of the two surviving 
daughters, according to the will and kept the share of the deceased 
"^(2001)8 800 552. 
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daughter with her. In 1966, R by a gift deed had transferred that 
share to one of her surviving daughter and she herself died in 1977. 
The appellant challenged the gift deed which was dismissed by 
the trial court and High Court, when the case had come before the 
Supreme Court it was held that till 1956 R had no absolute right over 
the property as this right is given by the Act of 1956 and the partition 
deed was made in 1955 according to the intention of the testator. 
After the Act of 1956, the share,which was retained by the widow,get 
enlarged into absolute one. So the gift deed was valid. It is submitted 
that though the case was decided according to the provisions of the 
Act of 1956, but it was not according to equity, justice and good 
conscience because the daughter of the pre-deceased daughter had 
not get the share of her mother. 
In Muthusami v Angammal,^'^'^ the father in law of the widow 
made a settlement deed, with the help of Panchayat for her 
maintenance, during his lifetime. In 1974, she executed a sale deed, 
which was challenged. That property was inherited by father in law 
through the husband of the widow. The issue in this case was that 
the widow's pre-existing right exists in the husband's property and 
not against the property of her father in law and the deed was made 
by intervention of Panchayat. The Supreme Court held, that the case 
was covered by Sec. 14(1). Though for time being she was not in 
actual physical possession of the land, but she was in the legal 
possession, as she never parted with the right of maintenance. So 
the sale deed was valid. 
'"'' AIR (2002) SC 1279; See also Yamanappa Dudappa Marve v Yelluba AIR (2003) Kant. 396. 
274 
Chapter -V 
In Gulabrao Blawant Rao Shinde v C. Balwant Rao Shinde,^"^^ 
the Supreme Court has corrected, the grave injustice done by the 
High Court of Bombay. In this case the deceased has contracted two 
marriages and have children from both the wives. The second 
marriage was contracted after the death of first wife. The children of 
the first wife filed a suit, for recovery of their share, in the property 
left by their father, which was in the possession of second wife. The 
plea was taken, by the children of the second wife, that the property 
was in lieu of maintenance of second wife and she also had 
possession over it, which had ripen into an absolute ownership, by 
virtue of the provision of Sec. 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
The High Court, held in favour of second wife. On appeal Supreme 
Court saved the interest of the aggrieved, by holding that there was 
no proof that the deceased has given the property to the second wife 
in lieu of maintenance and the disputed property was also an 
ancestral property from which the children of first wife could not be 
divested, by giving the benefit of Sec. 14(1) to the second wife. The 
object of Sec. 14(1) is to remove the restrictions, placed by the old 
Hindu law, on the full enjoyment of the property of a female, but not 
at all, at the cost of injustice with others. 
In Jose V Ramakrishnan Nair Radhakrishnan,'^'^^ the Kerala 
High Court has considered the two expression "Hindu female" and "in 
any ottier manner wtiatsoever" of Sec. 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 
1956. The question before the court for consideration was, whether 
the limited interest of a daughter, would get enlarged to full right 
'•" AIR (2003) SC 167 (from Bom.) See also Anup Kai:r v Anoop Singh Grewal AIR (2003) P&H 241. 
" ' A I R (2004) Ker. 16. 
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after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when a 
male Hindu following Mitakashra law died, before the said Act? This 
question was answered in affirmative a decade ago by K.P.B. Marar 
J in Velayudhan v IthavO^^ There could not be any distinction 
between the rights claimed by the widow and a daughter in respect 
of self-acquired property of a male Hindu. Section 14 uses the 
expression "female Hindu" to include daughter as well. To read 
'female Hindu' as only 'wife' is totally misconceived.^''" The Apex 
Court has given, a wider meaning to the expression, 'female Hindu' 
which includes not wife alone. '^^ ^ The court has given wider 
interpretation also to the expression '/n any other manner 
whatsoever". Section 14, has to be read with Section 4, which gives 
overriding effect of the Act, whatever property in the possession of 
the female Hindu whether it has been acquired by her self or in any 
other manner whatsoever shall be regarded^her absolute property. 
It is submitted that court has given a wise judgement to give 
every female Hindu, the benefit of Sec. 14 and thus fulfilled the 
intention of the legislature. Thus due regard has been given to the 
role and place of womanhood in the country on the basis of the 
prevailing socio-economic perspective. 
The conditions of the tribal woman after the independence of 
56 years is still a forlorn hope to achieve equality before law. The 
case of Madhu Kishwar v State of Bihar is a landmark decision in 
which they asked for loaf of equality, at least to get crumbs of 
' " (1994) 1 Ker. L.T. 617; AIR (1994) Ker. 267. 
'^ * Vidya v Nand Ram (2001) 10 SCC (2001) AIR SCW 2251. 
'^ "^  Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad v Kathuri Venakata Swaslu (2002) 2 SCC 139; AIR (2000) SC 434. 
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livelihood. In th/s case sections 7,8 and 76 of the Chota Nagpur 
Tenancy Act, 1908, was a challenged, as unconstitutional and 
discrin^iinatory, against females Under this Act the tribal wom<Jn are 
excluded from inheritance. Though as unmarried daughter had 
usufruct right in the property of her father, till marriage and widow 
has usufruct right till she got an issue. This case was brought before 
the Supreme Court that had directed the State government to take 
necessary steps. The State level Tribal Advisory Board suggested, 
that in case of right to inheritance to the tribal woman would result in 
elevation of land to non-tribal. On the order of the Supreme Court, 
the matter was reconsidered by the Bihar Tribal Council, which also 
gave the same opinion. Thus the discrimination only on the basis of 
sex still prevails and tribal woman have no right to inherit because 
the property would pass in the hand of other tribe. 
The decision rendered, by a majority of two against one, is 
regressive in the final analysis. Ramaswami J, was of the view that 
sections 7 and 8 of the Act,^^° are voilative of Art, 14 of the 
Constitution. He says that in every state, there are legislations 
prohibiting alienation of tribal lands \.o non-tribals. But the majority 
opinion of Punchhi and Kuldip JJ was though conservative, but took 
a cautious approach by giving limited relief to females. The exclusive 
right of male succession under the provision of sections 7 & 8 has to 
remain suspended so long as the right of livelihood of the female 
descendants of the last male holder remains valid and in vogue. 
''° The Chota Nagpur Tennacy Act, 1908. 
277 
Chapter-V 
In 2005, some very interesting questions were raised before 
different Higii Courts of India relating to the issue of inheritance 
In Brijendra Pratap Singh v Prem Lata Singh,^^^ a settlement 
deed between two brothers was, that on the death of either of the 
parties the male lineal descendants of that party alone will succeed 
how so low ever to the exclusion of all female heirs. It was 
challenged, on the basis that It will amount legislating new law of 
inheritance, which was at variance of Hindu law of Succession Act of 
1956. Though, in Hindu law, it is permissible to gift or to will in favour 
of son or grandson the whole property, excluding all female heirs. 
But in this instant case, there was no will or gift, they merely laid 
down an abstract rule of succession, which was against law. 
A Hindu cannot create the line of succession qua a settlement, 
because it will amount to legislating a new law, which is not 
permissible. The daughters and widow also have the right to inherit 
the property. This deed cannot be treated as a will or gift under 
which the Hindu can make a will in favour of his son or grandson, to 
the exclusion of daughter or granddaughter. 
In L.H. Vidyapoornam v L.H. Premavathy,^^^ a Hindu male died, 
leaving behind three daughters, three sons and a widow. The 
intestate had left self-acquired property, over which the plaintiff had 
no possession, so it was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to file the suit. The court held, that it would be presumed that the 
' " AIR (200.S) All 113. 
I5MIR (2005) Mad. 193. 
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plaintiff liad been, in possession of the said property as notionally 
partition among them t>ll the actual partition took place. It was very 
complicated case in which by a fraudulent will the rights of the 
daughters in the property of their father was tried to extinguish, but 
by minute observation the court had prevented the gross in justice to 
be done. 
In another, very latest case of 2005 Raw K\rih'\ Shetty v 
Jagathpata Shetty,^^^ the benefit of section 6-A. which is inserted by 
Karnataka Amendement Act 1994,''^'' was claimed by daughter. The 
facts of the case were that one Raju Shetty died leaving behind two 
sons and two daughters. The property was divided among them, 
according to the provisions of section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 
1956. But one of the daughter claimed that she was unmarried at the 
time of the death of her father, so she must be given the benefit of 
section 6-A of Hindu Succession Act of 1956. In absence of any 
proof that she was unmarried, at that time, the court had not 
accepted her claim. It is submitted that though judiciary generally 
bent towards female right but in the absence of material proof it is 
bound to do justice with males. 
Very recently, the Supreme Court has to construe a very 
different question whether the wife of a murderer be considered as 
the widow under section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ? 
There is a provision under section 25 of the Act of 1956 that the 
murderer be deemed as the predeceased. So whether she is entitled 
' " A I R (2005) Kant. 194. 
'^ '' By the provision of the Section 6-A an unmarried daughter be considered as a coparcener and is entitled 
to equal share to his brother. 
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to inherit tiie property as the widow? it was pleaded by lawyers of 
the widow. In Vallikannu v R. Singaperumal,^^^ the above-mentioned 
question was raised. The facts of the case were as such. His only 
son murdered one, Ramasami. There was no other survivor of 
Ramasami as his wife was already divorced and remarried. Under 
the provision of section 25 read with section 27 of Hindu Succession 
Act, 1956, the murderer who was the only son should be deemed to 
have predeceased, so not entitled to succeed the estate of his 
father. The wife of the son claimed that she was alone entitled to 
all the properties. Then question was, whether the wife of a 
disqualified son who succeeds through the husband could be entitled 
to succeed the property? The answer of this question was given far 
back before the passing of the Act of 1956, by the Privy Council in 
negative, on the basis of equity, justice and good conscience in 
Kenchava Kon Sanyellappa Hosmani & Anr v. Girimallappa 
Channappa/'^^ 
The Supreme Court, in the instant case referring the judgement 
of Privy Council of the above-mentioned case, has explained to the 
objects and reasons for enacting section 25 as -
"A murderer, even if not disqualified under old Hindu law from 
succeeding to the estate of the person whom he has murdered, is so 
disqualified upon principles of justice, equity and good conscience. 
The murderer is not to be regarded, as the stock of a fresh line of 
descent but should be regarded, as non-existent when the 
' " A I R (2005) SC 2588. 
' " A I R (1924) PC 209. 
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succession opens." The Supreme Court held that the wife of the son 
cannot lay a claim to the property of her father in law. 
In Priyamvada Devi Biria v Madhu Prasad Birla,''^^ a novel 
question very recently in 2006 came before the Calcutta High Court 
for consideration. What Is caveat-able interest? The second question 
was, whether the sister of the husband was entitled to inherit, being 
a class II heir, if there was no class I heir? 
In answering the first question that what is caveat-able 
interest? The court has said that the existence of real interest or 
even bare possibility of real interest in estate of deceased, is said to 
be the caveat-able interest. 
Now come to the second question the court held that where a 
lady dying intestate without having any class I heir of her own or of 
her husband, the estate would devolve on sisters of her husband 
who were class II heirs and after them on their^ heirshusbands and 
sons etc. 
Implementation of the NewfAmendmentjAct of 2005 
Recently a case has been decided by the Kerala High Court 
regarding the impact of the amendment in Section 23. In S. Narayan 
V Meenal<sfii (AIR 2006 Ker. 143) the question before the court is -
whether omission of section 23 of the Hindu Succession Act by the 
Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 would have any impact on 
a suit for partition or appeal there from pending on the date of the 
commencement of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. ? 
' " AIR (2006) Cal. 6 (Jan.) 
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The facts of the present case are one Ramaji died leaving 
behind her four daughters and a son. Afer the death of Ramaji one of 
her daughter who is the plaintiff of the suit, obtained purchase 
certificate from the Land Tribunal in her name. The other sisters 
released their fractional shares in favour of the plaintiff. Thus the 
plaintiff claimed 4/5 shares and contended that the defendant has 
only 1/5 share. 
The defendant contended that the property does not belong to 
Ramaji but to her husband and before the commencement of the 
Hindu Succession Act ,1956 all sisters were married, therefore they 
are not entitled to any share in the property. The lower courts found 
that the property belonged to Ramaji the mother of plaintiff and 
defendant. Therefore on her death the property devolved on her 
children. During the pendency of the suit the son died. Before the 
case was decided by the court the Hindu Succession Amendment 
Act^2005 was passed. The other questions decided by the court in 
this case are -
• whether a suit for partition at the instance of a daughter 
could be defeated by invoking Section 23 of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956 by the legal representative of a 
deceased son of the intestate ? 
whether section 23 would be applicable in a case where 
the deceased intestate has left behind him only one male 
issue and whether it is necessary that there must be 
more than one male issues to invoke section 23? 
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• whether the protection in favour of the male heir under 
section 23 of the Act of 1956 would be available if he 
inducts a third party in the dwelling house or any portion 
thereof? 
Though these entire questions are dealt in this case but after 
the passing of the Amendment of 2005 these questions have lost 
their significance because of the omission section 23 of Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. Therefore there is no need to discuss what 
are the answers of these questions. 
Now come to the first question, about which the court held that 
the effect of such omission would be retroactive The Hindu 
Succession Amendment Act, 2005 was enacted on the basis of the 
174 report of Law Commission. The representation made by the 
various women's organization was considered by the Law 
Commission. Even at, the time when the Hindu Succession 
Amendment Act, 1956 was enacted, women's organizations has 
voiced the grievance. Though the 1956 Act made commendable 
improvements in reads into the erstwhile Hindu system of 
inheritance. But still the gender discrimination against women was 
not fully done away by the Act, 1956. Still the gender discrimination 
against women was not fully done away by the (amendment) Act of 
2005. Since Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was not 
changed so it sWW creates great anomalies. 
In this instant case the son die during the pendency of the 
case. Now the question arises whether the legal heir of the deceased 
has any right to resist partition under the provision of section 23 of 
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the Act, 1956 ox whether it is a transferable or heritable right? It is a 
settled law that the right of male heirs to resist the partition is 
personal to him. It is neither transferable nor heritable therefore it is 
available only till their death. Thus it can not be said that cessation 
of such personal right during the pendency of a suit for partition 
would not entitle the female heir to claim partition taking note of 
subsequent events, if the contention that the state of affairs as on 
the date of the suit alone would be relevant, is to accepted, then it 
would have the effect of indirectly holding that the personal right of 
the male heir to resist partition could be continued by his legal 
representatives. Therefore whenever the personal right of a male 
heir under section 23 comes to an end the right of the female heir to 
claim partition cannot be defeated. In other words a defeasible right 
of a male heir would got defeated the moment his personal right 
ceases. Such personal right of the male heir has been taken away by 
the omission of section 23 of the Act of 1956 by the Amendment Act 
of 2005. The effect of such omission would be retrospective. 
It is submitted that the Kerala High Court has taken a diligent 
steps for the implementation of the new Act of 2005 and tries to give 
flesh and breath to the Act. 
On the basis of above discussion, it can be concluded, that in 
the field of woman's property right, the judiciary has played a very 
creative role. The rights of Hindu female to property passes through 
a long channel of judicial activism and now reached at its peak by 
giving the daughter equal rights of inheritance. The legislature just 
given a skeleton and judiciary will give the flesh, blood and soul to 
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that enactment. It is not important that how much enactment has 
been passed for the empowerment of woman but it is more important 
that how they are implemented. 
Christian Law 
in some countries, there are special courts for family matters, 
set up in pursuit of religious, political or social objectives. These 
include the Christians, Muslims, and Jewish ecclesiastical courts. In 
some other countries, there is also a fashion, to establish social 
courts, (another name of family courts) to deal with the legal 
problems, affecting families. In these courts, it is argued that judges 
should be given wide discretion in family cases. This seems to have 
been done in the family codes of Eastern Europe and the Peoples 
Republic of China, which are loosely constructed with statement of 
politics, legal principles and leave much leeway to the judges or 
conciliator. But against this contention, it is argued that such 
discretion would tend to turn tribunals into courts of morals, in which 
the personal views of judges could prevail, in the absence of 
applicable legal rules.^ ^® 
The Supreme Court of India, in Krishna Singh v Mathura,^^^ 
opined, that in process o; applying the personal law of the parties, 
the judges of the High Court, should not introduce their own concept 
of modernity. In view of Supreme Court the constitution maintained 
the position of personal law status quo. So far as the Christian law in 
India, is concerned their own laws governed the Christian before the 
"^ Encyclopedia Britanica Vol. V p. 82 (Family Law) 
'^ ^ AIR (1980) SC 707. 
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British period, as IViuslim rulers did not interfere, in the matter of 
personal law of any religious community. Similarly Hindus, Muslims, 
Sikhs, Christians and Parsis were the subject of their own personal 
'laws, especially with the matters relating to the family laws. 
In Pre-lndependence Period 
During the regime of Britishers in India, except Hindus and 
Muslims, all other classes of persons were made the subject of 
English Common Law. By the Act of 1781 only Hindus and Muslim's 
personal laws were reserved. The position of the application of 
common law to Christians, Parsis etc. was clarified by the Supreme 
Court^^° in 1844. In Gradiner v Fell,''^^ it was held by the court of 
Chancery in England that the descent of lands in the Mofassil of a 
British subject was governed by the common law. 
In fact the early British administrator had no conscious 
intention to deprive the people of various religion from the benefit of 
their own peculiar system of laws, but they have little acquaintance 
about them till the first judicial plan was introduced. 
Later on, the position was changed, and a provision was, 
therefore, made for applying customs of the country and the 'law of 
the defendant' to various classes of people. In Durand v Boilard,'^^^ 
the Calcutta Sadar Adalat decided a question of succession amongst 
the French in accordance with the French law. A question of a 
succession of the property of a Portuguese was held to be decide by 
'"" Ind. Dec. (O.S.) 1,92, 
'*' l.M.I.A. 299. 
162 5 Bcng. Sad. Rep. 176. 
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their own customs and usages.""^^ In Aviatick Ter Stephensons v 
Khaja Michael Aratoon,^^'' it was held that the inheritance of an 
American was governed by the American law. 
In case of Anglo-Indians, no law had been prescribed and their 
matters were decided on the basis of justice, equity and good 
conscience,""^^ These Anglo Indians were also governed by the 
principle of English law. 
In the leading case of Abraham v Abraham,^^^ Privy Council 
had made clear the position of native Christians.^®^ In this case the 
question, before the court, was whether the inheritance of these 
Anglo Indians be governed, by rules of old religion or there would be 
any other law applicable to these people? The facts of the case were 
that a Christian died, whose ancestors had been Hindu leaving 
behind an Anglo Indian wife and children. The question, before the 
court, was that the separate property of the deceased be the subject 
of which law? The Madras Adaiat held, that Hindu law of 
coparcenary is applicable but on appeal the Privy Council reversed 
the decision of Madras Adaiat. The Christians were not the subject of 
single law. The court had to decide the question of law applicable to 
a particular case in a particular circumstance that prolonged the 
litigation,^^^ and create a great chaos and dissatisfaction among the 
converts. 
' " Beng. Sad. Rep. 227. 
'^ ^ Beng. Sad. Rap. 9. 
' " Barlow V Orde 13M.I.A.227. 
'^M.M.l.A. 240. 
Native Christian are those whose ancestors are either Hindu or IVluslim and converted to Christianity 
'*' Jain M.P. : op cit, p. 455. 
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On the recommendation of first law commission tine English law 
was held to be applicable to all other than Hindus, Muslims and 
Parsis. To secure the forfeiture of property on a Hindu or Muslim 
converts into Christianity, the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850 
was passed. The Indian Succession Act of 1865 was passed 
amongst much hue and cry, which was the first piece of substantive 
law enacted for India.^^^ Under this Act limited property rights were 
given to the Christians, Parsis and Jews women to remove the 
traditional disabilities of married woman under the law of these 
religion. "The Married Women Right to Property Act, 1874 was 
passed. After that the Indian Succession Act, 1925 was passed 
which gave the women equal rights of inheritance as compared to 
their male counterpart. 
In Post Independence Period 
In post Independence India the courts were very liberal 
towards the women's property rights of females and adopted a 
progressive attitude in matter of gender justice. In Nepah Bela v Site 
Kanta,^^° the court held that a Christian who had converted from 
Hindu died leaving behind a Christian widow and a Hindu brother 
and sister. The inheritance, according to the court, between them 
would be as the half property would go to widow and the other half 
would be inherited by the Hindu brother and sister collectively. Both 
of them would be entitled to equal share. This decision seems to be 
biased against the Christian widow. 
'^'ibid. 
'™ 15 CWN 158; See also Benoy Kumar v Panchan (1956) Cal. 177. 
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But in 1964, in S/r/7 Christian v Mangamura,^'^ the Assam High 
Court made it clear that the Succession Act, 1925, did not concerned 
itself with the religion of the claimant. For succession although the 
religion of the deceased plays an important role and indeed it is 
almost the determining factor in the matter of applicability or 
otherwise of the rule of succession laid down in the Act to a 
particular case. This distinction in the nature of character of the 
re\eyar\\ estate depending upon the religion of the deceased owner 
runs through the Act. But stress was here laid in the matter of its 
devolution upon the religion of the heir or the inheritor and that the 
religion of the claimant as disguised from the religion of the 
deceased owner, was entirely irrelevant for the purpose. A Christian 
died intestate and his nearest heir being Hindu, inherited the estate 
of the deceased. 
Some times very contradictory opinion were given by the 
different High Courts as in Administrator General v Ananda Ctiari,'^^^ 
the Madras High Court held that where a Hindu married with a Hindu 
girl and afterwards converted to Christianity, where upon the Hindu 
wife refuses to live with him and renounces all claims to his estate. 
She was not entitled to her share as a widow. 
On the other hand in Smt. Sheptiali Ciietterji & others v Smt. 
Kamala Benerji,^''^ the Allahabad High Court interpret, the term 
'widow' as 'widows' and said that singular should include the plural. 
On the death of the husband both the widow and their lineal 
' " A I R (1964) Assam 59. 
' " 9 Mad. 466. 
' " A I R (1972) All 531. 
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descendants were, held entitle to inherit the property. In Rutland v 
Rutland,^^'^ the stepmother was not included with in the meaning of 
mother and she was also not kindered of the intestate, so she was 
not held entitled to inherit. 
Sometimes in favouring the female the courts unconsciously 
had done injustice with others for instance, in the case of Mathew 
Jacob V Selestine Jacob,^^^ The facts of the case were, that a 
Christian intestate Jacob Massey was survived by his one widow and 
five children. After the death of her first wife he remarried with 
another lady, from whom he had two children. He already had three 
children from his first wife. Selestine's widow claimed the whole 
property on the basis of an unregistered will executed by Jacob 
Massey. The validity of the will was challenged by the children of 
both wives on the basis of the exclusion of the natural heirs. But 
Usha Mehra J, upheld the validity of the will and stated that there 
was nothing unnatural in that will because the wishes of the testator 
were to protect the interest of his wife. The court relied in this case 
on the decision of Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Mukherji v Pan 
Chanam Benerji.'^^^ 
The Indian Succession Act, 1925 did not govern the State of 
Travancore and Cochin till, 1951, which was extended by the State 
laws Act of 1951. By this extension the Christian females of the state 
of Travancore and Cochin got the right to inherit the property equally 
"^2P. Wms.216. 
' " A I R (1995) SC 1684. 
176 AIR (1995) SC 1684. 
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with their brother. Before 1951, Travancore Christian Succession Act 
entitled the daughter's share to Rs. 5000/- only and she was not 
made entitled to inherit the father's land. 
Current Position 
In Land Board v Cyriac Thomas^ '^' a Christian died leaving behind 
two sons and four daughters who succeed equally. There was a provision 
under the Kerala Taluk Land Board that an individual cannot hold the 
property excess of that the specified limit of the board. If he possesses 
more than, the specified limit, then he will have to surrender the excess 
property to the government. One of his sons has cross the specified limit 
so that board claimed for that. But the son took the plea that the excess 
land belonged to his sister and they have already executed sale deed of 
that land. The board argued that the sister was not entitled to inherit the 
land, under Travancore and Cochin Christian Succession Act. So the sale 
deed executed by the sister was not valid. The Supreme Court, in this case 
upheld the decision of the Mary Roy v State ofKerala,^^^ where it was held 
that the succession would be governed by the provision of Indian 
Succession Act, 1925, where the daughter has equal right and equal share 
to inherit and the Christian are no more the subject of Travancore and 
Cochin Christian Succession Act. 
Recently the court in the case of John Vallamattom v Union of 
India gives a very landmark judgement/''^ in this case the validity of 
Section, 118, of Indian Succession Act of 1925, was challenged as 
' " A I R (2002) SC 3161. 
'^ ^(1986) 2 sec 209. 
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violative of Article, 14 of the Constitution. Under this section 118 a 
restriction is imposed on a person who has no children or wife or 
father or other heirs but has heirs of distant kindered, not to 
bequeath his property to charitable purposes. The court held this 
provision unconstitutional and against the faith of Christian religious 
belief. The court further observed that to give property for charitable 
purposes is an integral part of their religion. 
In relation to female generally the courts lean towards the 
females and in favouring the females, sometime a grave injustice 
has been caused to other legal heirs. Like all other laws, the laws 
applied to Indian Christians also passed through a channel of judicial 
system with some sweet and sore experiences. 
Parsi Law 
Pre Independence Period 
The process of the development of religious laws started with 
the Warren Hasting's Plan of 1772. The notable feature of the plan 
was that the suits regarding inheritance, marriage and other religious 
institution, would be dealt with their respective personal laws of 
Hindus and Muslims. But all other categories of persons like Parsis, 
Christians and Jews would be the subject of English law. This point 
was clarified by the Calcutta Supreme Court in J.S. Jebb v C. 
Lefevere & Caroline,^^° where it applied the English law to the 
property of a Portuguese descendant situated in Calcutta. The court 
pointed out that there were only three system of law which were 
'•'^  AIR (2003) SC 2902. 
'^ ° Ind. Dec (O.S.) 1.92 (Indian Legal History p. 417 Jain.) 
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administered English, Hindu & Muslim. In Jacob Joseph v Rowland 
Rowland,'^^'^and Emin v Emin,^^^ by a majority the court held that it 
had no jurisdiction to administer any other personal law except the 
Hindu & Muslim laws. Since the parties were not within the 
exception, the American inhabitant of Calcutta was dealt with English 
law. 
The question was again arisen in case of Musleah v Musleah^^^ 
regarding the application of the law with the Jew subject A cleavage 
of opinion arose in the court and this was illustrated rather forcefully. 
In those days of uncertainty, the difficulties of the administration of 
justice were that of the ascertainment of law. Justice Grant forcefully 
disagreed with the majority views and held that the Jewish law 
should be applied to the Jewish subject, But Peel C.J., agreeing with 
Seton J. held that the lands in question would "descend according to 
the course of the English law." Detailing the difficulties which the 
Supreme Court, would have to face if justice Grant's view was 
accepted, he said-
"...that it should decide one law for British subjects another for 
Europeans not of British origin. One law for American and another 
for Jews and another for Parsee ...all these must be admitted to be 
most grave inconveniences". 
The Privy Council ruled out in, 1856 that the English 
ecclesiastical law was not applicable to non-Christians.^"" The effect 
'*'Ind. Dec. (O.S.) 1,68(1818). 
'*- Ind. Dec. (O.S.) 1, 778; Sec also Sarkies v Pio.sonomoycc Dossec ILR 6 Cal. 794 (1818) 
'"ind. Dec. (O.S.) 1,894. 
'*'' Ardaseer Cursetjee v Perozebee 6 MIA 348. 
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of this ruling was that in the Presidency Towns, there was no forum 
and no law, to give relief to non-Christians (other than Hindu and 
Muslims) in personal cases like matrimonial and succession etc.^^^ 
Prior to 1837, the law applicable to the Parsis and their 
property was the subject of English Common law but with the 
passing of the Parsi Chattels Real Act of 1837, the Parsis of Bombay 
Presidency were relieved from the operation of the English law of 
primogeniture as regards immovable property but made them subject 
in all other cases of intestacy to the English Statute of Distribution, 
by which only 1/3 went to widow and the residue was divided equally 
amongst the children and their descendants.^^^ 
In 1838 Parsis made a request to the legislative council "for 
embracing the rights of inheritance and succession that are 
acl<nowiedged by the Parsi Nation."^^^ But nothing appears to have 
been done until 1855. In 1859, the Managing committee of Parsi law 
Association prepare a 'Draft Code of Inheritance, succession and 
other matters and presented to the Legislative Council. In 1861, a 
Commission was appointed who took evidence written and oral, as 
regards inheritance, and succession of the property between 
husband and wife, the Mofussil Parsis objected in toto, the right of 
females to inherit on the death of male Parsi and also objected to the 
right of married woman during covertures to hold or dispose of their 
separate property. These objection were overlooked and that the 
Parsis Intestate Succession Act, 1865, brought these changes that 
'"jainM.P. opcitp.419. 
"^ Indian Succession Act, 1925, p. 72. 
'"SeeSorabji Bangalies Parsis at (pp. 156-157) 
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the widow and the daughter of a Parsi dying intestate in Mofussil, 
first time got a share in the property.^®^ 
Till 1925, the Parsis were governed by the Parsis Intestate 
Succession Act of 1865. After the passing of the Act of 1925 all the 
controversies were resolved regarding the application of law to the 
Christians, Parsis and Jews subject. All other controversies and 
objections related to the female's property rights were also come lo 
an end. Now the judiciary had to interpret many provisions of the 
Acts relating to the right of Parsis females, which came before it from 
time to time. 
In Mancherji v Mithibai,^^^ the judiciary had interpreted the 
section 5 of the Indian Succession Act of 1925. In this case an 
intestate Parsi died leaving behind a widow, sons, daughters, 
children of predeceased son and widow of another predeceased son, 
who had died issueless and a posthumous daughter was afterward 
born, to the intestate. The share, of the widow of the predeceased, 
son who died issueless, was in question. The court held that the 
widow in question was entitled to one moiety of the share, which her 
husband would have taken if he survived the intestate and the other 
moiety of the share of the predeceased son, developed on the 
surviving issues of the intestate including the posthumous, daughter 
and the children of his other predeceased son. 
" ' 1 Bom. 349. 
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Post Independence Period 
A very typical case of Ersha v Jesbai,^^° came before the court, 
in which a father Ardeshir completely excluded his daughter, Jerbai 
and bequeathed whole property to his brother, who predeceased 
Ardeshir, so the bequest to him was lapsed. It was held that Ardeshir 
having died intestate, the estate must go according to law and Jerbai 
was entitled to the property. 
Shapoorji v Rustamji,'^^^one Ratnabai died leaving behind a 
husband, two sons and two daughters, under the will of the father of 
Ratnabai, she had a vested remainder after the death of the life 
tenant of her mother but Ratnabai pre deceased her mother. The 
question, in this case, was whether the English law of freehold 
property in remainder applied to Parsis? It was held that the case 
would be governed by the Pars! law in which there was no distinction 
between an estate in possession and an estate in remainder. 
In the case of Hirjibhoy v Barjorji,'^^^ a Parsi intestate died 
leaving behind the lineal descendants in different degrees of 
predeceased brothers and sisters. The question was whether the 
estate was to be divided as per capita or per-stripes in equal share 
subject to the rule that each male is to take double the share of each 
female of same degree? It was held that the first division should be 
into three shares, two shares to each of the two brothers and one 
"° 4 Bom. 537. 
' " 5 Bom. L.R. 252. 
"^ 22 Bom. 909. 
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share to sister and the shares should be sub divided among their 
respective lineal descendant.^^^ 
Current Position 
It is quite evident from the above discussion that after the 
passing of Indian Succession Act, of 1925 the Parsis are governed 
by the statutory laws which are quite in consonance with their 
religion. Major Changes were brought in the Parsi intestate, 
succession by the amendments made in 1991, in the provisions of 
the Indian Succession Act of 1925. These changes are so drastic 
that there is no need to further change and no apparent 
discrimination left over. The only discrimination, which one can say, 
is in the share of parents, which is half of each child, but if we see it 
in relation to the liabilities it is also not discriminatory. 
"^ See also Gibson v Fisher L.R. 5 Eg. 51. 
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SUMMATION AND SUGGESTIONS 
The domestic life, religion and right to property are intimately related 
to each other. Property always plays a vital role in the life style of 
individual, family, community and country. In general utility, the property 
allows of successive improvement in the distress. 
The property rights of women have been the subject of repeated 
controversy till the dawn of civilization and still a talk of the day. The 
existence and perpetuation of gender discrimination is a blot and slur on 
the modern welfare states. It generates much heat and passion due to the 
changing concept of gender equality and the impact of the West. 
Underlying the laws to ameliorate various forms of social injustice towards 
women, is an assumption, described by Moore and followed by Roscoe 
Pound as the 'social engineering.' 
The transition, from the rigorous law of ancient period to the liberal 
and humane laws of the modern era, took several centuries. A macro-
change in the composition of the infrastructure, is the need of the time. The 
distressing aspect of our Indian legal system is, however, that the women's 
right to inherit like their other rights, is also observed more often in breach 
than in practice. Though the legislation is an important medium for 
imparting the normative values to the society but the mere existence of 
such mechanism even if it is not frequently restored, may not be proved 
profitable. 
Besides legislative enactments, the resurgence of woman's 
liberation movement has been accompanied by endeavours at research, 
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opinion polls, social surveys and empirical studies which have helped to 
analyze the nature and mode of economic discrimination and to suggest 
remedies for their eradication. As a result of growing awareness of the 
seriousness of the problem of domestic violence, the legislators, jurists, 
social scientists, reformers and activist for the women cause have come 
fonward to alleviate the misery of females in their own way. But the 
women's emancipation is still a distant dream. The reason may be that the 
laws are not changed sufficiently and radically but only conventionally and 
superficially. The laws, themselves seemingly neutral, are crypto-partial [o 
men. It is one step forward and two steps backward for the common 
woman. There are contradictory forces at work. On one hand there is the 
progressive thinking, which has led to decentralization of powers, which is 
pro-woman, but on the other there is economic onslaught, which is 
detriment to woman. 
A complex interplay of biological, social, cultural and economic 
factors put the women and even young girls at greater risk of getting 
infected with HIV virus. A growing number of women are infected with HIV 
all over the world. An overwhelming reason for this trend is economic 
dependence of female over their male counterpart. 
In a diverse country like India gender issues and their solutions can 
never have a set model, what may work for woman in Kerala, may not 
work for a women in Punjab. It is also a matter of regret and surprising that 
the local legal culture has also not spared the women from divesting her 
property right and they are still in continuation even after the 
independence. So many anti-woman customs not only still prevails in 
different parts of India but they are protected by the judiciary. Throughout 
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the course of discussion there is no reported case from Muslim females 
relating to the unequal share of inheritance. The cases, which are found, 
mostly relate to the customs and claims were made to follow the Islamic 
law. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that the Islamic law 
is not discriminatory towards woman. Islam is the leader of feminist 
movement. Equality is a comparative concept. The equality can be judged 
by taking into account all the conditions and circumstances of two different 
social systems, their setups in which the question of inequality arises. It 
must be recognized that every difference in treatment between individuals 
under the law will not necessarily results in inequality and as well that 
identical treatment may frequently result in serious inequality. 
Under Islam equality does not mean literal and mathematical 
equality. Here equality means a judicious treatment with the males and 
females keeping in view their social, biological and economic 
responsibilities. This may be appreciated when we compare the Islamic 
system with other systems of law. 
In Islam, there is a peculiar Islamic attitude towards women, which is 
based on a characteristic appreciation of values and a full cognizance of 
the nature of the reality. According to Dr. Alexis Carrol, the noted 
physiologist, ''between the two sexes there are irrevocable difference, and 
it is imperative to take them into account in constructing the civilized 
world." The Islamic attitude which is based on the appreciation of 
difference is only partly reflected in the terms of rights that it accords to 
women in the society. At the very outset it has been asserted in 
unequivocal terms that the Quranic evaluation of womanhood can be 
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judged, only by the place assign to woman in the whole scheme of things 
in the cosmic order as such. First and foremost the Quran emphasizes the 
'musawah' means equality. As biologically, psychologically and 
metaphysically the role of the two sexes are totally different, so their 
privileges and liabilities are also different. 
The principle of double share for male is, no doubt, extremely 
equitable since the female heirs receive additionally 'maher" and 
maintenance from the husband. The male member is also liable for 
maintenance of his wife and family. The female heir has no such 
responsibility. The creation of property rights generates the rights and 
duties. Such as those, who receive something, make compensation or 
restitution. The law of property and obligation are categorized of the same 
kind. They assign one another. Rights are creature of events. Haji 
Sulaiman Abdullah in a discussion on woman, family & law, spoke of the 
need, 'to look at the whole system before deciding whether a particular law 
is discriminatory or not: The complexity of interpreting what is 
discriminatory and the notion perspective, 'looking at the whole system' 
and the gender assumptions, that drive it, are tied to the question of how 
abstract goal of equality may be achieved in practice. 
The above principle can be easily understood by the following 
example - a Muslim dies leaving behind a daughter and a son and property 
of worth Rs. 60,000/-. Son would take 40,000 and the daughter's share 
would be Rs. 20,000/-. Suppose the daughter was already married and 
received 10,000 as her 'mehar' from her husband. So the total share of the 
daughter became Rs. 30,000/-. The son got married later and paid Rs. 
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10,000/- as a 'mehar' to his wife what left to him was 30,000/- only with, 
other responsibility of maintaining the family. 
It is just an Instance. If one sees the Islam with a deep Insiyhl, he will 
realize that it is the daughter who is ultimate beneficiary though apparently 
the discrimination is visible. 
The son of Abu Ahuja having expressed his ignorance and doubt of 
the cause why a female the weakest and most helpless of the two, enjoyed 
only half the portion of inheritance bestowed upon a male. Imam Jafar 
Sadiq replied that a female is excused from performance of many duties 
imposed by law upon a male such as service in the holy wars, 
maintenance and support of relations and payment of expiatory fines and 
dowers etc., for this reason her share of inheritance has been justly limited 
to half the portion of male. 
Any attempt to assign a woman artificially a legal status, not 
congruent with her social custom or law, will disturb the equilibrium 
between the two spheres. It will create tension and usually will not stand 
the test of reality. To resort to the Islamic law of inheritance if woman were 
to be given their due share according to Islamic law, there would be no 
question of a woman becoming destitute. It is a matter of regret that the 
majority of Muslim women fail to get their due share of inheritance from 
their deceased father or husband as stipulated by Islamic law. If they could 
do so, this would be more than enough to meet any type of contingencies. 
The traditional Hindu Law conferred rights of inheritance only on 
sons because it was considered that they saved the parents from hell. 
Human society has always been kaleidoscopic to meet the ever-changing 
needs of the time; the law should also be changing with the gradual growth 
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of property law. With the lapse of time some property rights were conferred 
to women, though they were discriminatory as they were only entitled to 
hold the Stridhan. The journey of women's property right which started by 
the Hindu Law of Inheritance Act, 1928, continued till 2005 (the Hindu 
Succession Amendment Act 2005). By the Act of 1937, significant changes 
were brought in the law of partition, alienation of property, inheritance and 
adoption. 
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has been considered the 
piecemeal legislation because it gives daughters equal right to the son 
though only in separate property and self acquired property. During the 
debate on the Hindu Code Bill the majority of legislators had took a stand 
against daughter to be a coparcener. Perhaps it was the most shameful 
moment in the history of parliamentary proceedings. The Act of 1956, too 
had many drawbacks and created a lot of chaos in the practice. There 
were plethora of cases in which different courts have different verdicts. 
Sometimes they leaned towards women, but sometimes the literal 
interpretation has been given. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 
1956, deals with the devolution of interest of a male Hindu in coparcenary 
property and recognized the rule of devolution by survivorship among the 
member of the coparcenary and talked about the notional partition which is 
the most bewildering provision of the Act. The net result of section 6 was 
that only male members were entitled to have a share in the coparcenary 
property, completely excluding daughters. This was a blatant 
discrimination with daughters caused by the principles of notional partition. 
Thus the Act of 1956, though brought considerable changes in the 
rights of female yet it did not go the whole hog in making daughter. 
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member of the coparcenary with equal rights of partition and survivorship. 
Section 14, which is the most controversial section and created a great 
hardship in its implementation, is still prevailed. No changes has been 
introduced even by the new amendment of 2005. The words used in 
section 14 always remain in controversy in regard of its interpretation. The 
decisions given by the courts are, so divergent thai instead ol resolving Ihu 
controversies increase it. Generally the court leaned towards the favouring 
of women. 
Sections 23 and 24 were also very discriminatory because under 
section 23 only qualified right of partition was given to the female heirs in 
the dwelling house. She was not entitled to claim partition unless the male 
members choose to partition even there was only one male member, at 
this situation there was very little chance to choose partition. Sections 23 & 
24 are now omitted clearing the way for the daughter to have share in 
dwelling house, to demand partition and the widow to retain property even 
after remarriage. The bar imposed upon widow by the section 24 not to 
inherit the property of her previous husband on remarriage, has now been 
removed by the new amendment by omitting section 24. Despite of this 
amendment there are still two sets of rules governing the intestate 
succession of male and female separately. 
By this amendment some new heirs have also been added and most 
of them are related though female's or females themselves. So it is 
expected that the recent steps, taken by the Parliament to ameliorate the 
position of women, will restore the glory of Hinduism and will take the 
country to a high pedestal, globally. 
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Christian and Parsi laws, which governed Indian Christian and Parsi, 
are no more a religious law, in their strict sense. Because there is no 
spiritual sanctity or religious values behind them. The Christian and Parsi's 
intestate succession is governed by the pre-independence Act of 1925. 
Inspite of the policy of non-interference in the matters of personal affairs by 
Britishers, so many statutes had been passed to govern the Indian 
Christian and Parsis. The British rule in India began on the legislative front 
with the Indian Succession Act, 1865 and Parsi Succession Act, 1865, 
which were based upon English Law in letter and spirit. 
The Christian intesate succession is governed till now which did the 
provisions of the Act of 1925 base on the Act, 1865. The Act of 1925, had 
been passed through a long list of amendments, which started just after 
one year of the passing of the Act in 1926 (The Indian Succession 
Amendment Act 1926, (37 of 1926), (40 of 1926), (18 of 1927), (14 of 
1928), (18 of 1929), (17 of 1937), (17 of 1939), (35 of 1949), (34 of 1957), 
(16 Of 1962),(51 of 1991) and latest in 2002 (26 of 2002). 
In the Act of 1925, there are two different sets of rules to regulate 
the movable and immovable property of a intestate Christian. The domicile 
of the propositus is the main factor to decide the law of which country be 
applied to govern the succession. Under the provision of the Indian 
Succession Act, 1925, there is no place for the English concept of marital 
property. There is no distinction between real and personal property. The 
heir-ship of a Christian intestate be decided by the consanguinity but 
husband and wife are the exceptions. The Christian law does not 
discriminate between the agnate and cognates, half and full blood, 
posthumous child and the child born in the lifetime of his father. The 
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remarkable feature of Indian Succession Act, 1925, relating to Christian is 
that the widower has the same right of inheritance as the widow. The only 
discrimination is with the mother of a Christian intestate who has no right of 
inheritance if there is any lineal descendant or even father. It means she is 
not entitled to inherit the property simultaneously with the father. She is 
only entitled to inherit the property if there is no lineal descendant and 
father. On the other hand if there is no lineal descendant, the father will 
inherit the whole property excluding all other heirs even the mother also. It 
is a gross discrimination with the Christian mother. 
The Parsi law of intestate Succession has passed through many 
revolutionary changes. The Parsis were much exploited in the British 
period since their succession was governed by the rules of common law. 
After a long struggle, the Parsi Succession Act of 1856 was passed. That 
too was much discriminatory towards women. But by this Act the widow 
and daughter were made the heirs for the first time. Before it they were 
entitled only for maintenance. Yet the mother and sister were not included 
in the list of heirs. Before the amendment of 1939, the son's share in 
agricultural land was four times more than daughter and two times more 
than widow. After amendment the son's share was made double of the 
daughter, by this amendment sister and mother were also introduced as 
heirs. The drastic changes were brought in the law of inheritance of Parsis 
by the amendment of 1991, which had abolished all sex based 
discrimination and made the female equal to the male in the field of 
inheritance. The only discriminatory share is seems io be of the parents 
which is half of each child but it can not be said as discriminatory because 
the parents have no responsibilities. 
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From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that not only the concept 
of women's property right is different but even the concept of women's 
property is also different in every legal system. As in Hindu law, it is termed 
as Stridhana or women's limited estate. In common law it is called the 
marital property, which is not prevalent in Indian Christian. In Muslims it is 
just a property whether related to male or female both have equal right to 
appropriate it. In Hindu and Common law the consequences and rights 
attached to the property of male and female were not the same. 
Succinctly, it is evident that whatever the reason may be, the 
inheritance rights of females are discriminatory in almost all system. The 
difference if any is only of the degree or form. Sometime these are justified 
in the name of religion and sometime to avoid social and economic 
problem as to restrain from the fragmentation or to escape the chaos in 
social order. Even the enacted laws also maintained difference or 
discrimination between male and female heirs. The customary law which 
are anti women still allowed to prevail, which totally excluded the women 
from inheritance. 
The comparative study has facilitated in understanding the real 
position of women, with regards to their succession rights and shares, in 
different legal system. Though the comparative process is adopted 
throughout the work, with critical analysis of different ideologies in theory 
and in practice, which helped in evaluating the status of women with 
regards to economic and social empowerment and the progress made in 
20**^  century. It has also enabled us to see some principles which are 
recognized in one system but not in other as the doctrine of covertures is 
recognized in Hindu and Christian law but not in Muslim law. The change 
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of the status of females from maidenhood to womanhood does not disturb 
her proprietary right in Islam. By the comparative chart, the real position of 
woman according to their status is visible even at a glance. 
Courts are generally treated as a warning agency, maintainer of 
legal order and trustee of law. As per record in a federal democracy, the 
record of Indian Judiciary is also not free from lapses and blemishes. From 
a number of decisions the revolutionary and surprising attitudes of the 
court is quite clear. The courts took a liberal and favourable verdict 
towards the women in the matter of succession. Ambivalence is the most 
characteristic trait of court's approach to religious and secular laws. It is 
also stimulating to note that in some cases the judiciary has held that a 
woman may be a Karta of Hindu joint family. But it is pity to note that few 
courts still hesitate to go against the written text. Burgeoning case laws, 
illuminating many dark spots of existing laws have been taken into account 
and many burning problems have been highlighted by the courts. However 
one thing can be said with the air of certainty that the courts in India have 
played an important role in developing equality oriented jurisprudence, 
which is obvious by the foregoing discussion of the case laws. Inspite of it 
Muslim's females are not benefited. 
More than anything else Muslim women's right is in jeopardy 
because of the attitudes and practices developed over the years through 
the customary based laws. Unfortunately the issue got involved in 
communal politics to such an extent that even public discourse on the 
subject is suspicious and inhibited. In such a context incremental reform, 
through judicial process though slow and uncertain, is still welcomed. 
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However, it is gratifying that the process towards the realization of 
an egalitarian pattern of man and woman relationship has begun. Hopes 
have been raised that there will be no discrimination in social, economic 
and political field in the foreseeable future. The new amendments of 2005 
in the law of sucession are an encouraging step to equalize and 
emancipate the Hindu females. It is a glaring fact and hard truth that the 
Islamic law as practiced today has taken a course contrary to the letter and 
spirit of Shariah therefore causing hardship and miseries to the Muslim 
woman. The sooner it is set right the better will flow to the society. Now the 
ball is in the court of judiciary and executive to implement the provision of 
new Hindu Succession (amendment) Act 2005 and Islamic law in its true 
spirit to make a gender-just society. 
Suggestions 
After discussing the available relevant materials on the subject, an 
earnest and modest attempt has been made to forward some suggestions 
though not exhaustive but may go a long way to ameliorate the cause of 
property rights of women. 
• In a literary backward country like India, the people 
(particularly women) are not awarded about their rights and 
duties. So far as the property rights are concerned the women 
do even not know their right of inheritance, provided under the 
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Moreover the drastic changes 
brought about by the amending Act of 2005, are not known to 
females. For this reason there is an immediate and urgent 
need to educate the woman about their new rights conferred 
by the abo\'e Act. It is hereby submitted that a special 
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programme should, to spread legal awareness among the 
woman, be run by the state machinery. Various women's 
organizations, NGOs and law students should take initiative to 
educate the women particularly those belonging to weaker or 
submerged groups living in slums and villages. The general 
legal literacy is a need of time for the females of all 
communities. 
• Some grass root steps should have to be taken to weed out 
the patriarchal biases. Participation of both men and women is 
equally important for the upliftment of woman. Today the need 
is to establish equilibrium between men and women, as 
regards to social, legal and traditional status in the existing 
society. It is a genetic reality that any attempt to assign women 
a low and artificial legal status wills not stand at the test of 
justice and fair play. 
• The law does not exist in vacuum and mere promulgation of 
legislations cannot provide the proper solution of the social 
problem unless it is effectively enforced. It is, therefore, 
suggested that there should be a number of law enforcing 
agencies and family crisis wings within the family welfare 
centers throughout the country. These institutions should be 
looked after either by the State Government or by the Central 
Government. 
• The feminist movement could be more effective and result 
oriented if men also came forward and joined hands with 
them. To make the society a better place to live, the family 
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problems should be solved within the four walls of home. For 
that there is a change in the attitudes of men towards the 
women at family, society, and state and at global level. It is 
very essential towards achieving the goal by changing the 
stereotype ideas of male domination. The need is to change 
the infrastructure of the society. 
• The proceedings of the courts are required to be expedious 
and time bound as the best laws would be rendered 
meaningless, particularly to issues relating to women, by an 
ineffective justice delivery system. Sometimes the delay in-
justice even frustrated the object of seeking of the justice. 
• The legislative steps is recently taken are appreciated and 
welcomed by the females and the right thinking peoples of 
men folk. But in this regard the women should act sensibly to 
reach their goal of attaining equality without disturbing the 
family bond and harmony. The transition of powers should be 
smooth and without any heart burning. 
• With all due respect to judiciary, it is submitted that our 
lawyers and judges are not very much conversant with the 
provisions of Islamic law. It is therefore suggested that the 
government should provide the statutory status to the Qazi 
Courts and empower them to handle minor cases of property 
disputes, succession and family strife's of the community etc. 
This will not only lessen the burden on courts but will also 
save the valuable time of the court and money of the litigants. 
These courts should not be considered as an attempt to create 
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a parallel judicial system, but just an agency to help our 
already overburdened courts. Creation of such courts are not 
new in this country, these courts are already working. In 
Madya Pradesh, almost every district has a Qazi Court. Such 
courts are also working in many cities of Maharashtra. Darul 
Uloom and Nadwatul-Ulema are the glaring examples of the 
success of such courts. 
• In cases of conflict between statutory law and personal law, 
reference should be made to a jury of experts in personal law 
as well as unbiased judges who would ensure speedy justice. 
• There must be a comprehensive codification of the entire 
Islamic law it is inevitable. In this the representation of the 
Ulemas of all schools should be taken. By this way there 
would be a uniform law for all Muslims throughout the India. 
Any delay in its exercise will be detrimental for the cause of 
Muslim women in the country because the applicability is not 
uniform what is applied to the woman of Kerala, is not applied 
to the woman in Jammu & Kashmir. 
• In case of agricultural land, the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari 
Abolition & Land Reform Act, 1950, has excluded all females 
except widow, from having any share in agricultural land. This 
is a blatant discrimination with the females. No empowerment 
of women could be possible unless they are made 
economically sound. Therefore in this era of women 
empowerment it is ripe time that a suitable amendment should 
be made in the land laws to entitle the females to have a share 
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in agricultural land also. It should be noted that some States 
like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala have already 
taken a positive steps in this direction. It is therefore 
suggested that certain amendments should be made in the 
Shariat Application Act, 1937 to extend its application to the 
agricultural land as in some States these have been taken 
relating to Hindu females. 
• Even after the attaining of 58 years of independence certain 
anti women customary laws still prevail in certain part of the 
Indian sub continent as in Jammu & Kashmir, the customs like 
'Khana-e-damadi' or 'pisar-e-parvarda' etc. In this direction the 
Government must take some grass root steps to eradicate 
these customs and ensure the implementation of the pro 
women Islamic law of inheritance for Muslims females. 
• To avoid the fragmentation the provision may be attached that 
if the females want to sale the property or their share in the 
agricultural land the family members should be given 
preference to buy it, provided that they give the best price. 
• The provisions of inheritance under different system of 
religions and statutory laws should be strictly enforced. In case 
of non-compliance of the decisions delivered by the court 
some sanctions must be provided in the law. In this patriarchal 
and male dominated society it is impossible for female to get 
justice without the provisions of sanctions/punishments 
particularly in the field of succession. 
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• There must be drastic changes in the infrastructure in all the 
three components of Government judiciary, executive and 
legislature. Females should be given lions share in all the 
above mention organs of the Government. Hundred of Kiran 
Bedi, who knows the agony of women-hood, should be 
employed to treat the cases passionately. 
• The provisions of Indian Succession Act, 1925 has done great 
injustice with the peoples of different religion specially with in 
the field of inheritance, for instance, the parties who have 
contracted their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 
1954, will be subjected by the Indian Succession Act, 1925, in 
the matter of succession even if both the parties are of same 
religion and it will extent to their future generation also. But 
after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, this provision is not 
applicable in case of Hindus where both the parties are of 
same religion. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, will govern 
them. The above provision is highly discriminatory, it is, 
therefore, submitted that a uniform law applicable to all 
irrespective of their religion, should be enacted and applied. 
• Discrimination against women is so pervasive that it 
sometimes surface on a bare perusal of the law, made by the 
legislature itself, as in the case of a Christian mother under the 
provision of section 42 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. So 
necessary amendment should be made in the above said Act 
enabling the Christian mother to inherit the property 
simultaneously with the father. It will be more appropriate and 
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more humanitarian to entitle the parents to inherit the property 
even in the presence of linea! descendants, to save them from 
any social distress. 
We can conclude the discussion with the words of K.T. Bhashayam 
Ayenger, "We must give back their rig!its and privileges in law of which we 
have robbed them. The injustices perpetrated on them in the name of law, 
should be remedied and as we honoured them in life, so must we make 
equal them to us in law then the law shall be the real reflections of life." 
Desired result can be achieved only when men and women both join hand 
for the amelioration of economic independence of women. As the fight for 
gender equality is not a fight against men, it is a fight against traditions that 
have chained them, a fight against attitudes that are ingrained in the 
society, a fight against system and a fight against proverbial Lakshman 
Rekha.' 
Nothing in the world is perfect and no word is the last word in any 
branch of knowledge least of all in the study and practice of law. 
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